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It is not substantially the same as any that I have submitted, or, is being concurrently 
submitted for a degree or diploma or other qualification at the University of Cambridge or 
any other University or similar institution except as declared in the Preface and specified in 
the text. I further state that no substantial part of my thesis has already been submitted, or, is 
being concurrently submitted for any such degree, diploma or other qualification at the 
University of Cambridge or any other University or similar institution except as declared in 
the Preface and specified in the text.  
 
It does not exceed the prescribed word limit for the relevant Degree Committee 	 	
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A B S T R A C T  
 
Name: Joanna Hester McCunn 
 
Title: The interpretation of deeds and wills at common law, c. 1536–c. 1616 
 
This thesis explores common law approaches to the interpretation of deeds and wills between 
approximately 1536 and 1616. It identifies the rules and principles used by lawyers to 
understand these documents, and explores the wider forces that influenced their development. 
The methodology of the thesis is primarily doctrinal: it is principally based on an examination 
of contemporary law reports and legal treatises. 
 
The thesis demonstrates that common lawyers in this period took a sophisticated approach to 
the interpretation of private documents. They sought to strike a balance between interpreting 
a document according to the apparent meaning of its words, and interpreting it according to 
the writer’s presumed intentions. They also appealed to reason to guide them to the right 
meaning of a document. Different kinds of document required different approaches to 
interpretation, due to differences in the nature and purpose of each.  
 
This thesis argues that common lawyers’ attitudes to interpretation underwent a significant 
shift during the second half of the sixteenth century. Lawyers became less willing to prioritise 
a writer’s intention over the proper signification of the words he had used. They developed a 
preference for resolving cases in accordance with rules and maxims, or with the authority of 
previously-judged cases. They also became more anxious about the possibility of 
misinterpreting a document. These changes took place in a wider context of concern about 
legal documents, litigation, and legal uncertainty. 
 
The interpretation of private documents was an issue that both lawyers and laymen cared 
about fiercely in this period. This thesis will improve our understanding of legal interpretation 
in a foundational period for its development in England. 	  
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S T Y L E  
 
Law French has been translated. The original language has not been included, purely for 
reasons of space. Where they are available, I have generally adopted the standard English 
translations of case reports, as printed in the English Reports. If I felt that this translation did 
not accurately reflect the original French text, I provided my own translation and explained 
this in a footnote. Where Latin is used, both the original language and a translation have been 
provided.  
 
Spelling and capitalisation have been modernised throughout, and punctuation has 
occasionally been altered to clarify meaning. Where there were multiple contemporary 
spellings of a name, I have chosen a representative spelling for the avoidance of confusion.  
 
This thesis will use male pronouns when referring to parties in general, since, although 
women were involved in lawsuits on interpretation, the overwhelming majority of parties at 
the time were male.  
 
I have followed the dates given in individual case reports. The year has been taken to start in 
January. 
 
The following abbreviations have been used: 
 
D  Digest of Justinian 
I  Institutes of Justinian 
VI  Liber sextus 
 
BL Add MS British Library Additional Manuscript 
CUL MS Cambridge University Library Manuscript 
Hunt MS El Huntington Library Ellesmere Manuscript 
Hunt RB Huntington Library Rare Book 	  
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1 .  I N T R O D U C T I O N  
 
1.1. Legal interpretation in early modern England 
 
In the mid-sixteenth century, writes Ian Maclean, Europe experienced an ‘interpretation 
boom.’1 Works on interpretation abounded in all disciplines, as scholars became newly 
interested in methods for the understanding of texts.2 The common law was no exception. L. 
W. Abbott observes that ‘from the evidence of both printed and manuscript reports it is clear 
that the courts were increasingly concerned with interpreting legal instruments of all types.’3 
Questions of interpretation began to dominate the law reports, and the first English literature 
on the subject was produced.4 ‘Interpretation as a conscious activity was being systematised’ 
by common lawyers.5 
 
Previous generations of English lawyers had not been very interested in enunciating theories 
of interpretation. As Samuel Thorne puts it, they saw the reading of documents as ‘an 
incidental, routine function of judicial administration.’6 When lawyers invoked principles of 
interpretation, they did so haphazardly and without discussing the intellectual foundations 
that underlay them. John Baker characterises medieval judges as referees, whose role was 
simply to apply rules in a predictable way, and who were not expected to explain the reasons 
for their decisions.7  
 
By the Tudor period, however, attitudes were shifting. A combination of procedural changes 
and the influence of humanist scholarship meant that judges were increasingly likely to 
																																																								
1 Ian Maclean, Interpretation and Meaning in the Renaissance: The Case of Law (Cambridge University Press 
1992) 35. 
2 ibid 1. 
3 LW Abbott, Law Reporting in England 1485-1585 (Athlone Press 1973) 229. 
4 See, for example, Samuel Thorne (ed), A Discourse upon the Exposicion & Understandinge of Statutes 
(Huntington Library 1942), composed c. 1565 and probably attributable to William Fleetwood (see 1.2. 
below); and A Treatise Concerning Statutes, or Acts of Parliament, and the Exposition Thereof (Tonson 1677), 
composed c. 1575 and usually attributed to Christopher Hatton. 
5 Abbott (n 3) 229. 
6 Thorne in Thorne (n 4) 3. 
7 JH Baker, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, Vol VI: 1483-1558 (Oxford University Press 2003) 
49. For a different view, see Paul Brand, ‘Judges and Juries in Civil Litigation in Later Medieval 
England: The Millon Thesis Reconsidered’ (2016) 37 Journal of Legal History 1. 
2 
provide reasoned decisions and to discuss matters of legal principle in banc.8 The common 
law was also becoming more text-based, as its oral tradition diminished in significance.9 
Judges engaged in more rigorous textual analysis, critically probing all kinds of legal 
documents.10 As Lorna Hutson explains, common lawyers were developing ‘a more intricate 
and sophisticated sense of the textual form of argument.’11 With the advent of printing, they 
were also prepared to place more reliance on authoritative copies of written materials.12 It is 
thus unsurprising that lawyers of this period sought to establish the rules and principles by 
which legal texts were to be interpreted. 
 
In the existing academic literature, this transformation is primarily discussed in relation to 
statutes. In the fourteenth century, to interpret a statute meant to perpetrate a kind of fraud 
upon it.13 By the sixteenth century, however, the courts were eagerly developing sophisticated 
theories of statutory interpretation. 14  Commentators have linked this new focus on 
interpretation to the changing role of legislation. Before the sixteenth century, statutes were 
regarded as ‘essentially isolated rulings’15 that could be extended, restricted or disregarded as 
a judge saw fit.16 During the reign of Henry VIII, however, legislation grew in both scope and 
sophistication. The size of the statute book almost doubled, and Parliament began to involve 
itself in new areas of life as it sought to effect sweeping social change.17 Statutes were 
increasingly detailed and precise,18 and this affected their treatment by the courts.19 Newly 
																																																								
8 Baker, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, Vol VI: 1483-1558 (n 7) 385. 
9 See generally Richard J Ross, ‘The Memorial Culture of Early Modern English Lawyers: Memory as 
Keyword, Shelter, and Identity, 1560-1640’ (1998) 10 Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 229. 
10 Baker, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, Vol VI: 1483-1558 (n 7) 28. 
11 Lorna Hutson, ‘Rhetoric and Early Modern Law’ in Michael J Macdonald (ed), The Oxford Handbook 
of Rhetorical Studies (Oxford University Press 2017) 400. 
12 See generally Ian Williams, ‘“He Creditted More the Printed Booke”: Common Lawyers’ 
Receptivity to Print, c. 1550-1640’ (2010) 28 Law and History Review 39. 
13 TFT Plucknett, Statutes & Their Interpretation in the First Half of the Fourteenth Century (Cambridge 
University Press 1922) 164. 
14 See generally Georg Behrens, ‘Equity in the Commentaries of Edmund Plowden’ (1999) 20 Journal 
of Legal History 25. 
15 Thorne (n 4) 9. 
16 ibid 5. 
17 Baker, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, Vol VI: 1483-1558 (n 7) 35–37. 
18 ibid 37. 
19 See, for example, Foxe v Collyer (1581) Hunt MS El 482 f149, f149. 
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bold assertions of Parliamentary sovereignty prompted lawyers to develop theories of statutory 
interpretation based on the intentions of the legislator.20 
 
However, statutes were not the only kind of legal document that grew in significance during 
the early modern period. C. W. Brooks writes that ‘late sixteenth and seventeenth century 
English people of almost every social station lived in a matrix of parchment and paper.’21 
Even a humble farmer would be a party to deeds relating to his land, and would make a will 
at the end of his life.22 Private legal instruments were just as ubiquitous in the lives of the 
illiterate lower classes as they were in the affairs of the country’s elites.23 As Amy Erickson 
observes, ‘legal “evidences”—deeds, bonds, charters, contracts, wills and so forth—were 
enormously important at all levels of early modern society.’24 This was also recognised by 
contemporary lawyers. Edward Coke noted that the interpretation of deeds concerned ‘every 
man (for, for the most part, every man is a lessor or a lessee).’25 He later reiterated that the 
courts’ approach to the construction of leases was ‘necessary to be known of all men, because 
in effect it concerneth all.’26 
 
Cases involving private documents like deeds and wills accounted for a vast and growing 
proportion of the common law’s routine business. Cases that required the courts to construe 
deeds and wills were orders of magnitude more common than those involving statutory 
interpretation.27 Such documents also lay behind significant legal controversies. Following the 
Statute of Uses 1536, it had become possible to make new kinds of conveyance, the rules 
governing which remained unsettled.28 The common law was also getting to grips with its new 
jurisdiction over wills of freehold land, conferred by the Statute of Wills 1540.29 Given 
lawyers’ sophisticated treatment of statutes, it would be surprising if they were not also 
developing principles for the interpretation of these private instruments. 
 																																																								
20 Baker, The Oxford History of the Laws of England, Vol VI: 1483-1558 (n 7) 37. 
21 CW Brooks, RH Helmholz and P Stein, Notaries Public in England since the Reformation (Society of Public 
Notaries 1991) 84. 
22 ibid. 
23 ibid. 
24 Amy Louise Erickson, Women and Property in Early Modern England (Routledge 1995) 22. 
25 Walker’s Case (1587) 3 Co Rep 22a, 23a. 
26 The Reports of Sir Edward Coke, vol V (Joseph Butterworth and Son 1826) 10 Co Rep xvii. 
27 See 1.2. below. 
28 27 Hen VIII c. 10. 
29 32 Hen VIII c. 1. 
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Yet we know startlingly little about the courts’ approach to the interpretation of these 
documents. Most studies of this period have focused on statutory interpretation, with 
comparatively little interest in the courts’ treatment of other written instruments.30 Stefan 
Vogenauer’s history of statutory interpretation in England and continental Europe includes, 
by way of background, some material on other kinds of interpretation. However, this is 
necessarily brief, and the discussion of deeds in the English courts is confined to two 
paragraphs.31 Ian Maclean has examined the law of interpretation in the contemporary ius 
commune, but his short treatment of English law relates only to statutory interpretation32 and to 
defamation.33 
 
Other writers have dealt with the interpretation of deeds when surveying the history of 
English contract law. Alexander Lüderitz’s comparative study of contractual interpretation 
makes occasional reference to sixteenth-century English authorities.34 Most authors give the 
impression that interpretation in this period simply involved enforcing the letter of the deed, 
perhaps injected with a dose of common sense. A. W. B. Simpson, for example, remarks that 
conditions of bonds were to be ‘strictly construed,’ though, if their meaning was ‘not plain,’ 
they would be interpreted ‘sensibly.’35 Similarly, David Ibbetson explains that formal written 
contracts were interpreted ‘literally,’ with the application of ‘straightforward canons of 
construction.’36 However, neither gives much detail as to how this worked in practice. 
Meanwhile, many modern writers on contractual interpretation simply adopt John Henry 
Wigmore’s view that the law of this period was marked by ‘a stiff and superstitious 
formalism.’37  																																																								
30 See, for example, Thorne (n 4); Behrens (n 14); Stefan Vogenauer, Die Auslegung von Gesetzen in England 
Und Auf Dem Kontinent: Eine Vergleichende Untersuchung Der Rechtsprechung Und Ihrer Historischen Grundlagen 
(Mohr Siebeck 2001); Ian Williams, ‘Dr Bonham’s Case and “Void” Statutes’ (2006) 27 Journal of 
Legal History 111. 
31 Vogenauer (n 30) 778–779. 
32 Maclean (n 1) 181–6. 
33 ibid 193–202. 
34 See, for example, Alexander Lüderitz, Auslegung von Rechtsgeschäften: Vergleichende Untersuchung Anglo-
Amerikanischen Und Deutschen Rechts (C F Müller 1966) 66, 71, 248, 344. 
35 AWB Simpson, A History of the Common Law of Contract: The Rise of the Action of Assumpsit (1st edn, Oxford 
University Press 1975) 102. 
36 David Ibbetson, ‘Fault and Absolute Liability in Pre-Modern Contract Law’ (1997) 18 Journal of 
Legal History 1, 7; see also David Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (Oxford 
University Press 2002) 84. 
37 John Henry Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence, vol 9 (3rd edn, Little, Brown 
and Company 1940) 187. See, for example, Gerard McMeel, The Construction of Contracts (2nd edn, 
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As for other forms of interpretation, M. C. Mirow’s work on early modern wills emphasises 
the importance of the testator’s intentions for the construction of wills in both the canon law 
and the common law. Again, however, the treatment is cursory.38 Ian Williams’ PhD thesis on 
English legal reasoning touches on many topics relevant to the law of interpretation, which is, 
however, expressly excluded from its ambit.39  
 
There is therefore no work that fully deals with the history of the interpretation of private 
documents in English law. This thesis is a step towards filling that gap. Its aim is to explore 
common law approaches to the interpretation of deeds and wills between approximately 1536 
and 1616. It identifies the techniques used by lawyers to understand these documents, and 
examines the wider forces that influenced their development.  
 
The period chosen is one in which interest in interpretation was particularly intense. It opens 
after the enactment of the Statute of Uses and closes at the end of Coke’s judicial career. 
However, material that pre-dates and post-dates this period will also be used. Where it is 
helpful to contextualise legal developments, reference will be made to the medieval law. 
Similarly, later treatises will be referred to where they provide useful information about the 
law of our period.  
 
The thesis will focus on the common law, and will not examine the practice of the courts of 
equity or the ecclesiastical courts. This is, firstly, for reasons of space, and, secondly, because 
the existing records were considered unlikely to contain much in the way of relevant legal 
reasoning. The thesis will not cover the interpretation of statutes, on which much has already 
been written. Nor will it deal with letters patent. To a significant extent, patents were 
interpreted in a similar way to other deeds. However, special rules did apply to them: for 
example, they were to be construed most favourably for the Crown unless expressed to be 
made ‘de gratia speciali, ex certa scientia, et mero motu’ [of special grace, from certain knowledge, 
																																																																																																																																																														
Oxford University Press 2011) 22; Jonathan Morgan, Contract Law Minimalism (Cambridge University 
Press 2013) 229; Sir Kim Lewison, The Interpretation of Contracts (6th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2015) 6; 
Donald Nicholls, ‘My Kingdom for a Horse: The Meaning of Words’ (2005) 121 Law Quarterly 
Review 577, 577. 
38 MC Mirow, ‘Last Wills and Testaments in England 1500-1800’ (1993) 60 Recueils de la Societe Jean 
Bodin pour l’Histoire Comparative des Institutions 47, 69–70. 
39 Ian Williams, ‘English Legal Reasoning and Legal Culture, c.1528-c.1642’ (PhD thesis, University of 
Cambridge 2008) 2. 
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and mere motion]. 40  This was because of the monarch’s position as the head of the 
commonwealth.41 The construction of patents therefore raises questions about the authority of 
the Crown which are beyond the scope of this thesis.42 
 
This study will make three main contributions to the scholarship on early modern English 
law. Firstly, it will improve our understanding of legal interpretation in this period. As 
Williams has noted, discussions of statutory interpretation inevitably involve implicit questions 
of constitutional theory.43 If statutory interpretation is examined in isolation, it may be 
difficult to separate general theories of legal interpretation from particular theories about, for 
example, the authority of Parliament. This thesis should therefore help to distinguish ideas 
that were specific to statutes from those that were common to all kinds of interpretation. 
Furthermore, cases on private documents were much more common than those on statutes, 
and involved a wider cross-section of society. By extending our study of interpretation to these 
cases, we are likely to achieve a more realistic picture of the law than by focusing on the 
comparatively scanty and unrepresentative statutory material. 
 
Secondly, this thesis will contribute to our understanding of formal agreements in a critical 
period for the development of English contract law. Assessments of the intellectual state of 
contract theory before around 1800 have been scathing.44 Simpson notes the ‘dearth of 
treatises dealing with the subject,’ lamenting that contract law ‘lacked a literature.’45 Indeed, 
according to James Gordley, ‘before the 19th century… the common lawyers did not think in 
terms of contracts, let alone in terms of contract theory. They thought in terms of writs or 
forms of action.’46 But they also thought in terms of documents. It is true that only the 
developed action of assumpsit ultimately provided the basis for a general theory of contract 
																																																								
40 See, for example, The Case of Mines (1568) Plow 310, 330–2; The Dean and Chapter of Chester’s Case (1578) 
Hunt MS El 482 f32, f34; Whites v Farmor (1599) BL Add MS 25203 f56, f56v. 
41 (1493) YB Trin 8 Hen VII pl 1, f1a-5a, f1a; Arthur Legat’s Case (1612) 10 Co Rep 109a, 113b. 
42 The validity of letters patent was also controlled by statute: 31 Hen VIII c. 13, s 16; 34 & 35 Hen 
VIII c. 21, s 3. 
43 Williams, ‘English Legal Reasoning and Legal Culture, c.1528-c.1642’ (n 39) 2. 
44 See, for example, JH Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (4th edn, Oxford University Press 
2007) 350; Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (n 36) 221. 
45 AWB Simpson, ‘Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law’ (1975) 91 Law Quarterly Review 
247, 250. 
46 James Gordley, Foundations of Private Law (Oxford University Press 2006) 288. 
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law in England.47 However, this thesis will demonstrate that early modern lawyers took a 
unified and sophisticated approach to the interpretation of all kinds of deed, including formal 
contracts. As Peter Tiersma explains, ‘any valid approach to interpretation must be informed 
by a theory regarding the nature of the text that it purports to interpret.’48 By examining 
principles of interpretation, we can gain an insight into lawyers’ understanding of formal 
contracts. Indeed, this period is ripe for such an analysis. Brooks observes that  
 
the expansion of the legal profession in the sixteenth century, the sheer ubiquity 
of written agreements, and the deep interest in jurisprudential matters which was 
inherent in the humanist movement, meant that the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries produced some of the most fascinating statements about the nature of 
legal instruments which exist in the English tradition.49 
 
Formal contracts were a major subset of these legal instruments. Furthermore, since this thesis 
examines the interpretation of both deeds and wills, it will be possible to compare the 
interpretation of formal contracts made by deed with that of other documents. Thus, any 
distinctive attitudes to written contracts in this period can be drawn out. 
 
Finally, an awareness of interpretive issues is a necessary basis for understanding many 
controversies in the land law of this period. Cases like Colthirst v Bejushin (1550),50 Newis v Lark 
(1571),51 Shelley’s Case (1581)52 and Mildmay’s Case (1605)53 are often discussed as though they 
only laid down substantive rules of land law.54 In fact, much of the argument in all of these 
cases concerned questions of interpretation. If we focus only on the substantive rules, we will 
miss the centrality of interpretation to these disputes, and take a distorted view of their 
significance. 																																																								
47 Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (n 36) 146. Many of the basic principles of this 
theory had their roots in the medieval law: ibid 135. 
48 Peter M Tiersma, Parchment, Paper, Pixels: Law and the Technologies of Communication (University of 
Chicago Press 2010) 46. 
49 Brooks, Helmholz and Stein (n 21) 85. 
50 Colthirst v Bejushin (1550) Plow 21. 
51 Newis et Ux v Lark and Hunt (1571) Plow 403. 
52 Shelley’s Case (1581) 1 Co Rep 93b. 
53 Sir Anthony Mildmay’s Case (1605) 6 Co Rep 40a. 
54 See, for example, AWB Simpson, A History of the Land Law (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 1986) 208–41; 
Lloyd Bonfield, Marriage Settlements, 1601-1740: The Adoption of the Strict Settlement (Cambridge University 
Press 1983) 11–45. 
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The law of interpretation was a common thread running through all kinds of legal debate in 
this period. By following it, we will better understand the development of the surrounding law, 
whether that concerned the role of Parliament, the nature of contracts, or the powers of 
settlors over their land. Even when these issues were not discussed explicitly, lawyers’ attitudes 
to interpretation may indicate where their wider intellectual commitments lay.55 The law of 
interpretation, then, provides us with a new lens through which to view the key issues of the 
early modern common law. 	
1.2. Sources 
 
The methodology of this thesis is primarily doctrinal. It seeks to identify the rules and 
principles used by common lawyers to interpret private documents in court. As a result, it is 
principally based on contemporary law reports. These include the reports now available in 
print in the English Reports series, and two Selden Society volumes of James Dyer’s reports.56 
They also include a set of manuscript reports attributed to Thomas Coventry, which 
supplements the printed material.57 Coventry’s reports, as the best of the late sixteenth-
century manuscript reports,58 were deemed to be the most likely to include significant material 
on interpretation. Use has also been made of manuscripts of Thomas Egerton’s draft legal 
arguments.59 Perhaps uniquely, these provide direct evidence of arguments prepared for 
court, unfiltered through the intermediary of a reporter. 
 
It is certainly clear that our reporters had very different interests in, and perspectives on, the 
law of interpretation. To some extent, this simply reflects their different styles of reporting. 
Coke and Edmund Plowden, for example, offered full summaries of the argument in each 
case, while reporters like Dyer recorded only the essential issues.60 As a result, Plowden’s 
report of a case like Newis v Lark runs to 18 pages as printed in the English Reports, covering 																																																								
55 Brooks argues that questions about the nature of legal documents were closely connected to questions 
about political theory in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: Brooks, Helmholz and Stein (n 21) 90. 
56 JH Baker (ed), Reports from the Lost Notebooks of Sir James Dyer, vol 1 (Selden Society 1993); JH Baker 
(ed), Reports from the Lost Notebooks of Sir James Dyer, vol 2 (Selden Society 1994). 
57 See generally David Ibbetson, ‘Coventry’s Reports’ (1995) 16 Journal of Legal History 281. A 
number of collections of reports in this series have been identified. This thesis has used BL Add MS 
25203, the most complete collection. It covers Michaelmas term 1598 to Hilary term 1604: ibid 282.  
58 Ibbetson, ‘Coventry’s Reports’ (n 57) 281. 
59 Hunt MS El 482. 
60 Abbott (n 3) 90. 
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the pleadings; the arguments of counsel on a wide variety of interpretive issues; the 
conclusions and reasoning of the judges on these questions of law; and the abatement of the 
writ upon the discovery of a fault in its wording.61 Dyer’s report of the same case is much 
shorter. His first note covers the facts and some discussion of the pleadings,62 while his second 
reports the judgment of the court in a few terse paragraphs.63 William Bendlowes’ report, 
meanwhile, takes up a page in the English Reports, and records only the facts of the case and 
the abatement of the writ.64 
 
Each reporter also had his own ideas about what were the most important points to note in an 
interpretation case. Plowden, for example, was fond of ‘grandiloquent’ pronouncements about 
the nature of equity.65 Dyer enjoyed somewhat pedantic discussions of grammar and often 
made notes about the meaning and history of words.66 Coke, meanwhile, had a tendency to 
distill everything into pithy Latin maxims, either borrowed or of his own invention.67 The 
same case may therefore be presented very differently by each reporter. For example, 
Plowden’s report of Throckmerton v Tracy (1555) focused on the general principles discussed by 
the serjeants and judges, especially where they emphasised the importance of the parties’ 
intentions. Dyer, arguing for the plaintiff, warned that ‘to cavil about the propriety of words, 
when the intent of the parties appears, is not commendable.’ 68  Plowden reported that 
Saunders J gave similar advice,69 while Stanford J ‘laid down three rules for the understanding 
of deeds.’70 Broke CJ, meanwhile, strongly rejected their arguments.71 Dyer, however, began 
his report of the same case by introducing his own views.72 He did not record such high-flown 
statements of principle as Plowden, but devoted a greater proportion of his report to the 
																																																								
61 Newis et Ux v Lark and Hunt (n 51). 
62 Newis v Larke (1571) Dyer’s Notebooks (109 SS) 198. 
63 Newis v Larke (1571) Dyer’s Notebooks (110 SS) 235. 
64 News v Lark & Hunt (1570) Old Benloe 196. 
65 Sir Carleton Kemp Allen, Law in the Making (7th edn, Clarendon Press 1975) 453. 
66 Baker, Reports from the Lost Notebooks of Sir James Dyer, vol 1 (n 56) xxi. 
67 TFT Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (5th edn, Little, Brown and Company 1956) 283; 
Samuel Thorne, ‘Sir Edward Coke, 1552-1952’, Essays in English Legal History (Hambledon Press 1985) 
227. 
68 Throckmerton v Tracy (1555) Plow 145, 159. 
69 ibid 161. 
70 ibid 160. 
71 ibid 162. 
72 Throgmorton v Tracey (1555) Dyer 124b, 125a. 
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meaning of the word  ‘reversion,’ noting its etymology and its use in statutes, writs and fines.73 
At the end of his discussion, he simply noted the judges who had agreed and disagreed with 
his argument.74 When examining cases, then, we must be aware that we are seeing the 
arguments and judgments through the eyes of a particular reporter. Either consciously or 
unconsciously, they are likely to have put their own slant on the proceedings, presenting only 
the arguments they found most interesting or persuasive.75 
 
A reporter may have been particularly inclined to present material that supported his own 
view of interpretation when he was writing for publication.76 Both Plowden and Coke 
prepared their own reports for the press,77 and both have been accused of some bias in the 
presentation of their material. Plowden was renowned in his time as a careful and accurate 
reporter, and took significant pains to corroborate his notes with colleagues.78 The accuracy of 
his reports can generally be confirmed by comparison with other reports of the same cases.79 
However, as Alan Cromartie has observed, Plowden’s method ‘left plenty of scope for shaping 
by selection.’80  He was highly selective in terms of the cases he chose to report. He also 
distilled the arguments of judges and counsel, discarding material that he judged to be 
‘refuse.’81 Coke’s reputation amongst his contemporaries was less glowing than Plowden’s,82 																																																								
73 ibid. 
74 ibid 126b. 
75 David Ibbetson, ‘The Arguments in Calvin’s Case (1608)’ in Troy L Harris (ed), Studies in Canon Law 
and Common Law in Honor of R. H. Helmholz (Robbins Collection Publications 2015) 216. 
76 See Williams, ‘English Legal Reasoning and Legal Culture, c.1528-c.1642’ (n 39) 3. Even material 
that was not apparently prepared for publication could be widely shared. Leonard’s reports, for 
example, include a copy of ‘the argument of Egerton, Solicitor-General’ in Butler v Baker, ‘under his own 
hand’: Butler and Baker’s Case (1591) 3 Leo 271. This closely corresponds with Egerton’s draft argument 
in Butler v Baker (1591) Hunt MS El 482 f286.  
77 Abbott (n 3) 206, 248. 
78 Edmund Plowden, The Commentaries, or Reports of Edmund Plowden (Catharine Lintot and Samuel 
Richardson 1761) v; see also Abbott (n 3) 216; Geoffrey de C Parmiter, Edmund Plowden: An Elizabethan 
Recusant Lawyer (Catholic Record Society 1987) 115. 
79 Plowden’s report of any case is usually the most comprehensive available. However, his report of Brett 
v Rigden (1568) Plow 340 compares favourably with a more detailed manuscript report of part of the 
argument in Egerton’s papers. See Le Serjaunts Case (1567) Hunt MS El 482 f3. 
80 Alan Cromartie, The Constitutionalist Revolution: An Essay on the History of England, 1450-1642 
(Cambridge University Press 2006) 108. 
81 Plowden (n 78) iv. 
82 Damian Powell, ‘Coke in Context: Early Modern Legal Observation and Sir Edward Coke’s 
Reports’ (2000) 21 Journal of Legal History 33, 43. 
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although at least part of this may be attributable to professional rivalry.83 The chief difficulty 
with Coke’s reports is his failure to distinguish between the judgment of the court and his own 
opinion.84 However, if the reader is aware of these tendencies, both sets of reports can usefully 
be taken to indicate the arguments that their authors considered to be particularly important, 
whatever their provenance happened to be. 
 
As we have seen, the interpretation of documents was a key issue in the law of this period. 
However, there are a relatively small number of cases in which the reporter extensively 
discussed principles of interpretation. For this reason, some key cases will recur throughout 
this thesis. In many other cases, points of interpretation are resolved without a full explanation 
of the relevant issue. In one case, for example, Edmund Anderson reported that the judges 
had spoken extensively about rules of construction, but neglected to record what they had 
actually said.85 This thesis will attempt to elucidate principles of interpretation even when they 
are not explicitly set out in the cases. However, the focus will be on cases reported by those 
lawyers with a particular interest in the law of interpretation, who explained the issues and 
their resolution in full. 
 
Five key figures will therefore dominate our discussion. The first is Plowden, whose 
Commentaries span the period 1550 to 1579. Plowden has been described as ‘perhaps the most 
learned lawyer in a century of learned lawyers,’86 but he was never a serjeant or judge, due to 
his refusal to renounce his Catholic faith.87 His first volume of reports was published in 1571, 
with a second volume appearing in 1579.88 These were the first contemporary law reports to 
be printed since the 1535 Year Books.89 Immediately put into use by both students and 
practitioners, Plowden’s reports remained influential for centuries.90 They were highly praised 
by contemporaries;91  Coke, for example, described them as ‘exquisite and elaborate.’ 92 
																																																								
83 Abbott (n 3) 252. 
84 Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (n 44) 183; Abbott (n 3) 252; Powell (n 82) 44. 
85 Baldwyn v Marton (1589) 1 And 223, 225. 
86 Sir William Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol 5 (3rd edn, Methuen 1966) 372. 
87 Abbott (n 3) 199. Plowden was appointed as a serjeant by Mary, but the writ abated on Elizabeth’s 
accession to the throne and was never revived: ibid 201. 
88 Abbott (n 3) 207. 
89 Williams, ‘English Legal Reasoning and Legal Culture, c.1528-c.1642’ (n 39) 46. 
90 Abbott (n 3) 217. 
91 ibid; Parmiter (n 78) 117. 
92 The Reports of Sir Edward Coke, vol II (Joseph Butterworth and Son 1826) 3 Co Rep viii. 
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Plowden’s ‘peculiar fascination’ with legal interpretation is obvious throughout.93 About a 
third of his 63 case reports involve a point of statutory interpretation,94 while a further eight 
focus on the construction of deeds and four on the interpretation of wills. The Commentaries are 
justly famous for elaborating a theory of statutory interpretation based around the legislator’s 
intentions.95 As we will see, however, the interpretation of legal instruments in general was a 
major theme of Plowden’s reports. Plowden’s focus on interpretation brought the topic to the 
forefront of legal thought, 96 and his theories influenced many later judges and treatise 
writers.97 
 
Dyer’s reports span a period roughly contemporary to those of Plowden, covering his legal 
career between about 1532 and 1581.98 Dyer was appointed as a serjeant in 1552;99 as a judge 
of the Common Pleas in 1557; and as Chief Justice of the same court in 1559.100 His reports, 
published posthumously by his nephews in 1585,101 soon ranked alongside Plowden’s in 
importance, and were consistently cited in the following decades. 102  William Fulbecke 
recommended both reporters to law students, writing that Plowden and Dyer had ‘by a 
several and distinct kind of discourse… both laboured to profit posterity.’103 Some preferred 
‘Plowden for his fullness of argument,’ while ‘others do more like Dyer, for his strictness and 
brevity.’104 Indeed, Dyer’s reports were much less full than those of Plowden. Intended for his 
personal use, they had not been edited for publication, and consisted only of ‘working notes as 
taken down in the course of a busy life.’105 They therefore have less thematic unity than the 
Commentaries, and there is a much smaller proportion of cases relating to interpretation. Of 
1120 cases,106 only about a dozen concern a point of statutory interpretation, while over 70 
involve the interpretation of deeds and almost 30 that of wills. Owing to Dyer’s less 																																																								
93 Allen (n 65) 455. 
94 ibid 229. 
95 ibid 230–239; Behrens (n 14). 
96 Abbott (n 3) 238. 
97 ibid 230. 
98 Baker, Reports from the Lost Notebooks of Sir James Dyer, vol 1 (n 56) xxiii. 
99 ibid xxiv. 
100 ibid xxv. 
101 ibid xxxv. 
102 Abbott (n 3) 158. 
103 William Fulbecke, A Direction or Preparative to the Study of the Lawe (Thomas Wight 1600) 26v. 
104 ibid 27. 
105 Baker, Reports from the Lost Notebooks of Sir James Dyer, vol 1 (n 56) xxxvi. 
106 Abbott (n 3) 162. 
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discriminate method of reporting, it seems likely that these proportions were more 
representative of practice. Dyer was certainly interested in questions of interpretation, and 
particularly in matters relating to grammar and etymology.107 ‘His love of textual scholarship,’ 
notes Baker, ‘is obvious,’ and he had a detailed knowledge of the history of the common law 
and its language.108  
 
The period following the careers of Plowden and Dyer was dominated by Coke, one of the 
common law’s greatest personalities. He was appointed as Solicitor-General in 1592 and 
Attorney-General in 1594,109 before being created serjeant-at-law and Chief Justice of the 
Common Pleas in 1606.110 He was elevated to Chief Justice of the King’s Bench in 1613.111 
However, following a series of conflicts with the Crown,112 he was removed from office three 
years later.113 He began to publish his reports in 1600, issuing eleven volumes by 1615. Two 
further volumes were published posthumously.114 Coke’s reports cover the period from 1572 
to 1616, beginning in earnest in 1581.115 Baker has described them as ‘the single most 
influential series’ of nominate reports in the common law.116 Even Coke’s great rival, Francis 
Bacon, admitted that, without his reports, the common law would be ‘almost like a ship 
without ballast.’117 Coke was profoundly interested in interpretation, to the extent that he 
remains an authority on the subject today.118 We have already noted his recognition that the 
interpretation of leases was important to ‘every man.’119 This was borne out by the cases he 
chose to report. Of close to 500 cases,120 about a third involve a point of interpretation. These 
include over 70 on deeds, 15 on wills, and 65 on statutes. He made many more comments on 																																																								
107 Baker, Reports from the Lost Notebooks of Sir James Dyer, vol 1 (n 56) xxi. 
108 ibid xxviii. 
109 Holdsworth, A History of English Law (n 86) 426. 
110 ibid 428. 
111 ibid 438. 
112 ibid 429–441. 
113 ibid 440. 
114 TFT Plucknett, ‘Genesis of Coke’s Reports’ (1942) 27 Cornell Law Review 190, 201. 
115 ibid. For more details on Coke’s reports, see JH Baker, ‘Coke’s Note-Books and the Source of His 
Reports’ in JH Baker, The Legal Profession and the Common Law: Historical Essays (The Hambledon Press 
1986). 
116 Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (n 44) 183. 
117 James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis and Douglas Denon Heath (eds), The Works of Francis Bacon, vol 
13 (Cambridge University Press 2011) 65. 
118 For example, he is quoted half a dozen times in Lewison (n 37). 
119 Walker’s Case (n 25) 23a. 
120 Plucknett, ‘Genesis of Coke’s Reports’ (n 114) 201. 
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interpretation in the prefaces to the various volumes of his reports. In 1628, he also published 
his Commentary upon Littleton, the first of his four Institutes of the Laws of England, which contained 
further material on legal interpretation.121 
 
As we have noted, Coke’s reports may not be a wholly reliable guide to the law of his period. 
The reports of his contemporary, Francis Moore, therefore act as a useful counterbalance. 
Like Dyer’s reports, they are relatively concise.122 While Moore’s reports span the period from 
1512 until his death in 1621, he was not actually born until 1558. He therefore plainly took 
many of his early reports from another source, probably Bendlowes.123 The reports that pre-
date Moore’s entry to Middle Temple in 1580 are generally cursory, and few were found to 
be useful for the purposes of this thesis. Aside from these, Moore’s reports appear to have 
been based largely on his personal observations. 124  They were already circulating in 
manuscript during his lifetime, but were not printed until 1663.125 Moore was a prominent 
barrister at the turn of the century, and was well-known for his conveyancing skills.126 He was 
created serjeant in 1614.127 Moore’s reports include almost 100 cases on the interpretation of 
deeds, over 40 on wills, and about a dozen on statutes. 
 
Our final figure is Moore’s patron, Egerton.128 Egerton was appointed as Solicitor-General in 
1581,129 Attorney-General in 1592,130 Master of the Rolls in 1594,131 Lord Keeper in 1596,132 
and Lord Chancellor in 1603.133 He was a close associate of Francis Bacon and a supporter of 																																																								
121 ibid 212. 
122 Moore’s 1308 case reports occupy a total of 600 pages in the English Reports, while Coke takes  
2400 pages to report just over a third of that number. 
123 Abbott (n 3) 97 fn 175; JW Wallace, The Reporters Arranged and Characterized with Incidental Remarks (4th 
edn, Soule and Bugbee 1882) 122. 
124 Abbott (n 3) 243. 
125 Wilfrid R Prest, ‘Moore, Sir Francis’ [2008] Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
<https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/19107> accessed 22 March 2019. 
126 He is credited with inventing the device of the lease and release: ibid. 
127 ibid. 
128 In 1603, Egerton was created Baron Ellesmere: Louis Knafla, Law and Politics in Jacobean England: The 
Tracts of Lord Chancellor Ellesmere (Cambridge University Press 1977) 35. For the avoidance of confusion, 
he will be referred to as Egerton throughout this thesis. 
129 ibid 13. 
130 ibid 28. 
131 ibid 29. 
132 ibid. 
133 ibid 35. 
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James I’s constitutional claims. As a result, and because of jurisdictional disputes between the 
common law courts and the Chancery, Egerton frequently clashed with Coke.134 While 
Egerton did not publish law reports, this thesis makes use of his draft arguments, which are 
found amongst a bundle of Egerton’s legal manuscripts in the Huntington Library.135 Egerton 
has only dated some of these arguments: those dated fall between Hilary term 1577136 and 
Trinity term 1590.137 Where Egerton has noted the court in which the case was heard, it is 
most often the King’s Bench. Like his rival, Coke, Egerton had a strong interest in the law of 
interpretation. His commonplace books included two copies of the first English treatise on 
legal interpretation, A Discourse upon the Exposicion & Understandinge of Statutes. 138 This was 
attributed to Egerton himself by T. F. T. Plucknett,139 although Baker has recently identified 
the author as William Fleetwood.140 Nonetheless, it was clearly valued highly by Egerton, and, 
some years after copying the original, he wrote an abbreviated and updated version.141 His 
printed books are also filled with marginal notes on interpretation.142 Of Egerton’s draft 
arguments, seven cases involved the interpretation of deeds; six, statutes; three, wills; and 
three, letters patent. The relatively high incidence of cases involving statutes and patents can 
probably be explained by Egerton’s role as Solicitor-General during the 1580s. Perhaps the 
most idiosyncratic feature of Egerton’s approach to interpretation was his frequent citation of 
theologians, philosophers, and lawyers of the ius commune. It is clear that, for Egerton, legal 
interpretation could not be seen in isolation from the interpretation of all other kinds of 
document. 
 
Although the writings of these five men will dominate this thesis, they were by no means the 
only reporters to deal with issues of construction. Material from the reports attributed to 
Anderson, Coventry, George Croke, John Godbolt, John Gouldesborough, Henry Hobart, 
William Leonard, Thomas Owen, John Popham and John Savile will also be used.  
 																																																								
134 Allen D Boyer (ed), Law, Liberty and Parliament: Selected Essays on the Writings of Sir Edward Coke (Liberty 
Fund 2004) ix, 12, 275, 298. 
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136 Marburye v Wyrrall (1577) Hunt MS El 482 f64. 
137 Wade v Prestall (1590) Hunt MS El 482 f284. 
138 Hunt MS El 496; Hunt MS El 2565.  
139 TFT Plucknett, ‘Ellesmere on Statutes’ (1944) 60 Law Quarterly Review 242, 244. 
140 JH Baker, The Reinvention of Magna Carta 1216-1616 (Cambridge University Press 2017) 232–7. 
141 Thorne (n 4) 97–99. 
142 See, for example, Magna Charta Cum Statutis Quae Antiqua Vocantur (Richard Tottell 1556) Hunt RB 
59487; as well as Hunt RB 59643 and Hunt RB 61003, both compilations of Year Books. 
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The contemporary treatise literature will also be examined. In their treatises, lawyers sought 
to explain and reflect on the principles laid down in the case law. Treatises therefore provide a 
useful insight into lawyers’ understanding of the law of interpretation. There were no treatises 
written on the interpretation of private documents in our period. However, issues of 
interpretation are touched on in a number of more general works. These include books of 
drafting precedents;143 introductory texts for students;144 and works of legal theory145 and 
comparative law.146 Some important figures in our period, notably Coke and Bacon, would 
later write treatises dealing with interpretive issues.147 Although strictly falling outside our 
period, these will be used in order to shed light on their authors’ views about interpretation. 
Finally, some later treatises will also be used to confirm points from the case law of our 
period.148 Questions of interpretation also arose in contemporary moots and readings at the 




To discuss interpretation in this period is inevitably somewhat anachronistic. Common 
lawyers were only beginning to use the terminology of interpretation.149 In the Year Books 																																																								
143 Thomas Phayer, A New Boke of Presidentes (Edward Whytchurche 1543); William West, The First Part of 
Symboleography (Thomas Wight and Bonham Norton 1598); William West, The Second Part of 
Symboleography (Thomas Wight 1601). 
144 John Perkins, A Verie Profitable Booke (Richard Tottell 1555); Fulbecke, A Direction or Preparative to the 
Study of the Lawe (n 103). See also two institutional works: Henry Finch, Nomotechnia (Societie of 
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145 Christopher St German, Doctor and Student (TFT Plucknett and JL Barton eds, Selden Society 1974), 
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period, they spoke most frequently of understanding or taking a document, 150  and 
occasionally of adjudging151 or construing it.152 Plowden used all of these terms, but also spoke 
of expounding153 and interpreting154 an instrument. At the end of the sixteenth century, 
Fulbecke discussed understanding,155 taking,156 and interpreting157 legal texts. In this thesis, 
interpretation is taken to cover all of these processes.158 In a broad sense, it refers to the 
ascertainment of the meaning of a document, and of its legal effect.159 Interpretation should, 
however, be distinguished from the application of rules of substantive law.160 Principles of 
interpretation are guides to the meaning of a document, while rules of law override the search 
for meaning and compel the realisation of a particular outcome.161 The result in Shelley’s Case 
(1581), for example, may have been arrived at through a process of interpretation,162 but the 
‘rule in Shelley’s Case’ soon ossified into a substantive rule of law.163 Such rules are better suited 
to a discussion of substantive land law than of legal interpretation. 
 
This thesis will argue that common lawyers of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries 
took a coherent and sophisticated approach to the interpretation of private documents. The 
argument will proceed as follows. In chapter two, we will examine the tools used by common 																																																								
150 See, for example, (1442) YB Mich 21 Hen VI pl 16, f6a-7b, f7a; (1469) YB Pas 9 Edw IV pl 13, f3b-
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Newis et Ux v Lark and Hunt (n 51) 412. 
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156 ibid 30. 
157 ibid 33v, 34v. 
158 In modern law, interpretation and construction are sometimes considered to be separate processes: 
E Allan Farnsworth, ‘“Meaning” in the Law of Contract’ (1967) 76 Yale Law Journal 939, 939–40. In 
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lawyers to identify the meaning, or signification, of a document’s words. They largely relied 
on the rules of grammar to do so, having recourse to dictionaries and to experts in grammar. 
They also referred to common law texts as sources of linguistic meaning, and to previous cases 
in which words had been expounded. However, lawyers were well aware that a word could 
have more than one meaning. Where the meaning of the words was unclear, the intentions of 
the writer would have to be considered. 
 
Chapter three will explore the balance struck by lawyers between interpreting a document 
according to the ‘proper signification’ of its words and interpreting it according to the writer’s 
presumed intentions. It will be argued, firstly, that this balance varied depending on the kind 
of document at issue. When lawyers were interpreting a deed, they placed more weight on the 
meaning of the words than they did when interpreting a will. The balance also varied 
depending on the part of the document at issue: for example, more weight was placed on the 
words of a condition than on the words of other terms in a deed. Secondly, it will be argued 
that this balance shifted over time. In the mid-sixteenth century, the writer’s intentions were 
generally agreed to be paramount, even in the interpretation of a deed. However, by the end 
of the century, lawyers were more likely to prioritise the meaning of the words, even when 
interpreting a will.  
 
Chapter four interrogates the nature of the intentions that the courts were seeking. It 
investigates the time at which the relevant intentions must have been formed, and the parties 
whose intentions were relevant to the interpretation of the document. It concludes that there 
was a fundamental difference between the intentions that were used to interpret wills and 
those used to interpret deeds. For wills, only the testator’s intention was taken into account. 
For deeds, however, the court generally considered the intentions of all of the parties to the 
deed, even if its terms were made on behalf of only one of them. 
 
In chapter five, we ask how the courts identified these intentions. When interpreting a will, the 
courts relied heavily on the testator’s own declarations of his intentions; on the context in 
which the will had been made; and on the general presumption that he had intended his will 
to be valid. Although they took it for granted that a testator was a reasonable person, this did 
not provide much assistance in identifying his intentions. When interpreting a deed, however, 
the courts made greater use of reason to identify the intentions of the parties. It will be argued 
that this was because interpreting a deed involved considering the intentions of more than one 
party. This meant that the courts were able to construct a notional common intention for the 
parties, based on presumptions about what reasonable parties would have intended their 
document to mean.  
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Chapter six further explores the role played by reason in the process of interpretation. Reason 
was both a means of identifying the parties’ intentions and a substantive value in its own right. 
This chapter argues that the role of reason changed throughout our period. In the mid-
sixteenth century, lawyers made broad appeals to a priori reason when interpreting documents. 
By the end of the century, however, they were increasingly disinclined to do so. Instead, they 
preferred to rely on authority to establish what the reason of the law required. They also 
made greater use of interpretive maxims to explain the precise requirements of reason. This 
chapter includes case studies of two popular maxims of interpretation, which illustrate some of 
these points further. 
 
Finally, in chapter seven, we will take stock of wider legal changes in this period, and their 
influence on the developing law of interpretation. It will be argued that lawyers were 
becoming more conscious of their own active role in the interpretive process. Simultaneously, 
they were growing anxious about the possibility of misinterpreting legal documents. During 
our period, litigation rates had increased, legal texts had proliferated, and new kinds of legal 
instrument had emerged. The law of interpretation became a focal point for concerns about 
all of these developments. By the end of our period, lawyers were increasingly worried about 
legal interpretation, fearing that it created uncertainty and could be manipulated to destabilise 
the whole common law. 
 
Throughout this thesis, then, it will be argued that lawyers’ attitudes to interpretation 
underwent a significant shift during the second half of the sixteenth century. A number of 
closely-related developments will be identified. In chapter three, we will see that lawyers 
became increasingly reluctant to prioritise the intentions of the writer over the proper 
signification of the words he had used. In chapter six, we will examine the courts’ growing 
preference to rely on previously-judged cases or rules and maxims for guidance on 
interpretation. And in chapter seven, we will identify a new recognition that an interpreter 
could impose his own values on a document, creating meanings that its writer might not have 
intended. All of these changes formed part of the same shift, reflecting lawyers’ increased 
anxiety about the law and legal documents. 
 
In the remainder of this introductory chapter, we will set out some background for the main 
part of the thesis. Some fundamental features of deeds and wills will be identified, as will the 
uses to which they could be put and the contexts in which they might fall to be interpreted by 
the common law courts. 	
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1.4. Deeds: introductory remarks 
 
A deed was a formal written document, which had been sealed by its maker or makers and 
delivered to a beneficiary.164 As Coke put it, there were ‘three things of the essence and 
substance of a deed, that is to say, writing in paper or parchment, sealing and delivery.’165 
Until the late twelfth century, there had been various ways of authenticating a deed, but it was 
then established that only sealing could turn a mere ‘writing’ into a deed.166 Baker describes 
deeds as ‘defined partly by their physical characteristics.’167 If a document did not have a seal, 
it no longer constituted a deed; indeed, one common means of cancelling a deed was to 
remove the seal.168 It was also vital that the deed be written on paper or parchment. Coke 
explained that this was because ‘the writing upon them can be least vitiated, altered or 
corrupted.’169 
 
A deed had a special status as evidence at common law: it could not be contradicted by a 
parol averment.170 In Waberley v Cockerel (1541), for example, Edmond Cockerel and Henry 
Huttost had acknowledged their indebtedness to John Waberley in a deed. Waberley brought 
an action of debt against Cockerel, who pleaded that the debt had already been fully paid; 
that the deed had been returned to him as an acquittance; and that Waberley had stolen it 
back from him.171 Sjts Stamford and Bromley argued that this was irrelevant. It was a ‘maxim 
in law’ that a deed ‘cannot be avoided and answered by naked matter, but it must be by 
matter of as high a nature as the obligation is,’ that is, by another deed.172 As they explained, 
 
although the truth be, that the plaintiff is paid his money, still it is better to suffer 
a mischief to one man than an inconvenience to many, which would subvert a 
law: for if matter in writing may be so easily defeated, and avoided by such 
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surmise and naked breath, a matter in writing would be of no greater authority 
than a matter of fact.173  
 
A deed, then, could only be challenged by impugning its status as a deed. Since a deed took 
effect on its delivery,174 the defendant could claim that the deed had not been delivered to the 
plaintiff, or had been delivered as an escrow that had not yet taken effect.175 The defendant 
could also allege that the deed had been altered since it was made,176 or that he was illiterate, 
and its contents had been misrepresented to him. 177  A deed obtained by duress was 
voidable.178 
 
All parties to a deed were required to have sufficient capacity to contract.179 Corporations 
could make deeds.180 Prior to the dissolution of the monasteries, there had been complex rules 
as to when monks could enter into transactions, but these were becoming otiose in our 
period.181 The deed of an infant, a person under 21 years old, was either void or voidable, 
unless it was made to provide for necessaries.182 A deed was voidable if it was made by a party 
who was non compos mentis, but he would be prohibited from stultifying himself by pleading his 
own disability to avoid it.183  																																																								
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Unmarried women had the same legal capacity as men,184 but a married woman was subject 
to the laws of coverture and was subsumed into her husband’s legal personality.185 A feme covert 
had no chattels, and no right to dispose of her real property.186 If she purported to do so by 
deed, the deed would be void.187 Furthermore, a married woman had no independent will of 
her own.188 As Spelman J put it in Jordan’s Case (1535), ‘a feme covert does not have any will, but 
the will of the husband is her will.’189 She therefore had no capacity to make contracts of her 
own;190 if she made a bond, for example, it would be void.191 With her husband’s consent, she 
could make informal contracts on his behalf, since ‘by this agreement it is the grant or sale of 
the husband’ and not the wife.192 It is possible that married women were also involved in 
negotiating deeds on behalf of their husbands. However, as Simpson points out, the deed 
would simply name the husband as principal and the wife’s involvement would leave no 
trace.193  
 
A significant section of the population was illiterate in our period. David Cressy, for example, 
estimates that, in the 1640s, around 70% of adult men living in rural England were illiterate, 
though literacy levels seem to have been higher in towns.194 While the gentry and clergy were 
almost universally literate, husbandmen, labourers and women were ‘massively illiterate.’195 
Few parties would be able to write, or even read, their own deeds. Most deeds would 
therefore have been drafted by professionals. Scriveners were professional writers who could 																																																								
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draw up straightforward contracts and conveyances196 as well as non-legal documents like 
letters.197 Members of the legal profession were also involved in drafting deeds.198 William 
West, for example, who wrote ‘the first systematic treatise’ on the drafting of legal 
instruments, was a Yorkshire attorney. 199 There was a significant overlap between the 
professions of scrivener and attorney, and some men practised as both.200  
 
Lawyers often praised deeds for establishing certainty about parties’ legal rights. Reporting a 
judgment of Popham CJ, for example, Coke contrasted ‘the certain truth of the agreement of 
the parties,’ as preserved in their deed, with the ‘dangerous’ and ‘uncertain testimony of 
slippery memory.’201 Elsewhere, Coke observed that it was better to settle an important matter 
in a deed, rather than to ‘leave it to the sliding and slippery memory of men, which would be 
lost in a short time.’202 Some lawyers went even further. In the preface to his book of 
precedents, Thomas Phayer explained that ‘writings of record’ were of ‘great utility and 
assurance’ to parties, 
 
for by such evidence… are matters in the law continually decided, truth is made 
open and falsehood detected, right advanced and wrong suppressed, matters of 
doubt are put out of question, and by such evidence is justice and equity to every 
man yielded, suit and contention avoided, unity and concord induced, virtuous 
and politic order observed, finally love and amity increaseth, with all kind of 
goodness in quiet, which is the chief part of felicity or happiness in this life.203 
 
‘No man,’ he continued,  
 
can be sure of his own livelihood without help of evidence, which as a trusty 
anchor, holdeth the right of every man’s possessions safely and surely against all 																																																								
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troublous and stormy tempests of injuries, not of men only but of time also, the 
consumer of all.204 
 
There were two kinds of deed: deeds poll and indentures. A deed poll was a single deed, 
sealed only by its maker and delivered to the beneficiary.205 An indenture was a deed made in 
duplicate. Some indentures took the same form as a deed poll, but were made in two copies, 
one of which was sealed by each party. Other indentures were made and sealed by both 
parties.206 If a transaction involved reciprocal grants, the parties could use either an indenture 
or two deeds poll, one made by each party.207 The differences between deeds poll and 
indentures will be discussed further in chapter four.208 
 
A number of situations might call for the making of a deed. Firstly, deeds were commonly 
used for conveyancing. Although land could be transferred by livery of seisin without any 
accompanying documents, it was still useful to record the terms of the transaction in a deed,209 
especially in case of subsequent litigation.210 Indeed, the deed seems to have been regarded as 
the main component of the transaction since the early thirteenth century, with livery of seisin 
increasingly seen as a mere technicality.211 After the Statute of Uses permitted land to be 
transferred without livery, deeds took on an even greater importance.212 Other interests in 
land had never been susceptible to livery of seisin: for example, incorporeal interests such as 
advowsons or reversions. Such interests could only be transferred by making a deed of 
grant.213 Standard forms for many kinds of conveyance had emerged by the mid-thirteenth 
century, although there was a significant amount of variation.214 Common terms included the 
premises, which identified the property and contained words of grant; 215 the habendum, 
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specifying the estate granted;216 the tenendum, indicating the tenure;217 and the reddendum, 
providing for any services or rent.218 These might be accompanied by a variety of conditions 
and covenants, as well as a clause of warranty.219 
 
A deed might also be used if the parties wished to make a promise or agreement that was 
enforceable at common law. Deeds had long been used in mercantile transactions,220 but, as 
Baker observes, ‘the variety of subject-matter was limitless.’221 Deeds were used to record 
contracts to buy and sell goods, perform services, hire apprentices, instruct in trades, charter 
ships, and even marry.222 This was because a deed was a prerequisite for the two main 
‘contract’ actions in the common law courts.223 First was the writ of covenant, which could be 
used to enforce a promise made by the defendant to the plaintiff.224 Since the fourteenth 
century, this writ had only been available at common law where the plaintiff could produce a 
deed as evidence of the promise.225 A covenant was not considered to convey any immediately 
enforceable rights to the promisee. Rather, it made some future conduct wrongful which 
would otherwise have been lawful.226 While a deed was not needed to create a lease for years, 
such leases were often made by deed so that the parties would be able to sue each other in 
covenant.227 																																																								
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Since the late fourteenth century, however, the action of covenant had been relatively little 
used.228 Instead, the vast majority of contract actions were actions of debt sur obligation.229 
The writ of debt was available for the recovery of a definite sum of money,230 and debt sur 
obligation was brought on a deed in which the defendant had acknowledged his debt.231 Such 
a deed was known as a bond or obligation.232 The popularity of debt sur obligation was due to 
the prevalence of the conditioned bond as a means of contracting. In a simple covenant, the 
defendant would, for example, promise to repair the plaintiff’s roof. In a conditioned bond, 
the defendant would acknowledge his indebtedness to the plaintiff if he had not repaired the 
roof by a certain day. The condition would be written in a separate part of the instrument, 
usually on the back.233 It did not have to be sealed.234 Using a conditioned bond gave the 
plaintiff greater security, as it simplified the process of recovering from the defendant if he 
failed to perform.235 It also guaranteed him a fixed sum of money, rather than damages as 
assessed by the jury.236 By 1606, writs of debt accounted for 80% of the business of the 
Common Pleas and 46% of the business of the King’s Bench.237 Nine out of ten such writs 
were brought on an obligation.238 
 
A bond was conceptualised somewhat differently to a deed that evidenced a covenant. A bond 
was not evidentiary, but dispositive. It was not just proof of the defendant’s obligation: it was 
the obligation.239 Furthermore, unlike a covenant, a bond did not just entitle the plaintiff to 
some future action by the defendant. Rather, it granted him an immediate right to the debt.240 
This fragmentation of contract actions meant that lawyers had little opportunity to develop 
general theories on the nature of contractual terms.241  																																																								
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It might be expected, then, that bonds would be treated differently to other kinds of deed 
when it came to questions of interpretation. This does not, however, seem to have been the 
case. Lawyers frequently used cases on the construction of bonds as authority for their 
approach to the construction of other kinds of deed, without remarking on the differences 
between them.242 In Saunders v Stanfourde, for example, Egerton examined the meaning of a 
condition in a lease. He referred to a previous case involving a similar condition in an 
obligation,243 observing that ‘this case greatly resembles this our case.’244 Similarly, in The Dean 
and Chapter of Chester’s Case, he gave examples of both bonds and deeds of feoffment as 
examples of the courts’ approach to the interpretation of deeds.245 The converse was also true. 
In Bold v Molineux (1536), a case involving the construction of a bond, Fitzherbert and Baldwin 
JJ gave examples of cases involving ordinary covenants and leases246 as well as conditioned 
bonds.247 In fact, at no point in our period did the courts distinguish between the general 
principles for the construction of bonds and those for the construction of other kinds of 
deed.248 In this thesis, therefore, all kinds of deed will generally be examined together. 
 
Cases brought on the actions of covenant or debt sur obligation were relatively likely to raise 
points of construction, since they involved few principles of substantive law.249 As we have 
seen, a defendant could attempt to impugn the status of the purported deed. Aside from this, 
his only real option was to challenge the plaintiff’s interpretation of the deed and argue that 
he had not breached his promise, properly understood.250 However, it would be misleading to 
focus too closely on covenant and debt when examining the interpretation of deeds. Questions 
of a deed’s meaning did not arise only in contract actions. Indeed, while cases of debt sur 
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obligation were extremely common, they did not usually raise points of general principle, and 
were rarely reported.251  
 
Much more interesting to reporters were cases involving conveyances of land. Conveyances 
often included ambiguous or conflicting terms,252 the interpretation of which could prove 
crucial for establishing title to the land. Titles were often tried in actions of trespass quare 
clausum fregit, and, from the sixteenth century, ejectment.253 Thus, of the eight cases in 
Plowden’s Commentaries that turned on the construction of a deed, only one was brought on an 
action of covenant,254 and none were cases of debt. In contrast, four were brought on writs of 
trespass255 and one each on writs of ejectment,256 replevin257 and second deliverance.258 In 
Coke’s reports, cases involving the interpretation of deeds were brought on a variety of 
actions, including trespass, replevin, ejectment, second deliverance, novel disseisin, covenant 
and debt.259 
 
In a dispute over the terms of a lease, the reversioner’s first course of action would generally 
be to exercise his right to distrain or re-enter. This would then provoke a lawsuit on a real 
action to determine whether or not the lessee had a good title under the lease. Colthirst v 
Bejushin was a typical case. Matthias Colthirst brought an action of trespass against Peter 
Bejushin. Bejushin pleaded that he had initially been in possession of the land, but had been 
put out by Colthirst. Bejushin had then re-entered on Colthirst, who sued.260 It ultimately 
emerged that the question was whether or not Bejushin had complied with the terms of his 
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lease from the Prior of Bath.261 If he had breached a condition of his lease, Colthirst would 
have been entitled to the land under another lease made by the Prior.262  
 
All eight of Plowden’s cases on the interpretation of a deed concerned a lease. Plowden was 
writing at a time when disputes over leases were especially likely to be litigated. Before 1536, 
about a third of the land in England was held by religious houses,263 who were accordingly 
responsible for making many leases. On the dissolution of the monasteries, the freehold of this 
land was surrendered to the King and redistributed. The dissolution statutes, however, 
included provisions saving the rights of the monasteries’ lessees. The result was that the King’s 
grantees found their land encumbered by existing leases.264 The statutes also gave these new 
freeholders the right to enforce conditions and covenants contained in the leases,265 and some 
did so with alacrity. Five of Plowden’s cases on the interpretation of deeds concerned leases 
that were made by a monastic institution before its dissolution.266 In four of these, the plaintiff 
was the new freeholder, or a lessee of the new freeholder.267 It is possible that the religious 
conflicts of the day also increased the tension between these new landlords and their 
tenants.268 
 
Plowden’s focus on leases, then, may have been a product of his historical moment. In Dyer’s 
reports too, we find almost twice as many cases involving the interpretation of leases as those 
involving any other kind of deed, including other conveyances of land as well as bonds. Deeds 
relating to land were also well-represented in Coke’s reports. Coke’s focus was not solely on 
leases, however: he was also interested in feoffments to use. He reported about half a dozen 
cases involving the construction of a bond, and about a dozen each on leases and limitations 
of uses. In Egerton’s papers from the 1580s, a similar pattern can be discerned. Of his draft 
arguments relating to the interpretation of deeds, four involved leases and four feoffments to 
use. 
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The interpretation of uses was certainly causing some headaches for the sixteenth-century 
common law courts. Initially, a feoffment to use had carried no legal obligations, indicating 
only a personal trust in the feoffee.269 When the Chancery began to enforce uses, the cestui 
que use remained a stranger to the land at common law. However, a 1484 statute had granted 
the cestui que use the power to make effective feoffments of the legal estate,270 with the result 
that the common law courts had gained an extensive jurisdiction over the transfer of uses.271 
Not everyone, however, regarded the development of uses with equanimity. Because a cestui 
que use would not die seised of his land, he would be able to escape both the feudal incidents 
of tenure and the common law rules of inheritance.272 In 1536, Parliament attempted to 
clamp down on these alleged abuses. The Statute of Uses executed uses, transferring seisin of 
the land to the cestui que use.273 However, it did not stamp out the practice of limiting uses 
entirely. Firstly, some uses fell outside the ambit of the Statute and remained enforceable in 
Chancery.274 Secondly, settlors continued to limit uses that would be executed by the Statute 
and dealt with by the common law courts. This was because some devices, ordinarily 
impermissible at common law, could be created using an executed use.275 Throughout our 
period, the courts struggled to determine how far the construction of a use could diverge from 
established common law rules. We will investigate this issue in more detail in chapter three.276  
 
It can be seen, then, that most questions of interpretation arose on conveyances of land, on 
actions used to try title, while a significant minority arose in cases of debt or covenant. But 
why were such matters questions for the court in the first place? The meaning of an informal 
contract, whether made in writing or not,277 was a question of fact and therefore to be decided 
by the jury.278 We therefore have very little idea how such contracts were interpreted.279 The 																																																								
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meaning of a deed, on the other hand, was a question of law to be determined by the judges. 
This was the consequence of the common law’s rules of pleading. As Simpson explains,  
 
under a system of strict pleading, rules as to interpretation take the form of rules 
as to what must be pleaded in the way of performance of a [deed], the terms of 
which must go into a plea. Since objections to the contents of a plea are 
demurrers and raise an issue of law, this means that the court handles problems 
of interpretation.280  
 
As we have already mentioned, significant procedural changes took place during the Tudor 
period.281 Until the early sixteenth century, tentative pleading had been common, with 
serjeants and barristers seeking advice on the effects of their pleas in advance.282 However, 
judges became increasingly unwilling to assist counsel with their pleas, and discussions of 
pleading came to be regarded as inferior to judgments.283 Plowden refused to report ‘the 
sudden speech of the judges upon motion of cases of the serjeants and counsellors at the bar,’ 
but only recorded judgments given ‘after great and mature deliberation,’ on demurrers or 
special verdicts.284 During the first half of the sixteenth century, demurrers increased in 
frequency, as did the number of demurrers leading to a judgment.285 
 
As Simpson suggests, questions of interpretation were often raised on a demurrer. In Colthirst v 
Bejushin, as we saw above, Matthias Colthirst brought an action of trespass against Peter 
Bejushin.286 Bejushin pleaded that he held a lease of the land for life, on condition that he live 
there during his term, and that he had lived there continually since entering the land.287 
Colthirst demurred, and the parties joined issue on whether Bejushin’s plea was sufficient.288 																																																																																																																																																														
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Sjt Pollard, for Colthirst, raised the point of construction: Bejushin was required to live on the 
land throughout his whole term, but he had not shown that he had entered the land as soon 
as his term commenced.289 Sjt Saunders replied that he was not obliged to do so: the 
condition only required that he live on the land at some time during his life.290 In order to 
determine whether Bejushin’s plea was good, the judges were required to rule on the meaning 
of the term in his lease.  
 
One disadvantage of a demurrer was that the party who demurred was required to confess the 
truth of the facts in the relevant pleading. If his case failed on the point of law, he would have 
no opportunity to dispute the facts.291 Parties therefore began to look for ways to raise 
questions of law after a trial of the facts before the jury.292 From the mid-sixteenth century, the 
courts began to allow greater use of special verdicts to achieve this.293 The jury would set out 
the facts of the case and the question of law on which their verdict depended.294 This would 
then be sent to the judges for determination.295 In The Rector of Chedington’s Case (1598), for 
example, the jury found that Nicholas Fitzwilliams had leased a rectory to Elizabeth Elderker 
for 80 years, if she should live so long, and, if she died or alienated the land during the 80 
years, remainder to Ralph Elderker on the same proviso, and then to William Elderker and 
Thomas Elderker.296 All four Elderkers died within the 80 years, and the lease passed from 
Thomas’s administrators to the defendant. Meanwhile, a new rector had been admitted to the 
rectory, and had leased it to the plaintiff. The plaintiff entered on the defendant, and the 
defendant re-entered. The jury then enquired of the court whether the defendant’s entry was 
lawful.297 Again, in order to determine this question, the judges were required to interpret the 
lease and identify whether Thomas had held a good title under it. 
 
Questions of interpretation could also arise on a writ of error, brought by a disappointed party 
to have the judgment against him reversed.298 Because the court of error could not look 																																																								
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behind the record, this procedure was of limited use before the sixteenth century: only 
procedural errors were likely to appear on the record.299 However, when a special verdict had 
been entered, more details of the case would appear, so that points of substance could also be 
raised by a writ of error.300 Error initially went from the Common Pleas to the King’s Bench, 
and from the King’s Bench to Parliament. In 1585, a new Exchequer Chamber was 
established to hear cases of error from the King’s Bench, consisting of the justices of the 
Common Pleas and the Barons of the Exchequer.301 In Slingsby’s Case (1587), for example, 
Frances Slingsby and her husband had successfully brought an action of covenant against 
Roger Beckwith in the King’s Bench. Beckwith then brought a writ of error in the Exchequer 
Chamber, and the judgment of the King’s Bench was reversed.302 The Slingsbys had pleaded 
a covenant made to Frances and three other parties, but the judges of the Exchequer 
Chamber held that the words of the covenant were joint, rather than several. As a result, 
Frances could not succeed unless the other covenantees were joined in her action.303 
 
Questions about the meaning of deeds, then, were of great significance to many people in our 
period, particularly those with interests in land. Furthermore, procedural changes enabled 
parties to raise these issues more frequently in court. Parties also had better prospects of 
receiving clear answers: the courts were becoming more likely to give reasoned judgments, 
and those judgments carried greater authority.304 It is therefore no surprise that sixteenth-
century lawyers were so eager to debate the principles to be used for the construction of 
deeds. 
 
1.5. Wills:  introductory remarks 
 
According to West, a last will was ‘the disposition or bestowing of a man’s own goods and 
lands, taking effect after his death.’305 A testament, being ‘the principal kind’ of will, was 
‘defined by most men voluntatis nostrae justa sententia, de eo quod quis post mortem suam fieri velit’ [a 
will is a lawful expression of our wishes, concerning that which someone wishes to be done 																																																								
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after his death].306 This definition was derived from the Digest,307 and was used by common 
lawyers308 as well as canon lawyers.309  
 
It is perhaps unsurprising that West reached for a civilian definition of a will, since the 
common law’s jurisdiction over wills was relatively recent. Since the twelfth century, the 
common law rules of inheritance had governed the descent of freehold land.310 Thus, except 
where land was devisable by local custom, only chattels could pass by will.311 Such wills fell 
under the jurisdiction of the canon law.312 Since the fourteenth century, however, landowners 
had been exploiting uses to effectively gain the power to devise their land. The cestui que use 
would simply direct his feoffees to pass the land to a particular person on his death.313 
Following the statute of 1484, the devisee would then have the power to dispose of the land 
itself.314 Only in a very technical sense were landowners still unable to devise freehold land.315 
As we have seen, the Statute of Uses put paid to such devises by use. However, this was 
extremely unpopular amongst landowners, and lawyers swiftly invented devices to evade it.316 
In 1540, Parliament backed down. The Statute of Wills granted landowners the power to 
devise two-thirds of their land held by knight’s service, and all of their socage land.317 
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The common law, then, acquired responsibility for devises of freehold land, while the 
ecclesiastical courts retained their jurisdiction over wills of chattels, including leases for terms 
of years. Sometimes these were separate documents, especially where the testator was a 
significant landholder.318 In other cases, however, they could be separate parts of the same 
document. The sample wills set out by West in his Symboleography, for example, included both 
devises of the testator’s land and bequests of his goods.319 In Pawlet Marquess of Winchester’s Case 
(1599), the Marquess had made a will devising both his lands and his chattels.320 It appeared 
that the Marquess had not been of sane memory at the time, and the King’s Bench granted a 
prohibition to stay proceedings in the ecclesiastical courts. Since ‘the will concerning the land, 
and the testament concerning the goods are mixed together in one will,’ the judges thought 
that the common law ought to determine whether the Marquess had sufficient capacity to 
make both.321 A common law action might also be brought against a party who had failed to 
comply with the canon law on a devise, requiring the common law courts to apply the 
canonists’ rules to a will of chattels.322 As Helmholz observes, the division between land and 
chattels could be ‘quite unstable’ in practice.323 
 
Common lawyers preferred to keep canon law rules at a certain remove. Since wills of 
freehold land were made by statutory authority, they were deemed to operate on a different 
plane to wills of chattels.324 As a result, readers on wills tended to stolidly ignore the canon 
law, even where it had rules on issues, such as testamentary capacity, that concerned them 
both.325 Similarly, canonists like Henry Swinburne focused on the civil law and avoided 
references to wills of land.326 However, as we have seen, common lawyers were prepared to 
adopt the civilian definition of a will, and some spoke of the new devise of land as part of a 
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history stretching back to the Twelve Tables.327 Canon law and common law wills might have 
had different rules, but they were recognised to be conceptually similar. Indeed, in chapter 
three, we will see that common lawyers were not above borrowing canonist ideas about the 
interpretation of wills.328 
 
Making a will was regarded as an important religious duty. Christians had long been strongly 
encouraged to leave bequests for pious causes329 and to arrange the repayment of their debts 
before death.330 It had been regarded as sinful not to make a will of chattels,331 and wills of 
freehold land now took on a similar importance. Testators frequently devised their land to 
provide for charitable purposes, the care of their families, or the payment of their debts.332 In 
the preface to the Statute of Wills, Parliament noted the fear that a testator’s chattels might be 
insufficient to provide for the payment of his debts and the care of his family.333 Echoing this 
statutory language, Fulbecke wrote that the making of wills was ‘necessary,’ since 
 
without it men cannot effect the good education and bringing up of their 
children, nor be able of their proper goods, chattels and other moveable 
substance to discharge their debts, and after their degrees set forth and advance 
their children and posterity: nor leave their wives such comfortable support as in 
conscience they ought.334 
 
Coke warned that it was ‘some blemish or touch to a man well esteemed for his wisdom and 
discretion all his life, to leave a troubled estate behind him amongst his wife, children, or 
kindred, after his death.’335 
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Yet despite the importance of wills, they were rarely made in advance. It was a popular 
superstition that making a will would hasten one’s death.336 As a result, most testators did not 
make their wills until they were on their deathbeds,337 unless they had a particularly pressing 
reason to do so, such as embarking on foreign travel.338 A will was required to be in writing by 
the Statute,339 but very few testators wrote their own wills. Most were either illiterate, or 
incapacitated by their final illness and no longer able to write.340 Generally, a scribe would be 
called, either a professional notary or member of the clergy, or simply a literate friend or 
family member.341 The testator would then make an oral declaration of his will, which would 
be noted by the scribe and later written out in full.342 The written testament might therefore 
be produced only after the testator’s death.343 In Brown v Sackville (1552), for example, the 
testator was ‘sick in bed,’ and sent for ‘Mr. Atkins, a man learned in the law.’ Atkins took 
notes of the testator’s will and left to ‘put the said will in writing according to due form of law.’ 
The testator died before he could have the will read back to him, but it was held to be good 
regardless.344  
 
It was likely that most scribes did not have legal training. In fact, it was conclusively presumed 
by the courts that a testator had made his will without the aid of counsel.345 We will examine 
the implications of this presumption in chapter three.346 Model wills, however, had been in 
circulation since at least the late thirteenth century,347 and both Phayer and West included 
sample wills in their printed books of precedents.348 Will formularies were also circulating in 
manuscript form349 and, by the mid-seventeenth century, in popular almanacs.350  																																																								
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There were restrictions on who could make a valid will. According to an explanatory statute 
passed after the Statute of Wills, a will of freehold land made by ‘any woman covert, or person 
within the age of 21 years, idiot or by any person de non sane memory shall not be taken to be 
good or effectual in the law.’351 Thus, while an unmarried woman could make a will of land, a 
feme covert could not.352 As Coke put it, ‘a feme covert has not any will,’ since ‘after marriage the 
whole will of the wife is in judgment of law subject to the will of the husband.’353 A married 
woman could make a will of chattels with the consent of her husband,354 but not a will of 
land.355 Unmarried women were much less likely to make wills than men were,356 although 
many did.357 Most women who made wills were widows.358 
 
Infants were unable to make wills of freehold land, although they had a limited ability to 
bequeath chattels.359 Parties suffering a ‘defect of mind’ could not make wills. As West put it, 
these included ‘doting old persons wanting judgment,’ ‘drunkards void of reason,’ and ‘mad 
fools and idiots.’360 Coke explained that, to have a ‘sane and perfect memory,’ a testator must 
‘have a disposing memory, so that he is able to make a disposition of his lands with 
understanding and reason.’ It was not enough that he was simply able to ‘answer familiar and 
usual questions.’361 A person who had been deaf, blind or mute since birth would be unable to 
make a will, but those who had later become so could make their wills by writing or by 
																																																																																																																																																														
350 ibid 20. 
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making signs.362 Unsurprisingly, the more prosperous classes of society were the most likely to 
make wills.363 
 
Wills shared certain characteristics with deeds. Both were written instruments, subject to legal 
formality requirements, made by private persons in order to create legal rights and 
obligations. Such similarities were noted by lawyers at the time. West’s concept of 
‘symboleography’, for instance, covered the making of all ‘written instruments.’364 Instruments 
that were made by private persons, he explained, were ‘of two sorts, namely, instruments of 
agreements, or contracts, and of testaments or last wills.’365 He set out five similarities between 
deeds and wills. Firstly, they were ‘formal writing[s],’ to be distinguished from ordinary 
writings made ‘for a man’s own private use and memory.’366 Secondly, they were written on 
paper or parchment. 367  Thirdly, they could ‘breed obligations,’ unlike ‘bare speeches, 
communications, or private notes.’368 Fourthly, they were made by ‘persons.’369 Finally, they 
were ‘a kind of proof,’ having been instituted so that ‘the acts and things therein comprised 
might both more certainly be kept in memory, and more easily to be proved.’370 
 
A will of freehold land was also considered to operate as a conveyance, in the same way as any 
inter vivos grant of land.371 Wills of land made under the Statute were a replacement for wills of 
land made by use. Lawyers therefore continued to treat them as the same kind of transaction. 
Land devised by will was conveyed directly to the devisees, without passing through the hands 
of the executors.372 Because a will was treated in the same way as a conveyance, it was not 
fully ambulatory. A will would only pass land held by the testator at the time he made the will, 
unless he explicitly referred to land he intended to purchase later.373 The testator would 																																																								
362 West, The First Part of Symboleography (n 143) s 634. 
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therefore have to re-publish his will every time his landholdings changed.374 This rule will be 
discussed further in chapter four.375 
 
There were also significant differences between wills and other kinds of conveyance. Even if a 
will had been written and published, it took effect only on the testator’s death.376 The devisees 
therefore obtained no rights during the testator’s lifetime.377 Coke explained that ‘omne 
testamentum morte consummatum est: et voluntas est ambulatoria usque extremum vitae exitum’ [every 
testament is completed by death, and a will is ambulatory until the last moment of life].378 As 
a result, ‘it would be against the nature of a will to be so absolute’ that it could not be revoked 
by the testator.379 In fact, a will could be revoked by parol at any time. In one case, the 
testator had made his will in writing, but later declared by parol that he revoked the devise of 
his land to Harrison. Before he could reach town to alter his written will, he was murdered by 
Harrison. It was held that the parol revocation of his will was good.380 A devise could not, 
therefore, be relied upon in the same way that a deed could.381 Nor did a written will satisfy 
the formal requirements of a deed. Thus, interests that could only be created by deed could 
not be created by a will.382 
 
Unsurprisingly, questions about the meaning of wills of land generally arose on actions used to 
try title to land. Of Plowden’s four cases on the interpretation of a will, two were brought on 
actions of trespass,383 one on replevin,384 and one on an assize of novel disseisin.385 Coke did 
not always specify the writ on which his cases had been brought,386 but when he did, they 
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were similar to those we have seen in cases on deeds: ejectment,387 replevin,388 second 
deliverance389 and debt.390 The common law only had jurisdiction over wills of freehold land. 
A lease for years was a chattel real, and its bequest was a matter for the ecclesiastical courts.391 
However, questions about the devise of a lease for years could be raised in actions like 
trespass.392 Furthermore, cases concerning the devise of a freehold were often brought, not by 
the devisees themselves, but by their lessees.393 
 
The meaning of a will, like that of a deed, was a matter of law. Questions of interpretation 
arose by similar means. Some were raised on a demurrer. In Brett v Rigden (1568), for example, 
Thomas Brett brought an action of replevin against John Rigden for taking his cows.394 
Rigden pleaded that the land on which the cows had been taken was devised by Giles Brett to 
his great-nephew, who had leased it to Rigden.395 Brett demurred.396 The question for the 
judges was whether or not Giles had made a good devise of the land.397 
 
Other cases were brought on a special verdict. For example, in Boraston’s Case (1587), Richard 
Hynde brought ejectment against William Ambrye. The jury found that Thomas Boraston 
had devised his land to his executors until Hugh Boraston reached the age of 21, and then to 
Hugh in fee.398 However, Hugh died at the age of nine.399 At the end of the executors’ term, 
Philip Boraston, Hugh’s brother, entered as his heir, and leased the land to Ambrye. 
Thomas’s heirs then entered and leased the land to Hynde, who was ejected by Ambrye. The 
jury asked the court whether Ambrye’s entry had been lawful.400 This question required the 
judges to determine the nature of the interest devised to Hugh in the will.   																																																								
387 For example, Boraston’s Case (1587) 3 Co Rep 19a; Wild’s Case (1599) 6 Co Rep 16b; Adams and 
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Finally, questions of interpretation could be the subject of a writ of error. In Lowen v Coxe 
(1599), for example, Sibil Lowen brought an action of debt against Coxe in the King’s Bench. 
She claimed the rent due on a lease made to Coxe by her late husband Thomas.401 Coxe 
pleaded that the land had originally been held by William Coxe, who had devised it to 
Thomas and John Coxe ‘equally, and to their heirs.’ John was still alive. Lowen demurred.402 
The question was then whether Thomas and John were joint tenants or tenants in common 
by the words of William’s will. The King’s Bench held that they were tenants in common, so 
that Coxe’s plea was insufficient.403 Coxe then brought a writ of error in the Exchequer 
Chamber, where the judgment of the King’s Bench was affirmed.404  
 
Questions about the meaning of wills were both relatively novel and highly significant, since 
they governed entitlements to estates in land. As with deeds, procedural changes encouraged 
parties to raise questions about the interpretation of wills, and the courts to give authoritative 
answers. By the mid-sixteenth century, the stage was therefore set for our ‘interpretation 
boom.’ 
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2 .  T H E  S I G N I F I C A T I O N  O F  W O R D S  	
2.1. Introduction 
 
The first step towards understanding a legal instrument was to identify the meaning of its 
words. In fact, this was regarded as a separate exercise to the interpretation of the document. 
Writers like Christopher St German only spoke of an ‘interpretation’ when there was a 
departure from the meaning of the words.1 Fulbecke, for example, thought that it was ‘foolish’ 
to doubt the meaning of words where it was ‘plain and manifest.’2 He explained that, ‘when 
the words of a covenant or devise be clear and manifest, we follow the literal sense of them 
without further investigation, because in things that be certain, and apparent, there is no place 
for conjecture.’3 Similarly, in Bold v Molineux (1536), Fitzherbert and Baldwin JJ argued that ‘if 
a condition, or words in deeds and statutes, have a meaning, they do not want 
interpretation.’4 Only ‘if the words do not bear apparent meaning, but obscure,’ did a process 
of interpretation begin, one which required ‘the intention of the makers and parties’ to be 
‘expounded.’5 In the following chapters, we will examine this process of interpretation more 
closely. For now, however, we will confine our attention to the prior question: how did the 
courts identify the meaning of the words? 
 
Much has been written on Renaissance theories of language and meaning. Richard Waswo, 
for example, has claimed that the Platonic account of words as signs of things was beginning 
to dissolve in this period.6 Instead, scholars either explicitly or implicitly recognised that words 
did not necessarily stand for things, but could in fact have an apparently unlimited range of 
meanings.7 Maclean, however, argues that there is little evidence of this kind of crisis of 
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meaning amongst Renaissance lawyers in the ius commune.8 For civilian jurists, words had a 
‘true and proper’ signification, which could be extended or restricted by a process of 
interpretation.9 The same appears to have been true of common lawyers. Words were always 
considered to have a ‘proper signification,’10 although this was not necessarily conclusive as to 
the interpretation they would be given by the courts. The law could ‘draw’ even unambiguous 
words ‘from their proper and usual signification’ as part of the interpretive process.11 This 
chapter will ask how lawyers established the ‘proper signification’ of words in the first place. 
We will examine the role of definitions and grammar, and consider the relationship between 
the legal and common usage of words.  
 
2.2. Grammar and language 
 
Common lawyers primarily relied on the rules of grammar to identify the proper signification 
of words. As Brian Cummings explains, grammar in the early modern period was ‘the 
foundation of literacy in general.’12 The basis of both school and university curricula, it 
included language skills, literary theory, and ‘the interpretation of linguistic meaning.’13 
Discussions of grammar appear frequently in the law reports of this period, and it is clear that 
some lawyers had a particularly strong interest in its precepts. Dyer was especially fond of 
discussing grammar and etymology, and was careful to record discussions of grammar in his 
reports.14 
 
In Bold v Molineux, for example, Richard Bold had married William Molineux’s daughter 
Johan. Molineux made a bond for £30 to Bold, on the condition that he would not pay if 
Johan died before the Feast of St John the Baptist in 1533 without issue male then living. 
Johan had a son and died. Her son also died, after Johan but before the Feast.15 The question 
was whether the son had to be living at the time of the Feast or at the time of Johan’s death, 
prompting a debate on the meaning of the word ‘then.’ Sjt Mountague, for example, relied on 																																																								
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‘the rules of grammar’ to argue that ‘then’ referred to the time of the Feast. Firstly, because 
‘then’ was ‘an adverb of time,’ it must relate ‘to a time certain, and not to an uncertain 
time.’16 Secondly, ‘“tunc” significat tempus extremum [means the last time] by the civilians,’ and 
so ‘by construction of the rules of grammar, when a thing is doubtful, and may be referred to 
a double intent, ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio’ [relative words refer to the nearest 
antecedent].17 Counsel for Bold engaged with this point, objecting that ‘in many cases the 
relative shall not refer ad proximum antecedens,’ if the sense was otherwise.18 For example, if J.S. 
bargained and sold his land to J.N., ‘and the aforesaid John covenants to deliver the evidences of 
the land,’ this would refer to the first J.S., and not to J.N.19 Shelley J observed that the case 
had ‘been well argued over at the bar, and several good grounds of construction of deeds 
recited, and also rules of grammar and maxims of civil law.’20 Ultimately, however, these were 
inconclusive. Fitzherbert and Baldwin JJ concluded that the words of the deed were ‘obscure,’ 
and must be interpreted by reference to the parties’ intentions.21 
 
Egerton was also prone to lengthy discourses on grammar. In Saunders v Stanfourde, for 
example, the Prior of Wroxton had leased land to Richard Alderman for 30 years. The 
freehold was subsequently surrendered to the King, who sold it to Thomas Pope.22 Pope 
leased the land to Giles Poulton for 50 years, with a proviso that the lease would be void if 
Poulton did not quietly enjoy the land, but was disturbed and put out of possession by 
Alderman.23 Alderman did enter the land, but not until after Poulton’s death. The question 
was whether the lease to Poulton had terminated on Alderman’s entry, or whether Poulton’s 
executor could claim the land after Alderman’s lease expired.24 Egerton spent several pages of 
his draft argument analysing the grammar of the proviso in detail. First, he observed that the 
sentence had ‘two distinct parts and propositions, which are severed and divided by this word 
“but”.’25 In this case, the word ‘but’ did not create a new sentence, but ‘serves to explain that 
which was uttered before… as in common speech, we say, “It is not true, but false.”’26 Where 																																																								
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an affirmative proposition preceded a ‘but,’ and a negative followed it, ‘the one part expounds 
the other, and the latter does not contain a new thing.’27 He then sought to define the word 
‘possession’: it need not necessarily mean ‘actual and manual possession,’ he explained, but 
simply ‘the right to possession.’28 As a result, the lessee could have been put out of possession 
even if he had not actually been on the land. Finally, he examined the word ‘and.’ Here, he 
argued, ‘and’ ought to be taken as a disjunctive, ‘for otherwise, if it will be taken for a 
copulative, many absurdities ensue in the penning and construction of this short proviso, and 
all contrary to the plain and simple meaning of the parties.’29 He therefore concluded that the 
lease to Poulton had terminated when Alderman entered the land, even though Poulton 
himself had not been disturbed.30  
 
For common lawyers, grammar had a close association with the ius commune.31 In his ‘Speech 
touching the Post-Nati’ (1608), Egerton noted that many arguments based on definition and 
etymology had ‘been drawn out of some writers of the civil law.’32 He himself was clearly 
aware of civilian approaches to meaning, observing that the law would sometimes take ‘a 
disjunctive for a copulative; a copulative for a disjunctive; the present tense for the future; the 
future for the present,’ and that examples of this were ‘infinite, as well in the civil law as 
common law.’33 We have seen that, in Bold v Molineux, Sjt Mountague referred to the meaning 
given to ‘tunc’ by ‘the civilians,’34 and Shelley J spoke of ‘rules of grammar and maxims of civil 
law.’35 One reason for this was probably that grammar itself was concerned with the Latin 
language, rather than English. The first grammar of the English language was not published 
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until 1586, and even then it was generally assumed that English simply followed the rules of 
Latin.36 
 
Perhaps as a result, lawyers would occasionally translate English words into Latin in order to 
explain their meaning, noting, for example, that ‘that’ is ‘hoc’ in Latin,37 or ‘eftsoons’ ‘iterum.’38 
Coke was particularly inclined to this kind of discussion, especially in the later volumes of his 
reports. In Beresford’s Case (1607), for example, land had been granted ‘to the use of Aden, and 
the heirs males of the said Aden.’39 Coke translated this limitation into Latin in order to 
discourse on the meaning of the word ‘de’ [of].40 Similarly, in Robert Pilfold’s Case (1612), a 
question arose on the meaning of the word ‘damages’ in a statute. Coke chose to examine the 
‘signification’ of the Latin word ‘damna’ to resolve the dispute, although this word was not used 
in the Law French text.41 Elsewhere, Coke relied on etymology to establish the meaning of a 
word. In Lewis Bowles’ Case (1615), for example, he investigated the etymology of ‘impetitio’ 
[impeachment] in order to determine the meaning of a ‘without impeachment of waste’ 
clause.42 In his Commentary upon Littleton, he explained that ‘it is good to search out the 
etymology or right derivation of words,’ for ‘ignoratis terminis, ignoratur & ars’ [where the terms 
are unknown, the art is also unknown].43 
 
In other cases, the document at issue was simply written in Latin in the first place. In his 
Symboleography, West gave precedents for instruments in both English and Latin, explicitly 
noting that both were acceptable.44 Coke discussed the meaning of words like ‘aut’ [or] 45 and 
‘et’ [and]46 where they appeared in deeds that had been written in Latin. Coke was clearly 
confident in his Latin skills, but other lawyers were less so. Wilfrid Prest observes that many 
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barristers probably had little more than ‘a rudimentary knowledge of Latin.’ William Noy, for 
example, once had to seek advice on a patent, admitting that he had ‘forgot [his] Latin.’47  
 
Outside help, therefore, might be needed to explain unfamiliar words to the court. In one 
instance, an action of debt was brought on a bond written entirely in Dutch; the court wrote 
to the Hanseatic League to confirm the meaning of a contested term.48 In Buckley v Rice Thomas 
(1555), one issue was the meaning of the word ‘licet’ in the plaintiff’s declaration.49 Stanford J 
advised that 
 
in order to understand it truly, being a Latin word, we ought to follow the steps 
of our predecessors judges of the law, who, when they were in doubt about the 
meaning of any Latin words, enquired how those that were skilled in the study 
thereof took them, and pursued their construction… Our predecessors have 
always consulted about the meaning of Latin words with grammarians and 
others that best understand them, and such sense as the grammar warrants and 
allows they have admitted; wherefore I apprehend that grammar is the most 
proper judge of the meaning of this word.50 
 
Saunders J agreed: common lawyers ‘were not above being instructed and made wiser’ by 
outside experts.51 Since ‘licet is a Latin word, and the sense of it is to be tried by the grammar,’ 
the judges ‘ought to enquire of the grammar for the meaning of it.’52 He had ‘got the question 
to be proposed to the Doctors of the Arches at their table,’ who had agreed that ‘licet’ was 
perfectly good in this context, and confirmed that ‘they frequently use it in the civil law in 
such sense.’53 
 
Similarly, in Humphreston’s Case (1575), the court resorted to experts in grammar to explain the 
meaning of the Latin word ‘puer’. William Humphreston had suffered a common recovery to 
the use of him and his wife for their lives, remainder to the ‘seniori puero’ of his body. He later 
levied a fine to the use of him and his wife for their lives, remainder to the eldest child of his 																																																								
47 Wilfrid R Prest, The Rise of the Barristers: A Social History of the English Bar 1590-1640 (Clarendon Press 
1991) 108. 
48 Lynche v Osfeld (1570) Dyer’s Notebooks (109 SS) 193, 193. 
49 Buckley v Rice Thomas (1555) Plow 118, 121. 
50 ibid 122. 
51 ibid 125. 
52 ibid. 
53 ibid 126. Seipp notes that this kind of consultation was not uncommon: Seipp (n 31) 409. 
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body. The question was whether the land would remain to his eldest child, a daughter, or to 
his eldest son. Summing up the case, Gawdy J observed that ‘diverse authors of grammar 
have been produced to prove’ that ‘puer’ could mean either a boy or a girl, mentioning 
Ambrose Calepine’s Latin dictionary, and Philip Melanchthon, the theologian.54 ‘Puer’, it 
seemed, could refer to a daughter ‘in grammatical construction, and exposition of the civil 
law,’55 although it was ‘taken for male in any modern author.’56 The judges concluded that 
the Latin word was ambiguous, and went on to consider what Humphreston’s intentions must 
have been. In another case, Thomas Elyot’s English-Latin dictionary was prayed in aid by the 
court.57 
 
It is clear, however, that the rules of grammar were not considered to be part of the law of 
interpretation. Rather, they were a useful resource for lawyers to draw on when questions of 
language were at issue. In Buckley, Saunders J explained that ‘if matters arise in our law which 
concern other sciences or faculties, we commonly apply for the aid of that science or faculty 
which it concerns.’ For example, a judge might be ‘informed by surgeons whether it be a 
mayhem or not, because their knowledge and skill can best discern it.’58 Similarly, Bacon 
lauded the common law for being ‘contented to hear and be advised by other sciences in 
matters of dependency upon them, as in cases of exposition of words by grammarians,’ or ‘in 
minerals by natural philosophers.’59 
 
It should also be stressed that references to the civil law in this context had little to do with the 
substance of the law itself. As Stanford J had observed, civilians were simply people who knew 
some Latin, on a par with grammarians. In Fysher v Boys, for example, Egerton referred to 
Justinian’s Institutes and Digest, but as sources of Latin rather than law.60 Williams suggests 
that civilian texts were so often used only because ‘much of the early-modern activity in the 
																																																								
54 Humphreston’s Case (1574) 2 Leo 216, 217. 
55 Lane v Cowper (1575) Moore 103, 104. 
56 Lane v Coups (undated) Owen 64, 64. 
57 Case of the Bishopric of Chichester (1559) Dyer’s Notebooks (109 SS) 28, 29. 
58 Buckley v Rice Thomas (n 49) 124–5. See also The Reports of Sir Edward Coke, vol II (Joseph Butterworth 
and Son 1826) 3 Co Rep xxxviii. 
59 Le Case del Union, del Realm, D’Escose, ove Angleterre (1606) Moore 790, 791.  
60 Fysher v Boys (undated) Hunt MS El 482 f190, f190v. See I.2.1.1-6 and D.1.8. 
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study of Latin was undertaken with legal texts, often by civil lawyers.’61 Such references were 
‘linguistic rather than substantive,’62 and often made more or less in passing.63  
 
Lawyers were also continually warned that they could not simply rely on definitions and 
grammar to understand a document. For a start, grammar itself might not give a clear 
answer. In 1456, Moyle J recalled ‘a discussion with a master of grammar,’ who had 
explained that ‘often times the past tense will be taken for the present tense, and one word for 
another, and all will be saved and excused by figures and rules of grammar.’64 Definitions 
might also be unreliable. In Humphreston’s Case, for example, Plowden argued that Latin words 
could be deceptive. After all, ‘libra [pound] in Latin signifies a weight; and yet if I am bound 
in vigint[is] libris [twenty pounds], if I forfeit my bond, I must pay money, and not lead, or 
the like.’65 In Mathew v Harecourt (1590), an assumpsit case, the court observed that, when a 
barrel of beer was sold, only the beer would pass to the buyer, but when a hogshead of wine 
was sold, both the hogshead and the wine would be given.66 ‘This construction,’ they noted, ‘is 
not according to the nature of the words, but according to their common reputation.’67  
 
Egerton, too, warned that ‘definition and description’ were ‘uncertain and dangerous,’ while 
relying on etymology was ‘ridiculous and vain.’68 It might ‘serve a turn in schools, but it is too 
light for judgments in law.’69 Lawyers should ask what the words had been used for, not where 
they had come from.70 Even Coke admitted that grammar was not the be-all and end-all. In 
his Commentary upon Littleton, he noted that a double negative ‘in legal construction shall not 
hinder the negative.’ Thus, ‘the grammatical construction is not always in judgment of law to 
be followed.’71 Elsewhere, he admonished his reader that, while bad grammar would not 
avoid a deed, it was nevertheless to be avoided.72 																																																								
61 Ian Williams, ‘English Legal Reasoning and Legal Culture, c.1528-c.1642’ (PhD thesis, University of 
Cambridge 2008) 123. 
62 ibid. See also David Ibbetson, Common Law and Ius Commune (Selden Society 2001) 16. 
63 See, for example, The Case of Barretry (1578) 8 Co Rep 36b, 37a; The Case of Monopolies (1602) 11 Co 
Rep 84b, 86b. A different kind of case arose when a common law court was required to adjudicate on 
the meaning of a term in the canon law: see, for example, Portman v Willis (1595) Cro Eliz 386. 
64 (1456) YB Mich 35 Hen VI pl 25, f15b-17b, f16b. 
65 Lane v Coups (n 56) 64. 
66 Mathew v Harecourt (1590) Savile 124, 124. 
67 ibid 125. 
68 Knafla (n 32) 229. 
69 ibid. 
70 ibid. 
71 Coke (n 43) 223v. 
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2.3. Legal and common usage 
 
In other cases, common law texts were used to establish the meaning of a word. In some 
cases, they were simply treated as alternative sources of linguistic meaning. Writs, for 
example, could be used to demonstrate the rules of grammar or Latin usage. In Bold v 
Molineux, a cui in vita writ was used as an example of a good grammatical construction.73 
Similarly, in a 1561 case, Dyer CJ argued that a grant of a ‘messuagium’ did not pass a garden: 
in a praecipe writ, he explained, a messuage and a garden were named separately, ‘which 
proves them to be several.’74 In Buckley v Rice Thomas, Saunders J even described the Register 
of Writs as ‘our Calapine,’ a reference to Calepine’s dictionary.75 Having quoted the works of 
Fortescue and Polydore Vergil to demonstrate ‘the usage of those that are acquainted with the 
Latin tongue,’ he also cited a number of writs as evidence of the meaning of the word ‘licet.’76 
 
Previous cases could also be used to demonstrate the meaning of a word. In Andrew Ognel’s Case 
(1587), Coke cited two Year Books cases ‘for the exposition of’ the word ‘et’.77 In Saunders v 
Stanfourde, Egerton referred to the Year Books to demonstrate the meaning of ‘ita quod’ [so 
that].78 More often, though, a legal authority was cited to establish that the word in question 
had a specific legal meaning. In his Commentary upon Littleton, Coke observed that common 
lawyers used ‘significant words framed by art, which are called vocabula artis [words of art], 
though they be not proper to any language.’79 Many of these were ‘ancient terms and words 
drawn from that legal French,’ which were ‘woven in the laws themselves.’80 Fulbecke advised 
law students to use ‘diligence’ in learning these words, because they had been ‘devised for 
acquainting the mind with the rules and mysteries of their arts.’81  
 
Specifically legal precedents were therefore required to understand these words. In a 1576 
case, for example, rent was due ‘at Michaelmas, or by the space of a quarter of a year after.’ 																																																																																																																																																														
72 Henry Finch’s Case (n 45) 39b. 
73 Bold v Molineux (n 4) 15b. 
74 Anon (1561) Moore 24, 24. See also Portman v Willis (n 63) 387. 
75 Buckley v Rice Thomas (n 49) 125. 
76 ibid. 
77 Andrew Ognel’s Case (n 46) 50a. See (1440) YB Mich 19 Hen VI pl 7, f3b-4b and (1469) YB Mich 9 
Edw IV pl 28, f42b. 
78 Saunders & Starkey v Stanfourde (n 22) f75. See (1370) YB Trin 44 Edw III pl 24, f21b-22a. 
79 Coke (n 43) 101v. 
80 ibid preface (unpaginated). 
81 Fulbecke (n 2) 30. 
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Bendlowes produced ‘an old book of the Exchequer’ to prove that a quarter of a year was 
considered by the law to mean 91 days, ‘and to the six hours over, the law pays no regard.’82 
Similarly, although the ‘natural day’ was 24 hours long, Bracton was authority that the 
‘artificial day’ ended at sunset, so that rent due on a particular day must be paid before dark.83 
Other words carried a legal implication when used in a deed: for example, the word 
‘excambium’ [exchange] implied a condition of re-entry and a warranty of voucher.84 
 
Coke, in particular, delighted in recording these terms of art. In Edward Altham’s Case (1610), 
Marcia Nash argued that she had not given up all her right to her dower when she released all 
her ‘actiones… sectas, querelas et demanda’  [actions… suits, quarrels and demands] against 
Thomas Nash.85 Coke painstakingly analysed the meaning of each of these words in turn, 
relying heavily on how they had been understood in previous cases. ‘Quarrels,’ for example, 
had been held to cover both real and personal actions in a 1469 case, as well as causes of 
actions in 1460. Coke was also unable to resist adding notes on the etymology of ‘querela’ and 
its synonyms.86 In his Commentary upon Littleton, he expanded on the point further: querela 
‘properly’ referred only to personal actions, where the plaintiff was called the ‘querens,’ and the 
writ used the word ‘queritur.’ However, a release of all quarrels would be taken more 
extensively than the strict meaning of the word, on the principle that a deed was taken most 
strongly against its writer.87 The Commentary is full of similar discourses on the meaning of 
words. In the first chapter, for example, the word ‘lands’ inspired Coke to write several pages 
on the words that could be used for different kinds of land:   
 
In our Latin a wood is called boscus. Grava signifieth a little wood, in old deeds, 
and Hirst or Hurst a wood, and so doth Holt and Shawe. Twaite signifieth a wood 
grubbed up, and turned to arable. Stethe or Stede betokeneth properly a bank of a 
river, and many times a place, as Stowe doth, and Wic, a place upon the seashore, 
or upon a river. Lea or Ley signifieth pasture.88 
 																																																								
82 Anon (1575) Dyer 345a, 345a. 
83 Hill v Grange (1556) Dyer 130a, 130b. 
84 Bustard’s Case (1603) 4 Co Rep 121a, 121a; see also Goodall’s Case (1597) 5 Co Rep 95b, 96b. 
85 Edward Altham’s Case (1610) 8 Co Rep 150b, 150b. 
86 ibid 153b. See (1469) YB Mich 9 Edw IV pl 30, f43b-44b and (1460) YB Mich 39 Hen VI pl 15, f9a-
12a. 
87 Coke (n 43) 292. See 6.5.2. below. 
88 ibid 4v. Fulbecke included a similar, but much shorter, list in his guide for law students: Fulbecke (n 
2) 67v. 
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Egerton shared Coke’s love of language. He frequently highlighted definitions where they 
appeared in his statute books or law reports,89 and made lists of them in his notes.90 His 
library held several lists of legal terms, such as ‘An explanation of sundry titles, and ancient 
obscure words which have been contained in the Great Rolls of the Exchequer for diverse 
hundreds of years now last past.’91  
 
In many cases, it was vital to know the correct legal meaning of a word or phrase. As Coke 
observed, ‘there be many words so appropriated, as that they cannot be legally expressed by 
any other word, or by any periphrasis or circumlocution.’92 The legal effect of an instrument 
could be changed significantly by fine variations of its drafting. For example, certain forms of 
words were needed to limit different kinds of estates. Littleton warned that, to pass the fee 
simple of land to another, it had to be granted ‘to him and to his heirs.’ A phrase like ‘to him 
forever,’ or ‘to him and to his assigns forever,’ would not suffice, because it lacked ‘these 
words “his heirs,” which words only make the estate of inheritance in all feoffments and 
grants.’93  
 
Thus, in Pagett v Aston (1580), the Bishop of Coventry had covenanted to grant a 
woodwardship and estovers to Sir Edward Aston and his heirs. He subsequently made an 
indenture, reciting this covenant, in which he granted the office and estovers to Sir Edward, 
‘for the easement of the said Edward and his heirs.’94 Although the Bishop’s intention was 
clearly to grant the office to Sir Edward and his heirs, Egerton successfully argued that he had 
failed to do so, since the grant itself did not mention heirs. As Egerton explained, ‘in every 
grant where any estate of inheritance passes, it must have apt words to express it, and this is 
what Littleton has, that these words, his heirs,’ are required.95 The court agreed that ‘here no 
inheritance in the things granted passed to the said Sir Edward but only an interest for his 
own life; for the grant was to Sir Edward only without the word, heirs.’96 
 																																																								
89 See, for example, William Rastell, A Collection of All the Statutes (Richard Tottell 1572) Hunt RB 59499 
f213; Edmund Plowden, Les Comentaries, Ou Les Reportes de Edmunde Plowden (Richard Tottell 1571) Hunt 
RB 62961 f54v, f276v, f375. 
90 Pagett v Aston (1580) Hunt MS El 482 f204, f215. 
91 Hunt MS El 2629. 
92 Coke (n 43) 9. 
93 Thomas Littleton, Littleton Tenures in Englishe (Richard Tottell 1556) 2. 
94 The Lord Paget and Sir Walter Ashtons Case (1583) 1 Leo 2, 2. 
95 Pagett v Aston (n 90) f212.  
96 The Lord Paget and Sir Walter Ashtons Case (n 94) 2. 
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There were also strict rules about the words that were required to make a grant conditional. 
Dyer, for example, explained that the words ‘eâ conditione’ or ‘si contingat’ did not ‘make a 
condition’ by themselves, but only ‘a confidence and trust.’ However, the words ‘sub conditione, 
ita quod, proviso imply the penalty of a condition broken’ without more.97 Specific words were 
also required to reserve a rent,98 discharge a debt,99 or make a confirmation100 or warranty.101 
 
However, these rules did not mean that lawyers took an unthinkingly formalistic approach to 
meaning. They also looked at common usage to establish the meaning of a word. Egerton, for 
example, argued that ‘leases’ referred ‘most properly and aptly’ to ‘leases in possession, and 
not in reversion,’ as this was how the words were used ‘in common speech, in writings, and in 
statutes.’102 In another case, he observed that a distinction between the Queen’s ‘progenitors’ 
and her ‘other ancestors’ was ‘usual enough in common speech’ and had ‘been observed in 
the common form of pleading, which is much to be regarded.’103 
 
Lawyers were also prepared to admit that a word had more than one signification, and that it 
could be understood by its ‘common meaning’ instead of its legal meaning. In Edward Altham’s 
Case, Coke observed that the word ‘title’ had ‘two significations, one properly and strictly,’ and 
‘another signification’ in which it was ‘taken largely.’104 Similarly, in a 1583 case, Peryam J 
explained that there were ‘two constructions and meanings’ of the word ‘remainder’: its 
‘proper’ meaning at common law, and its ‘common meaning.’105 Lawyers had long been 
prepared to accept a common meaning where the legal meaning was clearly not what the 
parties had intended.106 As we will see in chapter three, the proper signification of a word 
could often be trumped by reference to the usage intended by the parties.107 
 
																																																								
97 The Duke of Norfolk’s Case (1557) Dyer 138a, 138b. See also Coke (n 43) 203–205. 
98 Coke (n 43) 47. 
99 Hickmot’s Case (1610) 9 Co Rep 52b, 53a. 
100 Coke (n 43) 301v. 
101 ibid 384. 
102 Lepur v Woolf (undated) Hunt MS El 482 f157, f158v. 
103 Anon (undated) Hunt MS El 482 f201, f201. 
104 Edward Altham’s Case (n 85) 153b. 
105 Anon (1583) Moore 122, 123. 
106 See, for example, (1423) YB Mich 2 Hen VI pl 2, f4b-5a, f4b; (1456) Mich 35 Hen 6 pl 25, f15b-
17b, f15b, f16b. 




The courts, then, insisted that an instrument must not be ‘interpreted’ if the meaning of its 
words was clear. They looked to the rules of grammar, to legal precedents, and to common 
usage to understand the proper signification of words. However, lawyers also acknowledged 
that words might bear more than one meaning. Where the words of the document were 
ambiguous, unclear or contradictory, there was plenty of scope for the law of interpretation to 
operate. Identifying the proper signification of the words, then, was only a starting point. In 
the next chapter, we will investigate the extent to which this signification could be displaced 
by evidence that the parties had intended their words to bear a different meaning. 
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As we saw in chapter two, early modern common lawyers recognised that words could have a 
meaning beyond their ‘proper signification.’ Effectively, the potential interpretations of a 
document could be set along a scale. At one end of the scale, the words would be taken 
according to their signification. At the other end, they would be understood as their writer or 
writers had intended them. Where on the scale the correct interpretation lay was primarily 
determined by which kind of document or, occasionally, which part of the document was at 
issue. Thus, the signification of the words was more important when interpreting a deed than 
a will, for which the writer’s intentions carried more weight. Furthermore, intentions were 
even less to be considered when the relevant term of the deed was, for example, an ‘odious’ 
condition or the limitation of an estate. These differences were justified with reference to 
differences in the creation, context and purpose of each kind of document or term. 
 
Within this framework, lawyers’ attitude to interpretation also changed over time. In the mid-
sixteenth century, the signification of the words was generally regarded as subordinate to the 
writer’s intentions, even in deeds. By the early seventeenth century, lawyers were more likely 
to prioritise the signification of the words, even in wills. Instead of arguing that the words of a 
document were subordinate to the writer’s intentions, they began to claim that his intentions 
must be subordinate to his words. 
 
This chapter will examine the extent to which the writer’s intentions would be allowed to 
subvert the proper signification of words in a deed or will. We will see that different 
approaches were taken to wills, to deeds, and to different terms in deeds. The chapter will also 
demonstrate how the courts’ approach to all kinds of instrument changed during the second 




3 .2 .1 .  THE W RITER’S  INTENTIONS 
 
References to the writer’s intentions had been rare in fourteenth-century cases on the 
interpretation of deeds,1 but became increasingly common after the mid-fifteenth century.2  																																																								
1 JM Kaye, Medieval English Conveyances (Cambridge University Press 2009) 243. 
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By the middle of the sixteenth century, when Plowden and Dyer were writing their reports, 
appeals to the parties’ intentions had come to dominate the interpretation of deeds. Because 
of the popularity of Plowden’s and Dyer’s reports in print, their ideas would influence many 
other lawyers. 
 
One particularly influential case was Hill v Grange (1556). Henry Pate had leased a messuage, 
and all the lands appertaining to it, to John Grange.3 William Hill, who had since acquired 
the reversion from Pate, objected that land could not be appurtenant to a messuage, because 
it was of a different nature; no land could therefore have passed by the lease.4 The defendant 
replied that it was ‘the common course throughout the realm’ to make leases this way. ‘If in 
such cases it has always been the intent of the parties in every country,’ he argued,  
 
that the land used with a messuage shall pass by a contract made in such words, 
it is the office of the judges to know the common language of the people, and 
their common method of speaking, and to adjudge upon them according to the 
common course and understanding of the country.5 
 
The judges held that ‘land could not be appurtenant to a messuage in the true sense of the 
word appertaining,’ and that not even immemorial usage could change this fact.6 However, 
they also ruled that, in this case, the word ‘appertaining’ should not be given ‘its proper 
signification,’ but should ‘have such signification as was intended between the parties.’ It 
would be taken to mean the land occupied with the messuage: ‘not according to the true 
definition of it… but in such sense as the party intended it.’7 The lease was therefore good. 
 
A similar problem arose in Throckmerton v Tracy (1555). The Abbot of Tewkesbury had leased 
land to three tenants for lives, then made a lease to John and Margaret Smith for 21 years, 
commencing on the next Michaelmas to follow the deaths of the life tenants. Richard Tracy, a 
successor to the Abbot’s title, claimed that this second lease was void. The problem was that 
the premises of the lease to the Smiths purported to grant the reversion, while the habendum 
clause specified the land itself. Since it was impossible for one person to hold both the 																																																																																																																																																														
2 See, for example, (1440) YB Mich 19 Hen VI pl 7, f3b-4b, f4b; (1456) YB Mich 35 Hen VI pl 25, 
f15b-17b, f16a. 
3 Hill v Grange (1556) Plow 164, 167. 
4 ibid 168. 
5 ibid 169. 
6 ibid 170. 
7 ibid. 
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possession and the reversion of land, the two parts of the deed were repugnant. Either it was 
wholly void, or the premises were valid and the habendum void, so that the lessees were only 
entitled to the reversion.8 However, since the reversion had been destroyed on the deaths of 
the life tenants, this meant that nothing remained for the Smiths to take the following 
Michaelmas.9 
 
The plaintiff, a successor to the Smiths’ title, responded that the Abbot’s intention was ‘very 
apparent’: he wanted the lessees to have the land after the deaths of the life tenants, but had 
used the word ‘reversion’ incorrectly.10 ‘If the intent of the parties appears,’ it was argued, ‘the 
law will construe the words in such sense as to perform that intent rather than in any other 
sense.’11 Thus, although the use of the word ‘reversion’ was ‘not in its proper signification,’12 
the law ought to ‘draw the words from their proper and usual signification to fulfil the 
intention of the parties.’13 Perhaps evincing a lack of faith in this approach, Dyer also claimed 
that the word ‘reversion’ had in fact been used in its ‘proper signification’ here, and that it was 
the common usage that was faulty.14 
 
Stanford J accepted that the word ‘reversion’ had ‘two intendments’: the ‘common sense’ and 
the ‘natural sense.’15 Here, the parties had evidently meant it in its ‘natural sense’, to refer to 
the land that had reverted. He concluded that the lease would ‘be construed according to the 
intent of the parties, and not otherwise.’16 Saunders J took an even more radical approach. 
For him, the meaning of ‘reversion’ was all but irrelevant. Indeed, ‘a grant of the land shall 
make a reversion to pass, and a grant of the reversion shall make the land to pass.’17 What 
mattered was ‘that contracts shall be as it is concluded and agreed between the parties, 
according as their intents may be gathered.’18 He warned judges not to ‘cavil about the words 
in subversion of the plain intent of the parties,’ which was ‘calumnia quaedam’ [a kind of 																																																								
8 Throckmerton v Tracy (1555) Plow 145, 152. If the premises and habendum of a deed were repugnant, the 
habendum would be void: see 5.2.1. below. 
9 ibid 153. 
10 ibid 159. 
11 ibid 154. 
12 ibid. 
13 ibid. 
14 ibid 160. 
15 ibid. 
16 ibid. 
17 ibid 161. 
18 ibid. 
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trickery] and ‘malitiosa juris interpretatio’ [a wicked interpretation of the law].19 Instead, they 
ought to ‘observe and follow the intent of the words’, which were only ‘the testimony of the 
contract.’20 ‘Summum jus,’ he cautioned, was ‘summa injuria’ [the greatest law is the greatest 
injustice].21 
 
As we have seen, Plowden had a reputation as a careful and accurate reporter,22 and the 
results in both of these cases are confirmed by Dyer.23 Neither was Plowden necessarily biased 
in his selection of cases, since similar discussions can readily be found in Dyer’s reports. In 
Reade v Bullocke (1543), for example, Dyer reported Shelley J’s observation that ‘he thought this 
doctrine honest, and wished it were used, s. that every man skilled in the law would construe a 
deed after the intention of the maker, as far as by his ingenuity and reason he is able.’24 
 
The same approach is evident in Bold v Molineux (1536), also reported by Dyer. As we saw in 
chapter two, Molineux had made a bond for £30 to Bold, on condition that he would not pay 
if Johan died before the Feast of St John the Baptist in 1533 without issue male then living.25 
The question was whether the son had to be living at the time of the Feast or at the time of 
Johan’s death. The parties began by squabbling over the grammar of the condition: what did 
the word ‘then’ mean? However, this was not ultimately decisive. Shelley J thought that the 
‘sense’ of the condition was more important than the words in which it had been expressed, 
concluding that ‘then’ seemed to refer to the time of Johan’s death.26 Fitzherbert and Baldwin 
JJ, however, believed that the circumstances suggested a different intention. Fitzherbert J 
‘argued much upon the intent of making’ the bond.27 It was, he observed, ‘the common 
practice of all men who give large sums of money with the marriage of their children’ to 
include such conditions. This was to ensure that ‘if the issue die, the payment shall 




20 Throckmerton v Tracy (n 8) 161. 
21 ibid 161–2. 
22 See 1.2. above. 
23 Hill v Grange (1556) Dyer 130a; Throgmorton v Tracey (1555) Dyer 124b. 
24 Reade v Bullocke (1543) Dyer 56b, 56b. 
25 See 2.2. above. 
26 Bold v Molineux (1536) Dyer 14b, 16b. 
27 ibid. 
28 ibid 17b. 
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Because they were printed, these case reports were readily available for future lawyers’ 
reference. Anderson even wrote that he would not mention cases showing that words in deeds 
were to be taken by the parties’ intentions, because ‘the common books in print contain many 
such cases.’29 Egerton, who owned a heavily-annotated copy of Plowden’s Commentaries,30 
referred to it often. In his argument in Saunders v Stanfourde, for example, he made 45 
references to earlier cases, 36 from the Year Books and nine from Plowden.31 Plowden’s 
influence is very clear in Egerton’s argument. In that case, as we have seen, land had been 
leased to Giles Poulton, proviso that the lease would be void if Poulton did not quietly enjoy 
the land, but were put out of possession by Alderman. The question was whether the lease 
had been lost when Alderman entered after Poulton’s death.32 Although Egerton examined 
the grammar of the proviso in minute detail, he also relied heavily on the intentions of the 
parties to establish its meaning. He argued that, even though Poulton had not been ‘put out of 
possession’ by Alderman, the parties would have intended such an entry to terminate the 
lease. ‘It is good,’ he explained, 
 
to apply the words to serve the meaning of the parties, and to the end for which 
they were ordained. And to remember, qui haeret in litera, haeret in cortice [he who 
sticks to the letter, sticks to the shell]… In our law, in construction of writings 
and deeds, the precision of the words has not been regarded, but the words have 
been applied to the meaning of the parties.33 
 
‘Qui haeret in litera, haeret in cortice’ recalled a discussion of statutory interpretation in Plowden’s 
Commentaries.34 Egerton went on to discuss Hill v Grange as a case where the words of a deed 
were not ‘construed according to their natural property, but will be applied to the end and 
intention of the parties.’35 He also drew from Throckmerton v Tracy, noting Saunders J’s point 
that ‘by the grant of the land, the reversion of the same land passes,’36 and echoing his 
																																																								
29 Williams v Evesque de Lincoln (undated) 2 And 173, 175. 
30 Edmund Plowden, Les Comentaries, Ou Les Reportes de Edmunde Plowden (Richard Tottell 1571) Hunt RB 
62961. 
31 Saunders & Starkey v Stanfourde (undated) Hunt MS El 482 f70. 
32 See 2.2. above. 
33 Saunders & Starkey v Stanfourde (n 31) f72.  
34 Eyston v Studd (1574) Plow 459, 467. 
35 Saunders & Starkey v Stanfourde (n 31) f72.  
36 ibid. 
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warning that ‘cavillation with words contrary to the simple meaning’ was ‘a wicked 
interpretation of the law.’37  
 
Plowden’s cases on interpretation also influenced later treatise-writers. For example, Edward 
Hake’s Dialogue on Equity, composed at the very end of the sixteenth century,38 was largely 
based on Plowden’s Commentaries.39 Hake drew on Plowden’s report of Browning v Beston (1555) 
to argue that ‘at all times and in all ages the judges of the law have expounded both deeds and 
contracts not precisely or strictly according to the words,’ but ‘according to the intent of the 
parties.’40  
 
At the turn of the century, the courts were still insisting that the aim of interpreting a deed was 
to identify and implement the intentions of its writers. For example, it was established that 
land could pass by the name of a manor, even if it was not in fact a manor.41 In one 1596 
case, the Common Pleas opined that this was not true of fines, but only of conveyances, ‘for 
there the intent of the parties will help it.’42 When the issue arose in the case of a fine, 
however, the court held that it would in fact ‘not regard this precise propriety of words,’43 
since, ‘forasmuch as the true intent and meaning of the parties appears, why should not we as 
judges adjudge it good?’44 Again, they referred to Hill v Grange for support. 
 
It was also considered that the ordinary effect of the word ‘proviso’ was to introduce a 
condition.45 However, this was not a hard and fast rule: what really mattered was whether the 
parties had intended to make a condition. As Egerton argued, a proviso by itself was 
meaningless until ‘the sense and meaning of the parties’ was considered.46 Thus, in Sir Moyle 
Finch v Throckmorton (1590), Clark B held that, although the words of a proviso were 
conditional, the ‘express agreement’ of the parties had been to make a limitation. He cited 																																																								
37 ibid f72v.  
38 Edward Hake, Epieikeia: A Dialogue on Equity in Three Parts (DEC Yale ed, Yale University Press 1953) 
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Plowden’s reports of Colthirst v Bejushin (1550) and Browning v Beston as authority.47 Similarly, in 
Sir Henry Berkeley v The Earl of Pembroke (1591), the judges of the Exchequer Chamber concluded 
that a proviso ‘made a condition by the intent of the parties.’ Moore reported that ‘no certain 
rule was given to expound where it will be a condition and where a covenant, except to follow 
the intent of the parties as near as it may be collected from the words.’48 
 
As we saw in Bold v Molineux, this approach also applied to penal bonds. In Walter v Pigot 
(1602), for example, debt was brought for ‘septingentis libris’ [£700]. However, the obligation in 
question was only for ‘septuagintis libris’ [£70], and the defendant demurred. The court found 
for the plaintiff, holding that ‘the intent is to be observed, which appears by the condition of 
the obligation.’ Since the bond was conditioned on the payment of £500, the parties must 
have intended a larger sum to be the penalty.49 
 
Why were lawyers so willing to discount the proper signification of a deed in favour of the 
meaning intended by its writers? Firstly, they were alive to the possibility that the parties 
might not accurately have expressed their intentions in their words. Lawyers of the mid-
sixteenth century do not seem to have expected laymen to know the correct meaning of the 
words in their deed. In Hill v Grange, for example, counsel for the defendant argued that it 
would be ‘unreasonable’ to destroy a lessee’s estate ‘because he has not made use of a 
language which is not used in his own country.’50 Rather, it was the responsibility of judges ‘to 
enquire and know the sense of words, and adjudge upon the same according to common 
usage, for else he would create great confusion and disturbance in the public-weal.’51 It was 
judges who must inform themselves about the language of common people, not vice versa. 
 
This was, lawyers considered, only reasonable. As Sjt Catlyn contended in Browning v Beston,  
 
if the law should be so precise as always to insist upon a peculiar form and order 
of words in agreements, and would not regard the intention of the parties when it 
was expressed in other words of substance, but would rather apply the intention 
of the parties to the order and form of words, than the words to the intention of 
the parties, such law would be more full of form than of substance. But our law, 																																																								
47 Sir Moyle Finch v Throckmorton (1590) Moore 291, 292. 
48 Sir Henry Berkley v Le Countee de Pembroke (1591) Moore 706, 707.  
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which is the most reasonable law upon earth, regards the effect and substance of 
words more than the form of them, and takes the substance of words to imply the 
form thereof, rather than that the intent of the parties should be void.52 
 
This rejection of formalism was not only based on pragmatic concerns about the efficacy of 
deeds, but also on fundamental understandings about the nature of language and legal 
documents. Plowden discussed this at length in the context of statutes. He explained that ‘it is 
not the words of the law, but the internal sense of it that makes the law.’53 This internal sense 
could be identified by enquiring into the legislator’s intentions.54 Words were simply the 
formal shell of the document, and did not necessarily correspond to its true, intended, 
meaning.55 As Sjt Saunders put it, ‘words, which are no other than the verberation of the air, 
do not constitute the statute, but are only the image of it.’56 
 
The same was true of the words of a deed. In Throckmerton, Saunders J held that judges must 
‘follow the intent of the words,’ for ‘the words are no other than the testimony of the 
contract.’57 Contracts, he explained, ‘shall be as it is concluded and agreed between the 
parties, according as their intents may be gathered.’58 Similarly, Popham CJ described a deed 
as ‘an explanation in writing of the intent of the parties,’59 and Sjt Catlyn insisted that ‘the 
agreement of the minds of the parties is the only thing the law respects in contracts.’60 The 
words of the deed, then, were only evidence of the parties’ intentions, and not necessarily 
reliable evidence. Thwarting the parties’ intentions because they had not used the correct 
words was not only unreasonable, but also inconsistent with the nature of legal writing.  
 
One of the most striking attempts to address this issue is found in Fulbecke’s Direction to law 
students. Fulbecke attempted to reconcile the traditional, Platonic account of language with 
the law’s prioritisation of the parties’ intentions over the signification of their words. He began 
by advising students not to ‘vary or depart from the proper sense and signification of the 																																																								
52 Browning v Beston (1555) Plow 131v, 140. 
53 Eyston v Studd (n 34) 465. 
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words,’ because ‘the property of words is strictly to be maintained.’61 He argued that words 
were ‘servants to things,’ because they were ‘invented for the plain and perfect description of 
things,’ and that ‘without words a man’s meaning may not be certainly known.’62 However, 
he added, words were also ‘invented that they might show the meaning of the parties.’63 Thus, 
it was possible to depart from the ‘true property’ of the words if there was ‘apparent proof of 
another meaning’:64 for example, if the proper meaning of the words caused ‘some absurdity, 
inconvenience, or injustice,’65 or was ‘too burdensome… and so unjust against the party.’66 
Like Plowden, he argued that  
 
a man’s speech doth consist of words and meaning, even as a man himself doth 
consist of body and soul, or to make the matter more plain, the words are but the 
superficies [surface], and the intent or meaning is the substance.67 	
Thus, if the writer’s meaning did not correspond to his words, ‘there the tongue yieldeth to 
the heart, and the words do give place to the meaning.’68 
 
All of these arguments were strongly influenced by continental lawyers, philosophers and 
theologians. Plowden explicitly attributed his account of equitable interpretation, which was 
based on the intentions of the legislator, to Aristotle.69 When he compared the words of a 
statute to the shell of a nut, he was borrowing a metaphor that had been used by Gratian to 
describe the words of the Gospel and by Baldus to describe the law.70 He quoted maxims like 
‘qui haeret in litera haeret in cortice’71 and ‘ratio legis est anima legis’ [the reason of the law is the soul 
of the law],72 both derived from the writings of the canonist Panormitanus.73 He also discussed 																																																								
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the standard hypothetical cases used by rhetoricians.74 Similarly, when Saunders J warned 
against the literal construction of a lease, he took Cicero as his authority.75 Hake’s discussion 
of equitable interpretation, largely derived from Plowden, included references to authors like 
Plato,76 Aristotle,77 Cicero,78 Augustine,79 Johann Wild80 and Melanchthon.81 Fulbecke cited 
Celsus’s discussion of words and their meaning,82 and linked it to Sjt Saunders’ treatment of 
the same topic in Plowden.83 The civilian maxims used by Plowden would remain popular 
throughout our period.84 
 
Some of these civilian ideas had been in the common law for centuries. Coke, for example, 
quoted Bracton’s definition of equity, which enjoined judges to fulfil the will of an owner in 
transferring his property.85 Bracton seems to have poached this from the Corpus Iuris Civilis.86 
Coke also cited Bracton’s description of a deed as ‘legatus mentis’ [a legate of the mind],87 which 
bore a close resemblance to the civilian maxim, ‘verba sunt cordis nuntia’ [words are the 
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messengers of the heart].88 Similarly, Sjt Lovelace quoted from Bracton’s introductory remarks 
to underline the importance of intentions in all things.89 Bracton apparently derived this 
material from the glossator Azo.90  
 
In other instances, however, common lawyers were apparently being influenced by 
contemporary continental scholarship. Fifteenth- and sixteenth-century civilian treatises on 
statutory interpretation consistently argued that the ‘mind,’ ‘reason’ or ‘soul’ of a statute took 
precedence over its words.91 Vogenauer, for example, observes that the Discourse on Statutes 
seems to be closely following Andreas Alciatus’s 1530 work, De verborum significatione, when it 
discusses the nature of words.92 Alciatus wrote that, ‘since words were invented to express the 
speaker’s intention, it is right that his will must be considered first.’93 Similarly, the writer of 
the Discourse explained that, ‘since that words were but invented to declare the meaning of 
men, we must rather frame the words to the meaning than the meaning to the words.’94 
 
Fulbecke also appears to have drawn his views on interpretation from civilian sources. He is 
believed to have studied law at a continental university,95 and was certainly very familiar with 
contemporary civilian scholarship.96 As Adolfo Giuliani explains, in the ius commune, the 
meaning of a private document was traditionally regarded as a question of fact, rather than 
law.97 Alciatus had argued that, while the legislator’s mind was relevant to the interpretation 																																																								
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of statutes, a contract must be interpreted by the proper meaning of its words.98 Fulbecke 
seems to have been making a similar point when he accepted that ‘in bargains and contracts 
we must not respect so much that which was meant, as that which is spoken, because bargains 
do properly consist in facto.’99 Thus, ‘in matters of contract a man’s will is rather gathered by 
his words, than by his meaning... as the words do sound, so his will is to be construed.’100 
However, Fulbecke ultimately concluded that ‘there be more things which we think, than 
which we speak or write.’101 He argued that, ‘though words were invented, that they might 
express our thoughts, yet by them only our meaning is not signified.’102 Even in the case of 
contracts, the law must examine the circumstances in which the words had been spoken in 
order to identify the parties’ true intentions.103 By the late sixteenth century, most civilian 
writers were also arguing that contracts gained their force from the parties’ intentions.104 
 
Because the interpretation of private documents was a question of fact rather than law, it was 
traditionally considered to fall into the province of rhetoric, rather than the civil law.105 This 
meant that early modern common lawyers had plenty of opportunity to acquaint themselves 
with continental theories on the subject.106 By the mid-sixteenth century, rhetoric was being 
taught in even humble grammar schools, thanks to the influence of the humanist project in 
England.107 Furthermore, over half of those called to the Bar between 1590 and 1639 had 
attended university,108 where literature, rhetoric and dialectic formed major components of 
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the curriculum.109 Many works of rhetoric were written by former students at the Inns of 
Court,110 and were popular amongst common lawyers.111 Lawyers were therefore soaking up 
rhetorical techniques and terminology. Scholars have demonstrated that many aspects of early 
modern common law method were strongly influenced by the traditions of continental 
rhetoric.112 The interpretation of documents was another area of law ripe for such influence. 
 
It is also striking that common lawyers often cited non-legal sources to explain their approach 
to interpretation. Indeed, the superiority of intentions over words was an idea also current 
amongst, for example, theologians and translators at the time.113 The influence of theological 
ideas on legal interpretation can be seen in the popular anti-Semitic trope that disparagingly 
associated literal interpretation with Jews.114 Fulbecke drew on this tradition, warning his 
reader against a ‘Jewish or mystical interpretation’ that would frustrate the intentions of the 
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parties.115 Interpretation that prioritised the parties’ intentions, meanwhile, had evidently 
been sanctioned by the Christian God.116 
 
3 .2 .2 .  THE M EANING OF THE W ORDS 
 
In the mid-sixteenth century, this view seemed to be almost universal. Only one discordant 
note was allowed to sound in Plowden’s Commentaries: the abortive dissent of Broke CJ in 
Throckmerton v Tracy. Unlike the other judges in the case, he had initially insisted that ‘there 
ought to be apt words to express the meaning, or else the meaning shall be void. For the party 
ought to direct his meaning according to the law, and not the law according to his 
meaning.’117 However, his scruples do not seem to have troubled him for long: ‘afterwards,’ 
reported Plowden, he said that ‘he was content that judgment should be given for the plaintiff’ 
after all.118 Dyer recorded that Broke had ‘prepared an argument on both sides, and if any 
one of his companions had been against the lease, he would have argued for it.’119 Broke CJ 
apparently did not intend his speech to be an authoritative judgment, an attitude that was still 
possible while the doctrine of precedent was in its infancy.120 
 
However, there were hints of similar views on interpretation elsewhere. In one case in the late 
1530s, the court held that a warranty of a ‘croft’ was void in the feoffment of a camp. 
Although admitting that ‘it was the intent to have a warranty of the same camp,’ they ruled 
that ‘this part of the deed will sooner be taken as void than to construe it according to an 
intent not warranted by the words.’121 As the century wore on, these dissenting voices were 
raised more loudly. In the early 1570s, Sjt Lovelace put a case where one man had made a 
lease to another, habendum to his executors and assigns. The judges agreed that this habendum 
was void, because it limited an estate to persons who were not mentioned in the premises.122 
Like Broke CJ, Harper J refused to ‘subject the law to his intent’: when a party ‘overthwarts 
the law,’ he ruled, ‘and frames such an instrument, the law shall be first served, and not their 																																																								
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meanings, when the same doth not agree with the law.’123 Such arguments were attempted by 
counsel increasingly frequently. Even when they were unsuccessful, this shows that they were 
at least thought to be plausible. In Cotton’s Case (1590), for example, Sjt Beaumont argued that 
‘where the intent of the donor is not according to the law, the law shall not be construed 
according to his intent: but this intent shall be taken according to the law.’124  
 
The courts were growing less certain that their proper role was to identify the parties’ 
intentions. Instead, it was for the parties to make sure that their intentions had been expressed 
in a way that the law would understand. By the end of the century, discussions of 
interpretation focused on the parties’ words as much as their intentions. The courts would 
only consider an intention that they could find expressed in the words of the deed. We have 
already seen that, in Sir Henry Berkeley v The Earl of Pembroke, the judges explained that they 
would ‘follow the intention of the parties as near as it may be collected from the words.’125 
Similarly, in Butt’s Case (1600), the court held that ‘the law will not make an exposition against 
the express words and intent of the parties,’ for ‘quoties in verbis nulla est ambiguitas, ibi nulla 
expositio contra verba expressa fienda est’ [when there is nothing ambiguous in the words, then no 
exposition contrary to the express words is to be made].126 This identification of the parties’ 
words and intentions made judges more hostile to arguments that the usual meaning of words 
should be subverted on the basis of a different intention. As Egerton explained, ‘deeds are to 
be construed according to the intent of the parties,’ but only ‘as far as the words will bear, and 
the rules of the law permit.’127 
 
What reasons did lawyers give for rejecting the meaning intended by the parties in favour of 
that expressed by their words? Again, they were both pragmatic and conceptual. Firstly, the 
courts no longer seem to have assumed that parties would not understand correct legal 
language. There was now an expectation that they would have thought carefully about, and 
even taken advice on, the drafting of their deed. They would therefore have chosen the right 
words to express their intended meaning.  
 
It had long been the case that a party who bound himself in a deed was treated as speaking at 
his own peril: 128  indeed, this was seen as a key difference between deeds and other 																																																								
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documents.129 As Sjt Lovelace explained in 1567, ‘in deeds the intent will be taken most 
strongly against the feoffor, because it is made on consideration and deliberation.’130 In 
Sharington v Strotton (1565), Plowden observed that words often passed ‘from men lightly and 
inconsiderately, but where the agreement is by deed, there is more time for deliberation.’ The 
writer must first determine to make the deed, then cause it to be written, then seal it, and 
finally deliver it. He therefore had plenty of time to deliberate on its contents.131  No 
concessions would be made to one who, with this advantage, nevertheless spoke ‘obscurely or 
ambiguously.’132  
 
The courts were becoming ever less tolerant of parties who were ignorant of the correct form 
of words to use in a deed. We have already encountered Egerton’s successful argument in 
Pagett v Aston: that the Bishop of Coventry’s grant to Sir Edward Aston passed only a life estate, 
despite clear evidence that it had been intended to grant a fee.133 Egerton compared the 
process of drafting a deed to that of writing a will. When construing a will, the courts would 
supply words that were lacking because of ‘the lack of advice and counsel’ available to the 
writer. However,  
 
in deeds and grants the law has another rule, for there advice and deliberation is 
used, to the intent that that which is intended by the parties may be expressed by 
apt and convenient words, and therefore no intent or meaning will be taken 
except that which the express and apt words deliver.134 
 
Coupled with this was a concern that badly-drafted deeds were becoming a serious problem 
in practice. In Throckmerton v Tracy, Broke CJ was already complaining about the Abbot’s 
‘peculiar form’ of drafting.135 In The Earl of Pembroke v Sir Henry Berkeley (1596), the court 
expressed a similar sentiment. Gawdy, Clench, Walmsley and Beamont JJ thought that the 
proviso in question was intended to be a covenant, noting that  
 
it is common for scriveners and ignorant persons to make in effect every 
covenant to begin with a proviso in this manner, and therefore to expound such 																																																								
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a manner of proviso as a condition, it shall be too perilous to the estates of 
men.136  
 
Their argument, however, was rejected by the other justices of the Exchequer Chamber, who 
insisted that ‘the ignorance of scriveners, who do they know not what by their ignorance, shall 
be corrected by the law.’137 Similarly, in Mariot v Mascal (1587), Anderson CJ held that ‘it is no 
reason to expound a lease which is void to be good because there are many of them made.’138 
It was better, he argued, that many leases should be void than that the law be undermined. 
Elsewhere, he maintained that a ‘knavish and foolish’ clause in a grant ought to be void, for ‘if 
it should be good, many mischiefs would follow.’139 The courts, then, were increasingly 
reluctant to be led by drafters, and instead sought to assert their authority over them.  
 
A second development was closely related. The courts were still concerned that their 
approach to interpretation should avoid causing ‘confusion and disturbance in the public-
weal,’ as they put it in Hill v Grange.140 However, they increasingly thought that this confusion 
would be caused, not when they struck down deeds for lacking the correct words, but when 
they hedged about what those words meant. As Broke CJ had argued in Throckmerton, 
 
if a man should bend the law to the intent of the party, rather than the intent of 
the party to the law, this would be the way to introduce barbarousness and 
ignorance, and to destroy all learning and diligence. For if a man was assured 
that whatever words he made use of his meaning only should be considered, he 
would be very careless about the choice of his words, and it would be the source 
of infinite confusion and incertainty to explain what was its meaning.141 
 
In Lewis Bowles’s Case (1615), for example, the court refused to resile from the established 
meaning of the phrase ‘without impeachment of waste.’ It would, they argued, ‘be dangerous 
now to recede’ from ‘the continual and constant opinions of all ages,’ concluding that it was 
‘better that there should be a defect, than that the law should be changed.’142 The courts 
should maintain clear and certain rules, instead of relying on something so uncertain as the 																																																								
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parties’ intentions. Bacon, for example, argued that ‘if the labour were only to pick out the 
intentions of the parties, every judge would have a several sense,’ and ‘quiet and certainty’ 
would be undermined.143 The courts emphasised that a deed was a ‘public’ document, and 
that ‘the inheritances and estates of men’ depended on it.144 It meaning ought therefore to be 
clear to all.145 Coke noted that the rules were less strict when the case concerned a lease, 
rather than a ‘freehold and inheritance,’ since ‘a lease for years was but a contract, rather 
than an estate in land.’146 
 
Again, underlying these concerns was a deeper understanding of language itself. For some 
lawyers, it was simply incoherent to take a word to mean something that it did not mean. 
Anderson CJ was a firm proponent of this view.147 In Mathew v Harecourt (1590), an assumpsit 
case, he rejected the idea that the law could accept a meaning that was ‘merely contrary to the 
truth of the sense of the words.’148 The other judges were prepared to follow the parties’ 
intentions, based on common usage.149 Anderson, however, insisted that ‘to say that common 
understanding makes that which the law understands contrary to the words is not reasonable, 
and it is not necessary to respond to this common understanding further.’150 
 
In his report of Mariot v Mascal, Anderson even included a lengthy digression on the nature of 
language. Words, he explained, were ‘means or instruments by which one may deliver to 
another his intent and mind.’151 Like Fulbecke, he recalled the Platonic account of language: 
‘each thing is known by its name,’152 and, when a person spoke, he expressed his intent about 
the thing he had named. Thus, it was a  
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great mischief to confound the sense of words and names, for thereby it will not 
be known of what thing there is speech, and if this were suffered, justice would 
not be executed, nor right done between the parties, and therefore in the law, 
words are to be considered according to their sense and signification.153 
 
Words were the means by which parties expressed their intentions in legal documents. If their 
meanings were not respected, he warned, land would be able to pass by the name of a horse, 
or a book by the name of a ring.154 And if the law 
 
suffered one word to be taken for another, and one word to express or contain a 
thing which it does not contain or express, it suffers a thing which is against the 
sense and nature of words, and thus confounds all manner of understanding, 
from which confusion and great inconvenience will ensue; for no Act of 
Parliament, record or writing may be understood, except by written words, and 
that by the natural sense of them.155 
 
For Anderson, like Broke, it was simply incoherent for the courts to interpret a word contrary 
to its signification. Even if this seemed to be what the parties had intended, it was better that 
they suffered a mischief than lawyers the inconvenience of being unable to agree on the 
meaning of any document at all. Anderson’s discussion echoed Phayer’s praise of written 
documents: only if they were clear and certain could justice truly be done between the 
parties.156 
 
3 .2 .3 .  CONDITIONS 	
Not all terms in deeds, however, were created equal. The courts were also developing more 
specific rules on the interpretation of particular terms: for example, conditions that, if fulfilled, 
would determine a party’s estate. No special approach to such conditions was mandated by 
Littleton: he simply wrote that they ought to be performed ‘as like to the intent of the 
condition’ as possible.157  
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Neither did Plowden suggest that destructive conditions would be treated differently to other 
kinds of term. In his Commentaries, he emphasised the importance of the parties’ intentions for 
the construction of conditions. In Colthirst v Bejushin, for example, the Prior of Bath had leased 
land to Henry and Eleanor Bejushin, and to their son Peter after their deaths, provided that 
he reside there during his whole term. One question was whether Peter had complied with 
this proviso, having lived there continually since entering the land, but not having entered 
until some time after his parents’ deaths. Sjt Pollard, for the plaintiff, argued that ‘the intent of 
a condition ought always to be performed as well as the words thereof’: if Peter did not enter 
until ten years after the beginning of his term, he could hardly claim to have complied with 
the lessor’s intention.158 Hales J accepted Sjt Pollard’s argument, holding that the words of the 
condition must be construed according to ‘the apparent intent of the lessor.’159 The other 
judges decided the case on a different ground. However, Mountague CJ agreed that ‘if it was 
a condition then I would readily admit that it ought to be taken according to the intent of it, 
that he should be resident all the term.’160 
 
However, there was also an alternative approach. In a 1535 case, for example, Audley LC 
held that ‘conditions will always be taken strictly, because they defeat the estates to which they 
are annexed,’161 and Dyer reported in 1539 that ‘every condition is taken strictly.’162 He 
expanded on the point in The Earl of Arundel’s Case (1576), holding that a condition ‘is in law 
construed penal, and rigorous, and strictly, not liberally.’163 On this view, a condition must be 
interpreted according to the narrowest possible meaning of its words, and not extended on the 
basis of the parties’ intentions.164 
 
The two approaches appear to have co-existed for some time. Egerton, for example, was 
prepared to argue the point in whichever way was most beneficial for his client. Thus, in 																																																								
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Saunders v Stanfourde, he echoed Colthirst v Bejushin, insisting that a destructive condition could be 
taken ‘amply and largely’ if the parties had so intended it.165 He admitted having heard that 
such a condition ought to be taken strictly, but had been able to find no good reason for 
this.166 In fact, he had observed ‘many cases in our laws’ where the converse had been held to 
be the case. As a result, ‘the most sure ground’ he had found in such cases, ‘as well as in 
others, is to search diligently for the true intent and plain meaning of the parties,’ instead of 
judging by ‘the precise nature and quality of the words.’167 In Scott v Scott (1589), on the other 
hand, Egerton changed his tune, arguing that a condition ‘will be taken strictly according to 
the words.’168 
 
The question remained controversial at the turn of the century. In Marsh v Curteis (1596), for 
example, French had leased a messuage and 20 acres of land to Harrington, on the condition 
that the lessee ‘shall not parcel out any of the lands from the house.’169 Harrington then leased 
out the messuage and part of the land. The question was whether this was a breach of the 
condition, given that the house had been parcelled out from some of the land, and not vice 
versa. The justices of the Common Pleas found that it was a breach. They were prepared to 
expound the word ‘“parcelling” as it is in vulgar speech,’170 having been informed that it was a 
‘common term in Essex,’171 and referred to any separation of the house and the land. In the 
King’s Bench, Gawdy J resolved that 
 
we must regard the intent of it, and this was that the land would go with the 
house to the intent that hospitality will be kept, and it is all one in effect and in 
the intent of the condition to grant the house from the land and the land from 
the house.172 
 
Popham CJ and Clench and Fenner JJ, however, disagreed. They held that ‘in a condition the 
letter and the intent must concur, because they are odious in law,’ and concluded that the 
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condition had not been breached.173 In Moyes v Grigge (1600), on the other hand, Clench and 
Gawdy JJ agreed that a destructive condition would be taken ‘strictly for the lessor.’174 And in 
Henry Earl of Pembroke v Symmes (1600), the following term, Gawdy J was the only one of the 
four to dissent from John Dodderidge’s argument that conditions ‘must have a reasonable 
construction, as appears in Colthirst’s case.’175 
 
The same justices of the King’s Bench had also equivocated in Taunton’s Case (1594). Coles 
had leased land to Taunton for 99 years, on the condition that he could re-enter if Taunton 
demised the land. Taunton devised the land to his youngest son in his will. The court 
concluded that ‘conditions shall be taken strictly, yet not directly against the intent of the 
parties, and the reasonable disposition of the words; and therefore a devise shall be intended 
to be within this word, demise.’ However, they admitted that this was ‘very hard,’ since 
Taunton ‘thought not it was any breach of the condition.’176 Here, the judges’ quandary was 
plain: although they disliked destroying estates, they were also reluctant to construe a 
condition in an unreasonably literal way. 
 
If the justices of the King’s Bench had no fixed opinion on the point, other lawyers seem to 
have taken a less equivocal view. Moore, for example, frequently appended remarks to his 
reports about the oppressive nature of conditions, describing them as ‘odious to defeat 
estates’177 or ‘odious against common right.’178 Coke, too, seems to have found destructive 
conditions particularly objectionable. As counsel in Englefield’s Case (1590), he compared them 
to penal statutes, which were also to be construed strictly.179 Both, he said, were ‘odious,’ 
concluding that the ‘destruction [of estates] is the cause of the hatred which the law bears for 
conditions.’180 Later, as Chief Justice in Fraunces’s Case (1609), he approved the argument that 
‘a beneficial condition, which creates an estate, is to be interpreted benignly, according to the 
intention of the words; however, an odious condition, which destroys an estate, is taken 
																																																								
173 ibid. The lessee had subsequently leased out the residue of the land, which all four judges agreed was 
a breach of the condition. 
174 Moyes v Grigge (1600) BL Add MS 25203 f200v, f200v. 
175 Henry Counte de Pembrooke v Symmes (1600) BL Add MS 25203 f226v, f227.  
176 Tauntons Case (1594) Owen 14, 14–15. 
177 Davy v Matthews & Binfield (1598) Moore 525, 526. 
178 Moody v Garnon (1616) Moore 848, 848.  
179 Englefields Case (n 45) 332. 
180 ibid.  
78 
strictly, according to the proper signification of the words.’181 He made the same point in his 
Commentary upon Littleton, distinguishing between conditions that created estates and those that 
destroyed them. The former were to be taken ‘according to the intent and meaning of the 
condition,’ but the latter ‘strictly’ by the words.182 
 
Another treatise writer, Fulbecke, was more ambivalent. He explained that the common law 
‘many times taketh the words of a condition strictly to preserve an estate,’ citing Dyer’s 
anonymous 1539 case.183 However, he also observed that, in a more recent case, a condition 
had been ‘extended by equity for the safeguard of the party.’184 It seemed, then, that the 
position of conditions remained unclear. Although common lawyers were anxious to preserve 
estates, they were not entirely comfortable with a literal approach to construction.185 	
3.2.4 .  LIM ITATIONS OF ESTATES 	
Terms in deeds that limited estates were also a special category, since there were specific 
forms of words needed to express each kind of estate. As we have seen, for example, a fee 
simple could only be passed by the words ‘to him and his heirs.’186 No evidence of the writers’ 
intentions could be introduced to vary the meaning of these words. This clearly left many 
pitfalls for the unwary: as Coke noted, a limitation to ‘him and his heir’ would not pass a fee, 
nor ‘to him or his heirs’, nor ‘to two and heirs’ without the word ‘their.’187 Conversely, parties 
who used the crucial words might be held to have passed a fee simple when they did not 
actually intend to do so. In Webbe v Potter (1583), Dyer CJ held that, where there was ‘an 
express limitation of the fee to the husband and his heirs,’ it ‘shall not be contradicted by any 
intendment’ that the grant was actually intended to be in frankmarriage.188 Lawyers were well 
aware that these rules could thwart the intentions of the parties. Henry Finch, for example, 
thought that one who granted land to another ‘and his heirs males’ must have intended to 																																																								
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give an entail, although the words would be taken to pass a fee simple.189 The justification for 
this was, again, the need for certainty where estates were concerned. As Coke explained, the 
reason that the law was ‘so precise to prescribe certain words to create an estate of 
inheritance, is for avoiding of uncertainty, the mother of contention and confusion.’190  
 
There was, however, an exception: when the estate limited was an entail. The statute De donis 
had expressly identified the words needed to grant an entail: ‘where any giveth his land to any 
man and his wife, and to the heirs begotten of the bodies of the same man and his wife’ or 
‘where one giveth land to another, and the heirs of his body issuing.’191 However, it had also 
provided that ‘the will of the donor, according to the form in the deed of gift manifestly 
expressed, shall be from henceforth observed.’192 By extending the equity of the statute, 
lawyers had recognised other forms of entail: for example, ‘if lands be given unto a man and 
to his heirs male of his body engendered.’193 The emphasis on ‘the will of the donor’ allowed 
them to permit limitations of entails that did not use the statutory wording, as long as the 
intention was clear.194 Thus, a grant to one and ‘the heir of his body’ would be good, in 
contrast to the rule for a fee simple.195  
 
In Cotton’s Case, for example, land was conveyed to Sir Thomas Cotton for life, remainder to 
William Cotton ‘and to his firstborn son, and his male heir, and thus to the firstborn of the 
firstborn of the said William,’ with remainders over.196 Sjt Drue argued that this was a good 
grant in tail, 
 
for according to the Statute of Westminster 2, the will of the donor ought to be 
observed, and here it appeareth that the intent of the donor was to create an 
estate tail, although the words of the limitation do not amount to so much. And 
the estates mentioned in the statute aforesaid, are not rules for entails, but only 
examples.197 
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Sjt Beaumont objected that ‘the will of the donor, without sufficient words, cannot create an 
estate tail,’198 but to no avail.  
 
There were some limits. Although Spelman had approved them in an early-sixteenth-century 
reading, Coke thought that the words ‘to him and his seed’ or ‘issue’ would not create an 
entail.199 ‘Albeit that the Statute provideth,’ he explained, that the will of the donor should be 
observed, ‘yet that will and intent must agree with the rules of law.’200 In Abraham v Twigg 
(1596), the use of land had been granted ‘to Gabriel Dormer and his heirs male lawfully 
engendered, and for defect of such issue,’ remainders over. The court held that this could not 
‘be an estate tail, because there is not any body from whom the heir male should come.’201 
The limitation simply departed too far from the statutory wording to be covered by its 
equity.202 As was argued in Beresford’s Case (1607), the intent of the donor in Abraham did not 
‘stand with the rule of law’ that required a body to be specified. Although the remainders over 
indicated his intention to grant an entail, ‘that could not against the rule of law make words of 
fee simple to be converted to an estate tail.’203  
 
However, these exceptions had a narrow scope. In Beresford’s Case itself, the grant was to ‘the 
heirs male of Aden lawfully begotten.’ The court was able to distinguish this from Abraham on 
the grounds that ‘of Aden’ was equivalent to ‘of the body of Aden,’ while the grant in Abraham 
had lacked the word ‘of.’204 Again, they emphasised the statutory mandate that ‘the intent of 
the donor’ prevail.205 Indeed, lawyers’ continued insistence on this point suggests that they 
saw this approach to entails as a departure from the common law rules, a departure that could 
only be justified on the basis of statutory authority. As Moore explained, in the case of an 
entail ‘the law is intent on the will of the party,’ and ‘dispenses with the defect of apt words if 
there are sufficient words to declare the intent’ because ‘the will of the donor is the intent of 
the Statute.’206 In this instance, lawyers were prepared to ignore the meaning of the donor’s 
words in order to fulfil his intentions. 																																																									
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3.2 .5 .  LIM ITATIONS OF USES 
 
Another exceptional kind of deed was the feoffment to use. As we have seen, uses were 
originally enforced only by the Chancery, but the Statute of Uses 1536 had brought executed 
uses under the jurisdiction of the common law.207 The Chancery had permitted some devices, 
such as executory interests, to be created via a use, although they were impermissible at 
common law. In the 1550s and 1560s, the common law courts held that these interests 
remained good even after the use had been executed.208 These departures from common law 
rules were justified on the basis that ‘the intention of the parties is the direction of uses.’209 
Manwood J observed that uses were  
 
not directed by the rules of the common law, but by the will of the owner of the 
lands: for the use is in his hands as clay is in the hands of the potter which he in 
whose hands it is may put into what form he pleaseth.210  
 
Egerton described a use as a ‘subtle thing,’ which ‘may be framed to commence, transfer and 
determine as a man wishes… because a use is nothing but trust, and trust must be guided by 
meaning.’211  
 
Although, once raised, a use would be executed by the Statute, the question of its raising in 
the first place was still governed by pre-Statute law.212 As Moore explained, the Statute of 
Uses had ‘not altered the common law in limiting and raising uses,’ for, although it had 
changed the nature of the use, ‘there is no alteration made in the limiting of the use.’213 The 
practice of the Chancery therefore also remained relevant.214 In Englande’s Case, for example, 
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Egerton relied on a 1522 definition of a use as ‘nothing but a trust and confidence.’215 As a 
result, he continued, ‘the judges and sages of the law, in the construction of uses, direct and 
apply their judgments according to the will and intent of the parties, and not according to the 
precise rules of the law.’ Otherwise, ‘the trust will be defrauded, the party injured, and 
conscience offended.’216 Coke also made the link to ‘conscience’ in Shelley’s Case (1581). He 
explained that ‘the intent of the parties was the direction of the uses,’ because they had been 
‘adjudged by the Chancellor who is a judge of equity, and that in Chancery, which is a court 
of conscience.’ He concluded that equity required the will of an owner to performed.217 
 
For this reason, the common law courts did not require any formalities to raise a use. The use 
of a deed or any other writing was unnecessary, as long as good consideration had been given 
and the settlor’s intention was clear.218 This intention could be ‘expressed by writing, words or 
circumstances.’219 As the court held in Scrope’s Case (1612), ‘it does not matter whether he 
declares his intention by words, or by his acts and deeds.’220 Again, Coke explained this rule 
on the basis of pre-Statute law. A use, he argued, was not ‘any inheritance in law, but is only a 
trust and the remedy for it is given in Chancery, and a trust is a secret thing between the 
parties, for which no deed is necessary, for a deed is public.’221  
 
Where writing had been used, its function was simply to provide evidence for the parties’ 
intentions. In Tibb v Poplewell (1599), for example, a woman had granted land to her future 
husband, but, following the deed’s enrolment, no livery had been made.222 The question was 
whether the deed was effective to raise a use. Coke argued that it was not, ‘for he said that 
uses always arise according to the intent of the parties… and he observed four circumstances 
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in the deed by which it appeared clearly that they did not have any intent to raise a use.’223 
Similarly, in Edward Fox’s Case (1609), it was held that ‘forasmuch as the intention of the 
parties is the creation of uses, if by any clause in the deed it appears, that the intent of the 
parties was to pass it in possession by the common law, there no use shall be raised.’224 The 
words of the deed, however, were clearly subordinate to the intention they expressed: the 
court concluded that ‘verba intentioni non e contra debent inservire’ [words should serve the 
intentions, not the reverse].225 
 
The courts’ approach to uses also meant that they would allow common law rules on the 
meaning of words to be trumped by evidence of the parties’ intentions.226 For instance, before 
the Statute of Uses, the words ‘to him and his heirs’ had not been required to limit a fee 
simple in use, either by the Chancery or the common law courts. In 1532, the justices of the 
Common Pleas had held that ‘to him and his’ or ‘to him to do his will therewith’ would 
suffice.227 This continued to be the case after 1536, and was explicitly based on the practice of 
the pre-Statute Chancery.228 In 1540, it was held that a bargain and sale could pass the fee 
simple of a use without the words ‘his heirs.’ As authority, Audley LC cited practice ‘before 
the Statute of Uses,’ concluding that it was ‘the same law of a sale by indenture by the statute 
of 27 Hen. VIII without words of heirs.’229 Coke made the same point in Shelley’s Case: 
 
The law is plain, that if a man had before the statute of 27 Hen. 8. bargained and 
sold his land for money without these words, ‘his heirs,’ the bargainee hath a fee 
simple. And the reason is, because by the common law nothing passeth from the 
bargainor, but a use, which is guided by the intent of the parties, which was to 
convey the land wholly to the bargainee.230 
 
He concluded that, even after the Statute, uses were to be ‘directed by the intent and meaning 
of the parties.’231 If a use passed by bargain and sale, ‘in equity, and according to the meaning 																																																								
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of the parties,’ the bargainee would have ‘the fee simple without these words “his heirs”.’232 
Likewise, Egerton argued that, in the case of a use, ‘the law respects principally the intent of 
the parties, and never the words of the deed.’233 And Moore wrote that  
 
as much as makes evident the intent and mind of the feoffor is a sufficient 
declaration of the use, although it was not expressed in such words as are 
requisite in the limitation of lands in possession. And for this reason, in similar 
cases where the law is intent on the will of the party, it dispenses with the defect 
of apt words, if they have words that are sufficient to declare the intent, and 
equivalent in substance.234 
	
He went on to make a connection between the limitation of uses and of entails. Both were 
‘cases where the law is intent on the will of the party’: uses because of the rules that had been 
developed before the Statute of Uses, and entails ‘because the will of the donor is the intent of 
the Statute’ De donis.235 
 
It is clear that the interpretation of uses, like the interpretation of entails, was seen as an 
exception to the usual common law rules. In the case of uses, this seems only to have been 
explicitly discussed towards the end of the sixteenth century. Perhaps this was because a 
consistent approach to uses had not been pinned down until this point. It may also have been 
because, with the courts increasingly focused on the words of a deed, their treatment of uses 
was beginning to seem anomalous and in need of explanation. 
 
As with the limitation of entails, however, there were limits to the courts’ tolerance. We have 
seen that, in Abraham v Twigg, it was held that the words ‘to him and his heirs male lawfully 
engendered’ did not make an entail. ‘Although it were by way of use,’ insisted the judges, ‘it 
differs not from other gifts by deed, and shall not have any other construction.’236 Similarly, in 
Corbet’s Case (1600), the court held that a perpetuity clause in the limitation of a use was bad. 
Firstly, it was substantively unlawful, being repugnant to the nature of an entail.237 Secondly, 
																																																								
232 ibid 100b. 
233 Englande’s Case (n 215) f54v.  
234 Uses & Revocations de Uses (n 206) 610.  
235 ibid.  
236 Abraham v Twigg (n 201) 478. 
237 Corbet’s Case (1600) 1 Co Rep 83b, 84a. See 7.3. below. 
85 
it would have been in any case void for uncertainty.238 Anderson CJ held that ‘judges ought to 
know the intent of the parties by certain and sensible words, which are agreeable and 
consonant to the rules of law.’239 He drew a parallel with the limitation of a fee simple: even if 
the parties’ intention was apparent, it would be to no avail if they had failed to use words 
understood by the law.  
 
3.3. Wills  
 
3 .3 .1 .  THE W RITER’S  INTENTIONS 
 
The common law had only recently gained a substantial jurisdiction over gifts by will.240 
Devises of chattels continued to be governed by the canon law, but the common law had 
become involved with devises of the use of freehold land in the fifteenth century, and since the 
Statute of Wills 1540 had exercised jurisdiction over wills of land itself.241 Despite the novelty 
of wills of freehold land, the mid-sixteenth century courts do not seem to have had much 
hesitation about the correct approach to their interpretation. As with deeds, the intention of 
the writer was far more important than the meaning of the words he had used. Lawyers 
argued that the words of a will were simply evidence of the writer’s intentions, and had no real 
significance of their own. As Egerton wrote, 
 
each will consists of two parts, words, and intent. And as spoken words are 
nothing but wind and verberation of the air, so written words are nothing but 
dead elements, and nothing to be esteemed except in respect of the intent and 
meaning which is to be collected and drawn out of them. Thus the effect of each 
will is the intent and meaning of the deceased, and the words serve only as 
testimony of his will.242 
 
In fact, the position was even more pronounced with wills than it was with deeds. Even Broke 
CJ, in his dissent in Throckmerton, noted the difference. In deeds, he argued, ‘the law rules the 																																																								
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intent, and not the intent the law. But in testaments the intent only shall be observed and 
considered.’243 
 
One leading case was Newis v Lark (1571), also known as Scholastica’s Case. The substantive 
effect of the case was to sanction an evasion of the rule against perpetuities, an evasion that 
would be firmly disapproved in Mary Portington’s Case (1613).244 The argument, however, was 
framed in terms of interpretation, and the case was also important for what it established 
about the construction of wills. Henry Clerk had devised land to his son John in tail, 
remainder to Francis, remainder to Scholastica. He also provided that, if any of them 
alienated the land, they were to be excluded from the entail.245 John and Francis granted the 
land to William Lark, and Scholastica and her husband entered, claiming that the two had 
forfeited their estates.246 The question was whether the term was a condition or a limitation. If 
it were a limitation, the land would pass to Scholastica. If it were a condition, however, the 
breach would destroy the whole entail, and the land would revert to Henry’s heir, John. The 
court agreed that this ‘manifestly’ could not have been Henry’s intention.247 He had wanted 
the entail to continue, and, to effect this, the term must be taken as a limitation on the estate. 
The judges held that ‘words in a will, which seemingly tend to a condition, shall not in the law 
be taken for a condition’ if the testator’s intention appeared to have been otherwise.248 ‘When 
the case is upon a devise,’ they explained, ‘the intent only is regarded, and the words, 
although they are not apt in law for the matter, shall be drawn to the intent.’249 Dyer CJ 
referred to the case of a conveyance, observing that if a condition could be taken as a 
limitation ‘where it was by deed, a fortiori shall it be so here where it is by last will, in which the 
intent rules the words, and not the words the intent.250 
 
Egerton made a similar point in his argument in Englande’s Case. William Chester held the use 
of a piece of land in Southwark, and devised it to be used to maintain, inter alia, a chantry and 
an almshouse. The question was whether these words were sufficient to transfer the use of the 
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land from William’s heirs to his feoffees.251 Egerton began by reminding the court that deeds 
were to be construed according to ‘the true intent of the parties’ and not the ‘precision of the 
words.’252 Just as ‘such favourable construction’ had been made of deeds,  
 
in construction of wills, it has been received as a principle that the intent of the 
devisor is to be preferred, as fully as it may stand with the law. And the words 
(although they be imperfect or improper) will be drawn and strained to serve the 
intent.253 
 
In fact, this had ‘prevailed so fully that sometimes the intent of the testator has been received, 
contrary to the natural sense and property of the words.’254 In this case, Chester must have 
intended the use to go to his feoffees, or none of his stated aims could be achieved.255 
Although the use had not been expressly mentioned in the will, any defect in the words could 
be remedied by evidence of Chester’s intention.256 
 
It was, therefore, agreed that wills were to be treated differently to deeds. Coke observed that 
a ‘benign’ interpretation was to be made of a contract, but a ‘more benign’ interpretation of a 
testament.257 Thus, words that were to be given their proper signification in a deed would be 
taken according to the testator’s apparent intention when used in a will. We have already 
seen, for example, that conditional words could be taken to make a limitation in a will. In 
Wiseman v Baldwin (1595), Baldwin had devised land to Henry on condition that he pay £20 to 
Baldwin’s daughter. If Henry failed to do so, the daughter would have the land. As Godfrey 
noted, the words were clearly conditional, but the devisor had apparently intended to make a 
limitation.258 On the authority of Newis v Lark, the term was held to be a limitation. Gawdy J 
explained that ‘there is great diversity between an estate in law, and a devise, in which the 
intent of the devisor is to be observed.’259 In the same way, words like ‘eâ intentione’, which were 
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insufficient to make a condition in a deed,260 could do so in a will if this appeared to be the 
devisor’s intention.261 This was, as Egerton explained, because of ‘the favourable allowance 
which the law yields to the intent of testators.’262  
 
The same was true of words referring to land. In Kerry v Derrick (1602), a testator had 
bequeathed his ‘rents’ to his wife for life. It was held that this was a good devise of his land, 
‘according to the common phrase and usual manner of speaking of some men, who name 
their land by their rents.’263 In Inchley v Robinson (1587), the Marchioness of Exeter, who held a 
rent issuing out of a certain manor, devised ‘the manor.’ The question was whether this was a 
good devise of the rent. Sjt Walmesley argued that it was not. A rent had no ‘affinity or 
likelihood’ to a manor, nor was it described as a manor ‘in common speaking.’264 Similarly, 
Sjt Shuttleworth objected that ‘there is not any mention made of any rent in all the will,’265 
and it could not pass without ‘apt words.’266 Sjt Fenner, on the other hand, argued that the 
testator’s ‘intent shall be taken, although it was not written by apt words.’ He reminded the 
court that a deed could be interpreted by the writer’s intention, ‘and a fortiori a devise.’267 The 
justices indicated that they agreed, and the case was discontinued.268 
 
The courts took a similar approach to terms limiting estates in wills. They would correct 
defects of form when they deemed the testator to have sufficiently expressed his intention: as 
Cooper put it in Forster v Walker (1584), ‘the defect of a will in words, in making of an estate 
shall be supplied by intent.’269 Thus, in Boraston’s Case (1587), Thomas Boraston had devised 
land to his executors until Hugh reached the age of 21. Although Hugh died at the age of 
nine, Thomas was deemed to have granted the executors a term for the twelve years until 
Hugh would have turned 21. Although Thomas had made 
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his will in a disordered manner, and in barbarous and unfit words, the law in 
such case will reduce his words, which want order, into good order, and sentence 
his unfit words to words sufficient in law, according to his intent which appears 
by his own words.270 
 
The courts would also waive the usual requirement of specific words to grant a fee simple or a 
fee tail. In Blanford v Blanford (1616), a term was devised to Thomas and Lucy, ‘and if it shall 
please God to send them issue male, then to be reserved and put out’ for their benefit. It was 
held that ‘the implication of the devise is sufficient to settle an estate in the issue male, 
although the term was not expressly devised’ to them.271 Similarly, a devise ‘to him and his 
successors’ would pass a fee simple, even without the words ‘his heirs;’272 so too would a devise 
‘to him in perpetuity,’ or ‘to him and his assigns forever.’273 ‘If he die before he hath issue’ 
could substitute for ‘if he die without issue’ in the creation of an entail;274 ‘men children’ was a 
good approximation of ‘heirs male’;275 and ‘to him and his lawfully procreated heirs’ would 
suffice without ‘heirs of his body.’276 Furthermore, while a grant ‘to him and his heirs male’ 
would pass a fee simple, a devise in the same words would create an entail.277 ‘The reason for 
this,’ explained Anderson, ‘is that the intent of the donor’ could not be fulfilled ‘if “heirs male 
of his body” is not supplied by intendment.’278 Fulbecke described this as limiting an estate ‘by 
implication.’279 In Hake’s discussion of the same rule, he observed that ‘in the exposition of 
wills and testaments… the common law seemeth so highly to respect the intent of the testator 
or devisor, as that a man would think there were almost nothing else that the law therein hath 
regard unto.’280 	
Why did the courts take such different approaches to the interpretation of deeds and wills? 
Firstly, wills were closely linked to uses, since any pre-1540 will of freehold land, unless 																																																								
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devisable by custom, must have been a devise of a use. As we have seen, the usual phrases 
needed to limit estates were not required for uses. Thus, it was established before the Statute 
of Wills that a devise ‘to him and his’ or ‘to him to do his will therewith’ would pass a fee 
simple,281 as would ‘to him in perpetuity,’ so that ‘the will of the devisor made by the 
testament shall be performed after the intent of the devisor.’282 In 1535, Fitzherbert and 
Shelley JJ agreed that a devise to a man and his heirs male would pass an entail, ‘because the 
law is favourable to all devises, and construes them according to the intent of the devisor.’283 
 
As N. G. Jones explains, even after the Statute of Wills was passed, there was not always a 
clear distinction between executors and feoffees to use.284 Wills made under the Statute were 
understood to operate as conveyances, in a similar way to declarations of use.285 As a result, 
the courts’ approach to devises of uses continued to influence their interpretation of wills of 
freehold land. In Shelley’s Case (1581), for example, Coke explained that ‘the limitation in uses 
and estates given by devises resemble one another.’ Citing pre-Statute cases, he observed that 
‘the judges there took the construction of devises, and of estates conveyed in use to be all one, 
viz. according to the meaning of the parties.’286 Similarly, Sjt Shuttleworth relied on a case on 
a will from 1500 in Inchley v Robinson,287 and Hake on the 1535 case discussed above.288  
 
Secondly, common lawyers’ approach to wills may have been influenced by the canon law, 
which had a parallel jurisdiction over the devise of chattels.289 Many common lawyers 
reported their familiarity with the church courts’ processes for dealing with wills,290 perhaps 
from their personal experiences of acting as an executor or inheriting goods.291 In canon law, 
the testator’s intention was of paramount importance for interpretation. In his sixteenth-																																																								
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century treatise on canon law, Swinburne wrote that ‘it is the mind and not the words of the 
testator, that giveth life to the testament,’292 and advised judges to consider ‘not the words, but 
the meaning of the testator.’293 ‘Without meaning, or consent of mind,’ he explained, ‘the 
testament is altogether without life; and is no more a testament than a painted lion is a lion.’294  
 
Common lawyers often referred to ius commune sources as authority for this approach to wills. 
Particularly popular was the etymology, given in Justinian’s Institutes, of ‘testament’ as ‘testatio 
mentis’: a signifying of the mind.295 Discussed by Swinburne,296 it was also wheeled out by 
common lawyers and judges,297 treatise-writers,298 and readers in the Inns of Court,299 even 
though it was well known to be false.300 Another common definition of a testament also had 
roots in the Digest,301 and was used by civil and common lawyers: ‘a testament is the 
determination of our will, concerning that which one would have done after his decease.’302 
One sixteenth-century gloss to Littleton, attributed to James Whitelocke,303 connected the 
common law’s respect for the will of the testator with a Digest text enjoining the reader to 
‘interpret in the fullest possible way the wishes of testators.’304 The coincidence of the two 																																																								
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bodies of learning affirmed common lawyers’ conviction that their approach to wills was a 
reasonable one.305 
 
Thirdly, it was felt that last wishes were inherently worthy of respect, and that carrying them 
out was part of the law’s fundamental role in society. Coke, for example, wrote that ‘reipublicae 
interest suprema hominum testamenta rata haberi’ [it is the concern of the commonwealth that the last 
wills of men be upheld].306 Sheppard quoted a biography of Virgil to argue that ‘belief in the 
laws must be preserved; it is necessary to obey what the last wish commands and orders to be 
done.’307 We saw in chapter one that wills had always performed a religious function.308 Since 
it was a testator’s Christian duty to arrange his affairs before he died, it was also the duty of 
those who survived him to put his wishes into effect. 
  
The Statute of Wills had explained that the power to devise land was granted so that a testator 
could provide for ‘the advancement of his wife, preferment of his children and payment of his 
debts.’309 As we saw in chapter one, these were weighty concerns.310 This statutory language 
was quickly adopted by the profession,311 and was used to explain the importance of the 
testator’s intentions. In 1567, Sjt Wraye argued that one ‘cause of the favourable exposition of 
wills’ was that the testator ‘provided for his family.’312 Similarly, in Paramour v Yardley (1579), a 
devise providing funds for the education of the testator’s children was construed favourably 
because of its ‘great importance.’313 A will was also the testator’s last chance to pay his debts, 																																																																																																																																																														
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another critical obligation.314 In Milward v Moore (1580), the court held that a devisor must 
have intended his debts to be paid as soon as possible, for ‘the speedier disburdening of his 
conscience, and less peril to his soul.’315 As a result, in Matthew Manning’s Case (1609), Coke 
explained that  
 
a more favourable interpretation is made of a will in point of interest or estate to 
satisfy the will of the dead for the payment of his debts, than of a grant or 
conveyance in his life; which he may enlarge, or make other provision of his 
pleasure.316  
 
These were not just important concerns because of the statute. Rather, they were thought to 
be common functions of all kinds of will. Fulbecke, for example, had the civil lawyer in his 
Parallel observe that ‘the making of wills is necessary’ so that men could educate their children, 
pay their debts, advance their children, and support their wives ‘as in conscience they 
ought.’317 
 
Finally, and most importantly, there was a pragmatic reason for giving little weight to the 
words of a will. As we have seen, a testator usually declared his will on his deathbed, without 
the benefit of legal advice.318 Thus, as Harper J explained in Newis v Lark,  
 
the devisor shall be accounted inops consilii [without help of counsel], because 
men most commonly make their wills when they are at the point of death, and 
have not time to seek counsel, for which reason the law shall be their counsel, 
and shall interpret the words, and direct the operation of them according to the 
intent of the party.319  
 
Similarly, Egerton observed that deeds were made by parties ‘in their sanity, and when they 
had, or could have had, advice of counsel, to express and show their intent in apt and proper 																																																								
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words.’320 In contrast, ‘wills (for the greater part) are made when men are in extremity of 
sickness, and lack counsel, and they themselves are ignorant and simple, and thus the law 
yields all favour which it may in construction of wills.’321 Unlike a party to a deed, a testator 
could not be regarded as speaking ‘at his peril.’322 Rather, as Sjt Lovelace put it, he was 
making his testament ‘by the necessity of death.’323 
 
The presumption that a testator was inops consilii was so strong that it was invoked even in 
cases where the testator really did have time to consult a legal advisor. In the serjeants’ case of 
1567, four of the seven serjeants made reference to the presumption, even though the testator 
in their case had made his will some years before he died.324 Sjt Jeffrey went so far as to 
declare that ‘every devise will be construed favourably, because the approach of death 
deprives a man of his senses and of his intelligence,’ although this was manifestly irrelevant to 
the case at hand.325  
 
It was also irrelevant that the testator might have had legal knowledge of his own. In Paramour 
v Yardley, Plowden noted that ‘testators themselves in general are unacquainted with the law, 
and know not how to put their words in their proper order.’326 Some judges seem to have 
treated this as an irrebuttable presumption. In Coxe v Lowen (1600), for example, Lowen had 
devised land to his two sons ‘equally.’ It was argued that he must have intended the word 
‘equally’ to make them tenants in common. However, Walmesley J held that ‘we must not 
understand that he was an erudite man, for all our books are contrary. But he is to be taken 
for an illiterate man, in which case it is no marvel if he uses an idle word.’327 Similarly, in The 
Lord Mountjoye v Barker (1587), Gawdy J argued that ‘it may be taken, that she who devised was 
ignorant of the law,’ and thought that a rent was the same thing as a manor.328 Inconvenient 
words could thus easily be explained away. 
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3.3 .2 .  THE M EANING OF THE W ORDS 
 
On the other hand, the words of a will had a particular importance. Though lawyers drew 
analogies between wills and limitations of uses, there was a major difference between the two: 
a will of freehold land was required to be in writing by the Statute.329 Thus, the only intention 
that the courts were lawfully permitted to consider was one that they could extrapolate from 
the testator’s written words.  
 
In Brett v Rigden (1568), for example, Giles Brett devised his land to his nephew Henry, 
habendum to Henry and his heirs forever. Henry, however, pre-deceased Giles, leaving a son, 
Thomas.330 Giles ‘said and declared to the same Thomas Brett the son’ that he would have 
the land that Henry should have had by Giles’ will. However, Giles did not alter his written 
will before his own death. One question that arose was whether Thomas was entitled to take 
the land, either by the words ‘his heirs’ in the will, or by Giles’ oral declaration.331 The court 
held that he was not. Although Henry’s heirs had been mentioned in the will, this was only to 
limit the estate that Henry himself would have, a fee simple. It did not mean that Giles had 
intended Henry’s heir to take the land directly.332 As for the oral declaration, they ruled that it 
‘was of no effect in law, and that no regard ought to be given to it, inasmuch as it was not 
written in his last will.’ If the words of the will could not, by themselves, make the land pass to 
Thomas, they were not to be aided by matter that was not in writing.333  
 
The extent to which the courts could deviate from the proper meaning of the words was a 
vexed question. As we have seen, there was a strong inclination to interpret a will favourably 
throughout our period. However, by the final decades of the sixteenth century, lawyers were 
increasingly voicing their concern about the legitimacy of this approach. In Higham v Horwood 
(1585), an illiterate testator had instructed a clerk to write his will, specifying that his house, 
land and pasture were to be sold. The scribe, however, wrote that the land and its 
appurtenances were to be sold. The question was whether the executors had the authority to 
sell the land, which was not, strictly speaking, an appurtenance. Bramshaw argued that they 
did not. A will of land, he pointed out, ‘must be in writing by the Statute, and all that is not 
included in the writing is void.’ The devisor’s intention was not to be considered, but only ‘the 																																																								
329 32 Hen VIII c. 1. 
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words that are written.’334 Coke, as opposing counsel, made the orthodox counter-argument: 
‘the writer was ignorant of the law,’ and must have thought that land could be appurtenant to 
a house. Therefore, ‘the word will be framed according to his intent,’ to mean ‘land usually 
occupied with the house.’335 The court ultimately agreed.336 However, Clench J was initially 
reluctant to do so. He observed that, if a testator devised land to his son, without specifying 
‘him and his heirs,’ it could not be averred that the devisor’s intent was that the son and his 
heirs would take. Why, he asked Coke, should it be different in this case?337 Moore did not 
record Coke’s reply.338 
 
Other judges were less scrupulous. In Downhall v Catesby (1594), an illiterate testator instructed 
that his land be given to his son for life. The clerk, however, wrote that the son was to have 
the land in fee. Fenner J thought that the words could be taken to mean an estate for life, but 
the rest of the court was against him.339 In Fuller v Fuller, the same year, a testator had devised 
land to his son and the heirs male of his body. As in Brett v Rigden, the son pre-deceased him. 
Here, however, Popham CJ and Fenner J thought that ‘there was enough before in writing to 
make the issue have the land.’340 Gawdy and Clench JJ disagreed. 
 
The tide certainly seemed to be turning against such arguments. Judges were increasingly 
preoccupied by the idea of a ‘secret intent,’ which could not be found in the words of the will. 
In Maunchel v Dodenton (1587), the court explained that ‘devises must be taken according to the 
intents of the devisors, if they may be known by the will.’341 However,  
 
this intent must appear to others who adjudge it, or otherwise they cannot know 
or recognise the intent of the testator, which is very reasonable; because none can 
recognise the secret intent of a man which does not appear by some external 
things or act, such as writing or such similar thing.342 																																																									
334 Higham v Horwood (1585) Moore 221, 221.  
335 ibid 222.  
336 Higham and Harewoods Case (1586) 1 Leo 34, 34; Harwood and Higham’s Case (1586) Godbolt 40, 40. 
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Realme of England (n 317) 50; Bucher v Samford (1588) Gould 99, 99. 
339 Downhall v Catesby (1594) Moore 356, 356. 
340 Fuller v Fuller (1594) Moore 353, 353. 
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In Legwoode v Burrish (1599), a testator had devised land to his wife until his eldest son turned 
24; and if the eldest son died, to his younger son; and if the younger son died, to his two 
daughters; and so on. The question was whether he had intended to create an entail, or to 
grant successive life estates. It was argued that  
 
the will must be construed according to the intent of the devisor, and it may not 
be understood that his intent was to disinherit his posterity, but his intent was 
that if the eldest son died without issue that the younger would have it, and if the 
younger died without issue that his daughters would have it.343 
 
The court responded that ‘perhaps his private intent was such, that his issues would not be 
disinherited, but the words of the will have no such implication.’ The eldest son was therefore 
held to have only a life estate in the land.344 
 
The key distinction was that ‘the intent of the devisor may be implied where the words are 
defective, but never against the express words of the will.’345 However, there was clearly a fine 
line between understanding defective words in light of the testator’s intentions and 
introducing intentions that contradicted the written words. On a number of occasions, 
lawyers expressed anxiety about overstepping the mark. In The Lord Mountjoye v Barker (1587), 
for example, Sjt Shuttleworth argued that ‘the construction of a will ought to be according to 
the words, or according to the intent collected out of the words, and not by a thing out of the 
will.’ He gave two reasons for this. Firstly, if the intention did not come from the words of the 
will, ‘a stranger shall be the maker of the will of another.’346 Secondly, the ‘set order’ of words 
ought to be observed ‘for the avoiding of confusion.’347  
 
A similar point was made by Coke in Bullen v Bullen (1600): 
 
It is clear that the intent of the devisor must be collected out of the written will, 
and the court must not adjudge what was his intent by any foreign matter outside 
the will, for at this day the greater part of the inheritances of the realm depend 
on wills, and therefore it is convenient to have the exposition of them guided by 
some certain bounds, and it would be dangerous to make such favourable 																																																								
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construction of wills as to search for an intent which does not appear by the 
words of the will.348 	
In Garmyn v Arscott, the court refused to accept that a will was fundamentally different from a 
deed in this respect. The judges observed that ‘neither a will nor an act of the party rules the 
law, but the law rules wills and other acts of the parties.’349 A will was not taken according to 
the writer’s intentions because it was the testator’s last will, but because it expressed his 
intentions, just as ‘a deed is the will of the parties.’350 Thus, ‘the intents of the makers of wills 
will be taken, but not always, any more than the intents of parties to deeds will always be 
taken.’351 For instance, a testator’s intention would be void if it were not expressed clearly 
enough in the will. ‘No one knows what thing the maker of the will intended,’ explained the 
court, except by the words of the will. ‘Otherwise, it is an intent that passes all understanding 
and intelligence, and rests on opinion without any certainty.’352  
 
We have seen that, in Englande’s Case, Egerton argued that ‘wills are to be construed according 
to the intent and meaning of the devisor.’353 In Sanders v Byng, however, his client’s case 
required a different approach. Here, Egerton warned that 
 
the intent is not to be imagined and hunted out of the words of the will according 
to our fancy, but an apt and reasonable intent is to be plausibly collected and 
inferred, from the words themselves put together, and from the necessary 
circumstances of it.354 	
Where the testator’s intention was not clear, he argued, the land should simply be allowed to 
descend ‘as the law directs.’355 The common law rules of descent were ‘never to be prevented 																																																								
348 Bullen v Bullen (1600) BL Add MS 25203 f248, f249. Coke went on to discuss The Lord Cheyney’s Case 
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or avoided, except where the intent of the testator appears to be thus, either by express words, 
or by direct and plain intent, to be inferred by the words and circumstances of the will.’356 In 
fact, an intention to depart from the common law rules of inheritance should be regarded as 
‘unnatural and wrongful.’357 
 
Egerton was exploiting lawyers’ continued suspicion of the Statute of Wills, which, decades 
after its enactment, could still be regarded as a dubious novelty. On this view, rather than 
being ‘favoured’ by the common law, wills of freehold land were an imposition on its rules 
and ought to be strictly curtailed. Arguments against the favourable interpretation of wills 
were bolstered by the presentation of a fallback option: ‘in doubtful cases the safest way is to 
expound with the heir general against the will.’358 In Wild’s Case (1599), Clench and Fenner JJ 
argued that the testator’s intention ‘ought to be manifest and certain, and not obscure or 
doubtful: for at the common law lands were not devisable.’ The Statute of Wills was ‘made to 
the great disadvantage of heirs at the common law,’ and was ‘utterly against the rule and 
reason also of the common law; for the ancient common law did favour him whom the 
common law made heir.’359  
 
There was a clear link between attitudes to the Statute of Wills and approaches to the 
construction of wills. In Butler v Baker (1591), for example, Egerton was again on the other side 
of the argument. As a result, he was full of praise for the Statute, which was made ‘for the 
favour and benefit of subjects,’ and was ‘to be construed favourably according to the intent of 
the makers.’360 Conversely, ‘against the heir it will be taken strictly,’361 and in the same way, 
‘wills will be taken strictly against the heir, for the entire scope and intent of Parliament was to 
bind the heirs.’362 
 
We have seen that distaste for bad drafting encouraged the courts to take a stricter approach 
to the interpretation of deeds. In principle, this should not have been the case for wills, since 
the courts’ role was to aid a testator who was inops consilii. However, it is clear that lawyers and 
judges were increasingly anxious about badly-drafted wills, and this may also have influenced 
their increasingly strict approach to interpretation. In Butler v Baker, for example, Coke warned 																																																								
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testators to draft their wills carefully, since ‘great doubts and controversies daily arise on 
devises made by last wills,’ due to their ‘obscure and insensible words, and repugnant 
sentences.’363 The result, he observed elsewhere, was that ‘none should know by the written 
words of a will, what construction to make, or advice to give.’364 Coke had little patience for 
inept testators, complaining that judges had to ‘so often and so much perplex their heads, to 
make atonement and peace by construction of law between insensible and disagreeing words, 
sentences, and provisos’ in wills.365 
 
As with deeds, then, lawyers were increasingly emphasising the words of wills by the end of 
the sixteenth century. They were no longer concerned with the testator’s intentions per se, but 
with the ‘intention expressed in the will.’366 In Lovice v Goddard (1604), for example, the court 
held that ‘the mind of the devisor… is to be preferred in cases where the words will serve.’367 
Coke made the same point in his report of the case, explaining that ‘against the express words 
no inference or interpretation shall be admitted.’368 While in theory, specific forms of words 
were not needed in wills, a testator who was insufficiently precise could be accused of failing to 
make his intentions clear. Walmsley J warned in 1595 that ‘it is not a safe course to search the 
intent, unless we be certain of the intent.’ If the testator’s intentions were not clear, it was 
safest to interpret the words according to their usual meaning at common law.369 However, if 
the will remained ‘uncertain and doubtful and cannot be expounded for the uncertainty of the 
words thereof, the law therein will ever favour the inheritance of a man,’ allowing the will to 
fail and the land to descend to the common law heir.370  
 
3.4. The parol evidence rule 
 
Concerns about subverting the words of a document were also apparent in the law of 
evidence.371 In particular, they were evident in the development of the nascent parol evidence 
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rule, which provided that the terms of a written document could not be varied by parol 
evidence.372 This could touch on the same issues as the law of interpretation, but was raised at 
a different point in the proceedings. The parol evidence rule concerned questions of fact, 
which were a matter for the jury, while questions of construction were for the judges to 
resolve.373 
 
The rule first appeared in relation to wills.374 In 1587, Anderson CJ had argued that an 
averment of fact could be admitted ‘to take away surplusage’ in the words of a will, ‘but not to 
increase that which is defective,’ because, in that case, the will would not be ‘in writing which 
the statute requires.’375 However, in The Lord Cheyney’s Case (1591), the court held that an 
unambiguous will could never be altered by a ‘secret invisible averment’ of the testator’s 
intention. This was because a 
 
will concerning lands, &c. ought to be in writing, and the constructions of wills 
ought to be collected from the words of the will in writing, and not by any 
averment out of it; for it would be full of great inconvenience, that none should 
know by the written words of a will, what construction to make, or advice to give, 
but it should be controlled by collateral averments out of the will.376 
 
The rule clearly emerged from the same anxieties as the courts’ stricter approach to 
interpretation.377 It was also based in the statutory requirement of writing. Egerton, for 
example, observed that an averment could be made against the words of a will of chattels, or 
of a will of land that could be devised at common law.378 
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There was, the court noted, an exception to the rule: where the will contained a latent 
ambiguity.379 For example, if a man devised land to his son John, witnesses could be produced 
to show that the testator had two sons named John, and meant the younger.380 In The Lord 
Cheyney’s Case, the court explained that, if a will was ambiguous, the reader ‘ought at his peril 
to inquire’ what it meant. It could therefore cause ‘no inconvenience’ to have the meaning of 
the will depend on a ‘secret invisible averment,’ since everyone ought to know that one would 
be needed.381 
 
The rule was applied to deeds in The Countess of Rutland’s Case (1604). The question was 
whether the jury in a trespass trial could consider a parol agreement that purported to vary 
the terms of a use limited by deed. Popham CJ held that, in general, it could not, since ‘every 
contract or agreement ought to be dissolved by matter of as high a nature as the first deed.’382 
Furthermore, 
 
it would be inconvenient, that matters in writing made by advice and on 
consideration, and which finally import the certain truth of the agreement of the 
parties should be controlled by averment of the parties to be proved by the 
uncertain testimony of slippery memory. And it would be dangerous to 
purchasers and farmers, and all others in such cases, if such nude averments 
against matter in writing should be admitted.383 
 
Here, there was no statutory requirement of writing to uphold, but there was a concern for 
the sanctity of deeds, and again for the certainty of estates. The terms of a deed could not be 
varied by an averment of fact, but only by raising a question of interpretation.384 If the words 
were unambiguous as a matter of construction, there was nothing that could be done. As the 
court explained in Edward Altham’s Case (1610), 
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if a man makes a feoffment to one and his heirs, no averment can be taken that 
the intent of the parties was, that the feoffee should have but an estate to him and 
the heirs of his body, for such averment would be against the judgment of the 
law, which appears to the judges upon the view of the deed.385 
 
If the words of the deed were patently ambiguous, no averment of fact could be taken to 
correct them. A grant to ‘one of the sons of I.S.,’ for example, was simply void for 
uncertainty.386 The party here was in something of a catch-22: the question was one of 
construction, which the jury could not determine, but the evidence was matter of fact, of 
which the judges could not take notice. 387 Bacon explained the rationale for the rule: if a deed 
could be corrected by an averment of fact, it would make ‘that to pass without deed, which 
the law appointeth shall not pass but by deed.’388  
 
The only exception was if the deed was good on the face of it, but a latent ambiguity was 
raised by the facts of the case. In this case, the ambiguity was created by matter of fact, so the 
question became one for the jury, who could take an averment of fact to correct it.389 The 
same example was given as in the case of a will: if A. levied a fine to his son William, this was 
clear as a matter of construction. It would therefore be possible to inform the jury that A. in 
fact had two sons named William, and that A. had meant William the younger.390 In this case, 
however, the result was explained on the basis of the jury’s proper role, rather than policy 
concerns about uncertainty.  
 
The crystallisation of the rule at the end of the sixteenth century was, at least in part, a result 
of the same pressures that bore on the law of interpretation. The courts were increasingly 
concerned that invoking the writer’s intentions would undermine certainty, to the detriment 
of those whose estates depended on written documents. They therefore took a more 
formalistic approach to legal instruments and their meaning. 
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There was a significant shift in lawyers’ attitudes to the interpretation of private documents 
during our period. In the mid-sixteenth century, they had accepted that a document should 
be given the meaning intended by its writer, rather than the proper signification of the words 
he had used. They did not believe that a word was given a new meaning by the writer, but 
simply that they should ‘apply the word out of its proper signification to fulfil the intent.’391 
Thus, they emphasised both the existence of a ‘proper signification’ and its subordination to 
the intentions of the writer. This was because of their understandings of the nature of 
language, the role of legal documents in society, and the way in which those documents were 
made. 
 
At the turn of the century, the courts were still insisting that their aim was to identify the 
writer’s intentions. However, they now emphasised that those intentions must be properly 
expressed in the words of the document, and asserted their right to determine which forms of 
drafting were legitimate. Otherwise, they warned, the result would be uncertainty for those 
whose estates depended on written documents. Again, lawyers were motivated by a 
combination of ideas about the nature of language and about the practical effects of legal 
instruments. Similar concerns encouraged a parallel development in the law of evidence: the 
formalisation of the parol evidence rule. 
 
The courts seem to have thought of their approach to deeds as the default position for 
interpretation. Deviations from it were always carefully justified. For example, the courts 
hewed more closely to the strict meaning of the words when the term of the deed at issue was 
a destructive condition or the limitation of an estate. Both exceptions were explained in policy 
terms: the former, because the courts did not wish estates to be destroyed, and the latter, 
because of the need for estates to be certain. Other exceptional cases demanded greater 
consideration of the writer’s intentions, with the result that the legally-mandated words would 
not be required if the writer had made his intentions clear. This was the case for limitations of 
entails and uses, in both cases because of an imposition on the common law rules: by the 
statute De donis for the former, and Chancery practice for the latter. It was also the case for 
wills, partly because of their historical links to the Chancery, but also due to the usual 
circumstances of will-making and to lawyers’ reverence for last wishes. 
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Lawyers saw these exceptional cases as part of the same picture. Moore described wills and 
limitations of entails and uses as ‘similar cases, where the law is intent on the will of the 
party.’392 In Ross v Morris (1588), Egerton drew an analogy between wills and entails, arguing 
that ‘both the will of the donor and the will of the testator are to be respected.’393 And in The 
Lord Paget’s Case (1589), Coke cited precedents on uses and wills interchangeably, noting that 
‘the intents of the parties do direct the construction of both.’394 However, the three were not 
entirely alike: a will still demanded a more favourable construction than any inter vivos 
conveyance. Anderson CJ observed that ‘the case of a will, which receiveth a benign 
interpretation according to the testator’s intent, is stronger’ than that of a use.395 As we have 
seen, in Abraham v Twigg, it was held that the grant of a use ‘to Gabriel Dormer and his heirs 
male lawfully engendered’ was insufficient to create an entail.396 The court held that the 
limitation of a use ‘differs not from other gifts by deed.’397 Moore, counsel for the losing party, 
complained that ‘it is not the same in a will of land.’398  
 
As concerns for certainty came to the fore, however, suspicion of these exceptional cases was 
growing. Coke described entails, uses and wills as encroachments on the common law, which 
had caused ‘infinite troubles’399 by raising ‘intricate and subtle questions’ of interpretation.400 
Because the usual rules of construction were suspended, writers had been encouraged to 
devise ‘upstart and wild’ forms of drafting, which provoked litigation, took up valuable court 
time, and undermined certainty.401 The courts reacted by refusing to consider an intention 
that had not been sufficiently expressed in words.  
 
In chapters six and seven, we will examine further, closely-related changes in the courts’ 
approach to legal interpretation. First, though, we will explore lawyers’ conceptions of the 
writer’s intentions in more detail. In chapter four, we will ask what kind of intentions the 
courts thought that they were looking for. And in chapter five, we will see how lawyers went 
about identifying the intentions that would inform their interpretation of a document. 																																																								
392 Uses & Revocations de Uses (n 206) 610.  
393 Rose v Morys (n 211) f282. 
394 The Lord Pagets Case (1589) 1 Leo 194, 198. 
395 Corbet’s Case (n 237) 86a. 
396 Abraham v Twig (1596) Moore 424, 425.  
397 Abraham v Twigg (n 201) 478. 
398 Abraham v Twig (n 396) 425. See, for example, Church v Wyat (n 276) 637. 
399 The Reports of Sir Edward Coke, vol II (Joseph Butterworth and Son 1826) 4 Co Rep vii. 
400 ibid 4 Co Rep vi. 
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In chapter three, we saw that the writer’s intention was central to the interpretation of a legal 
document. We now turn to consider the kind of intention that lawyers were invoking in the 
interpretive process. Firstly, whose intention was relevant? For wills, the answer was relatively 
clear: the intention of the testator. But what about deeds, where the multiple parties involved 
in the drafting might have had different intentions? There was a further difficulty: when was 
the intention to be assessed? This was a particular problem when the document was made a 
long time before it came into effect, and its words had taken on a different meaning in the 
interim. This chapter will build on chapter three by investigating the courts’ conception of a 
writer’s intention. We will examine both of these issues to establish the similarities and 
differences between the intentions that were relevant to deeds and those that were considered 




4 .2 .1 .  WHOSE INTENTION? 
 
During the medieval period, the courts had strict rules about which party must ‘speak’ which 
terms in a deed. Sometimes, only one party would have to make the terms. For example, only 
the lessor would have to speak in a lease that involved simply a grant of the land and a 
reservation of the rent.1 This kind of lease could be made either by a deed poll, sealed only by 
the lessor, or by an indenture, sealed by both parties.2 However, other terms that could be 
added to a lease might have to be spoken by the lessee: for example, a covenant to repair.3 A 
lease that involved such reciprocal grants would have to be made by an indenture, and would 
often be written in the third person.4 
 
In the fifteenth century, it was debated whether the terms of an indenture would always bind 
both parties who had sealed it. On one view, an indenture would only bind both parties if it 
																																																								
1 JM Kaye, Medieval English Conveyances (Cambridge University Press 2009) 11. 
2 ibid 8. 
3 Gibbons v Maltyard and Martin (undated) Popham 6, 8; Kaye (n 1) 11. 
4 Kaye (n 1) 8. See also Thomas Littleton, Littleton Tenures in Englishe (Richard Tottell 1556) 79v. 
107 
purported to speak for both: for example, if it was written in the third person.5 However, the 
view that ultimately prevailed was that both parties would be bound, even if only one party 
had spoken the terms.6 As Littleton explained, an indenture sealed by both parties was ‘the 
deed of both, and also every part of the indenture is the deed of both parties.’7 
 
In the mid-sixteenth century, the courts were still struggling with the implications of this 
question. They were unsure whether a term spoken by one party to an indenture could be 
understood to be made by the agreement of both parties. In one 1536 case, for example, 
Shelley J and Sjt Mervyn described it as a ‘constant principle’ that a condition must be 
reserved by a lessor, and not granted by the lessee. Fitzherbert J replied ‘that all the grants, 
covenants and words in an indenture are the grant and agreement of both parties, and is only 
one deed.’8 However, Shelley and Mervyn insisted that ‘although it be but one deed, yet the 
grants and covenants are several’ unless the ‘words are spoken in the third person, and suit 
equally well to the lessor and lessee.’9 Thus, in Reade v Bullocke (1543), Shelley J was prepared 
to accept that a lessor’s reservation of rent could be described as a covenant of the lessee, 
because, in that case, it was ‘as much the word of the lessee as of the lessor.’10 
 
In Browning v Beston (1555), the point was discussed at greater length. John Browning leased 
land from Magdalen College, Oxford, covenanting and granting that he would pay a certain 
sum annually, and that the lease would be void if ‘the said annual rent’ was not paid.11 He fell 
into arrears, and the college claimed that the lease had thereby terminated. However, 
Browning argued that there was, in fact, no rent to pay. A rent, explained Sjt Ramsey, must 
be reserved by the lessor, but here, the lessee had made the grant.12 The condition that made 
the lease void had also been granted by the lessee, which was similarly impermissible.13 Sjt 
																																																								
5 Kaye (n 1) 10. See, for example, (1430) YB Mich 9 Hen VI pl 8, f35b-36a, f36b. 
6 ibid; see, for example, John Perkins, A Verie Profitable Booke (Richard Tottell 1555) 33v; Smith v Stapleton 
(1573) Plow 426, 434; Saunders & Starkey v Stanfourde (undated) Hunt MS El 482 f70, f71v. 
7 Littleton (n 4) 80v. See also Bryan CJ in (1480) YB Mich 20 Edw IV pl 2, f8b-9a, f8b: ‘When there is 
an indenture it is the deed of both of them.’ 
8 Anon (1536) Dyer 6a, 6b. 
9 ibid. 
10 Reade v Bullocke (1543) Dyer 56b, 57a. 
11 Browning v Beston (1555) Plow 131v, 131v. 
12 ibid 132. 
13 ibid 133. 
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Gawdy agreed that ‘it is utterly against reason to take the words of one person as the words of 
another,’ even when ‘he is party to the same indenture.’14 
 
Counsel for the college took two different tacks in response. Sjt Stanford and John Walsh 
argued that the law would ‘say that the words are spoken by him who could most properly 
speak them.’ Thus, although they were ‘in fact the words of the lessee… in construction of law 
they shall be taken the words of reservation of the lessors.’15 For Sjts Morgan and Catlyn, 
though, this was an unnecessary complication. As Sjt Morgan explained, ‘the chief matter to 
be considered is the assent of the parties.’16 No words spoken by the lessor could be effective 
without the agreement of the lessee. The lessor could not have an action of debt for the rent 
unless ‘it be adjudged a contract in law, and a contract cannot be without an assent between 
two or more, wherefore the assent of both parties is the perfection of the contract.’ Thus, ‘the 
law saith, that although the words come out of the mouth of the one only, yet they are the 
words of both in effect and operation of law.’17 Similarly, Sjt Catlyn argued that ‘in contracts 
it is not material which of the parties speak the words, if the other agrees to them, for the 
agreement of the minds of the parties is the only thing the law respects in contracts.’18 On this 
view, the words were not just the words of the lessee, although he was the party who had 
spoken them. Rather, because they had been agreed by both parties, they were the words of 
both.  
 
Browning was ultimately decided on a point of pleading, so the judges never gave their opinions 
on the issue.19 Nonetheless, Sjts Morgan and Catlyn’s argument took on an authority of its 
own.20 In Thomas v Ward (1590), for example, Robert Houghton cited Browning to argue that 
the words of a lessee in an indenture ‘are the words of the one and other.’21 Similarly, in 
Domina Russell v Gulwell (1599), Coventry observed that, ‘as Littleton says, each indenture and 
each part of it is the deed of both parties.’22 Thus, although a reservation of rent ‘must be 
spoken by the lessor… yet it is an agreement of the lessee, as is held in Browning and Beston’s 
																																																								
14 ibid 136. 
15 ibid 134. 
16 ibid 137. 
17 ibid 138. 
18 ibid 140.  
19 Browning v Beston (n 11) 144. 
20 But compare Tanfield v Crapnell (1574) Dyer’s Notebooks (110 SS) 304, 305. 
21 Thomas v Ward (1590) Cro Eliz 202, 202. 
22 Domina Russell v Gulwell (1599) BL Add MS 25203 f49v, f49v.  
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Case.’23 Gawdy J agreed, holding that ‘where the words of an indenture are spoken generally, 
they bind both parties and will be taken for the agreement of both of them.’24 Other lawyers 
failed to distinguish between this position and Stanford and Walsh’s argument that the law 
would simply treat the words as spoken by the appropriate party. In Alfo v Henning (1610), for 
example, Coke CJ held that ‘the words of the indenture shall be accounted to be his, who may 
most properly speak them.’25 However, he later concluded that ‘being by indenture, they shall 
be the words of both.’26 
 
By the end of the sixteenth century, it seems to have been generally accepted that all 
indentures were made by the agreement of both the parties, no matter how they had been 
phrased.27 However, some lawyers still refused to accept the practical consequences of this 
conclusion. In The Earl of Pembroke v Sir Henry Berkeley (1595), for example, Tanfield and 
Atkinson argued that, ‘although the words in the indenture are quasi the words of both, yet 
they are properly the words of him who speaks them.’ Thus, if a term was spoken by the 
lessee, it would not be understood to be made by the lessor. Only words written in the third 
person could truly be the words of both.28 In a 1613 reading, Humphrey Were attempted to 
reconcile the 1536 case and Browning, arguing that ‘although the words of the indenture are 
the words of both, yet the words of the one will not be taken as the words of the other, for 
each has his own part to speak in an indenture.’29 He continued, 	
Although the words of the indenture are the covenants and agreements of both, 
yet the covenants and grants which are of one party, are not the covenants and 
grants of the other party, and although it is one deed, yet the grants and 
covenants are several: reservation is the part of the feoffor, payment the part of 
the feoffee, etc.30 
 
																																																								
23 ibid.  
24 ibid f50.  
25 Alfo and Dennis v Henning (1610) Owen 151, 151. 
26 ibid 152. 
27 See also Stevinson Case (1589) 1 Leo 324, 324; Brett v Cumberland (1619) Popham 136, 137. 
28 Earl of Pembroke v Sir Henry Berkley (1595) Cro Eliz 384, 385. 
29 A Reading on the Statute of Discontinuance (1613) CUL MS Dd.11.87 f56, f60.  
30 ibid.  
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Treatise writers had generally accepted the new understanding of indentures. Coke approved 
Littleton’s claim that ‘each part of the indenture is the deed of both parties,’31 while West 
wrote that ‘both parts of such deeds indented be the deeds of both the parties to the same: and 
every part of such indentures is the deed of either of the said parties.’32 
 
This changing view of indentures was paralleled by new language in the context of 
interpretation. We have already noted that the fourteenth-century courts very rarely 
considered the parties’ intentions when interpreting a deed.33 They generally only made 
exceptions when required to do so: for example, by the statute De donis, which directed them 
to observe ‘the will of the donor.’34 When they referred to the writer’s intention in cases that 
did not involve entails, they used the same language. In one 1344 case on a lease, for example, 
Sjt Seton argued that ‘it is reason and law, in all that a man may do, to draw out the will of 
the donor.’35 
 
This made sense, since, as we have seen, the party making the grant was presumed to be the 
writer of the deed.36 If an indenture contained reciprocal grants, it could be carved up into the 
terms spoken by each party. In one 1469 case, Choke J observed that there was a difference 
between a deed poll and a ‘deed of both’ parties.37 In the latter case, the court ought to 
consider ‘who made the deed in that clause which belongs to him:’ considering, for example, 
whose grant it was.38 Since each party’s terms were fundamentally independent of the other’s, 
a term would simply be interpreted according to the intentions of the party who had spoken 
it.  
 
However, as the courts began to consider the writer’s intention in a wider variety of deeds, 
they moved beyond their focus on ‘the will of the donor’ alone. Since they recognised that 
‘each part of the indenture is the deed of both parties,’ they began to consider the intentions 
of both parties when interpreting an indenture. By the sixteenth century, they were referring 																																																								
31 Sir Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, or, A Commentary upon Littleton (The 
Societie of Stationers 1628) 230v.  
32 William West, The First Part of Symboleography (Thomas Wight and Bonham Norton 1598) s 47. 
33 See 3.2.1. above. 
34 Kaye (n 1) 243. See, for example, (1316) YB Mich 10 Edw II pl 14, 52 SS 46-52, 47. 
35 (1344) YB Mich 18 Edw III pl 91, RS 362-365, 363. 
36 See, for example, (1423) YB Mich 2 Hen VI pl 2, f4b-5a, f4b, where Sjt Paston argued that a deed 
belonged to the party who made the feoffment. 
37 (1469) YB Trin 9 Edw IV pl 22, f19b-22a, f21b.  
38 ibid.  
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less often to ‘the will of the donor,’ and more frequently to ‘the intent of the parties’ or ‘of 
both the parties.’39 In Southwall v Huddelston (1523), for example, Brudenell CJ held that 
‘bargains and sales are [understood] in the way it has been concluded and agreed between the 
parties, as far as their intentions can be understood.’40 Sjt Catlyn observed in Browning that ‘if 
any persons are agreed upon a thing… the law always regards the intention of the parties  and 
will apply the words to that which in common presumption may be taken to be their intent.’41 
 
However, unlike the question of who had spoken a deed’s terms, this shift was not confined to 
indentures. Even when interpreting deeds that bound only one party, the courts were 
beginning to refer to the intentions of both. This was apparent even in the fifteenth century. 
In 1440, for example, Paston J discussed the ‘intent between the plaintiff and the defendant’ 
where the plaintiff made an apparently unilateral release to the defendant.42 In a 1499 case, 
the plaintiff had been granted an annuity by a Prior. Although Bryan CJ distinguished 
between the grantor and grantee, he also referred to the writers of the deed in the plural.43 
This remained the case throughout the sixteenth century. While in some cases, the courts 
considered a deed poll solely from the grantor’s point of view,44 in others they recognised that 
even a simple grant represented ‘the bargain and mutual agreement of the parties,’45 and 
sought to discover the intention of both.46  
 
Thus, even if only one party was speaking the terms of the deed, it was not only his intention 
that was relevant to its interpretation. The intention of the ‘listening’ party also had to be 
taken into account. Perhaps this is not surprising. After all, deeds were frequently made in the 
context of a wider settlement, with multiple parties executing various interdependent 
instruments. Furthermore, a grantee who did not speak might still be contributing something 
to the bargain: for example, a lessee would have to pay the rent reserved by the lessor. Finally, 
even a passive grantee would be relying on the terms of the deed, and would therefore have 
an immediate interest in its meaning. 
 
																																																								
39 Throckmerton v Tracy (1555) Plow 145, 161; Chapman v Dalton (1565) Plow 284, 291. 
40 Southwall v Huddelston and Reynoldys (1523) Hil 14 Hen VIII pl 1 (119 SS 150) 160. 
41 Browning v Beston (n 11) 140. 
42 (1440) YB Mich 19 Hen VI pl 7, f3b-4b, f4b.  
43 (1499) YB Trin 14 Hen VII pl 8, f31b-1a, f32b.  
44 Davenport’s Case (1610) 8 Co Rep 144b, 145a; Maund’s Case (1601) 7 Co Rep 28b, 28b. 
45 Butt’s Case (1600) 7 Co Rep 23a, 23a. 
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112 
Both parties’ intentions could also be taken into account when interpreting a deed that limited 
a use. In some cases, only the settlor’s intention was emphasised, even though the use was 
limited in an indenture;47 in others, the courts referred to the intention of both parties; 48 and 
in still others, both ideas were deployed in quick succession. In Edward Fox’s Case (1609), for 
example, the court held that ‘the intention of the parties is the creation of uses’ and enquired 
into ‘the intent of the parties,’ before coming to a conclusion about ‘the intent of the 
grantor.’49 And even where a deed poll was used, ‘the intent of the parties’ might still be 
relevant.50 As Egerton observed in Englande’s Case, ‘the ground and foundation’ of a use was 
‘the meaning and intent of the parties,’ for ‘trust must be guided and directed according to the 
meaning of those between whom the trust is.’51 It was not just the settlor’s intention that was 
relevant, but also the intention of the feoffee, whom he was trusting. 
 
While for some purposes, then, it was important to know which party was speaking the terms 
of a deed,52 both parties could be taken into account when identifying the intentions behind it, 
no matter who had spoken. Some lawyers tried to reverse engineer this principle, claiming 
that both parties’ intentions were only relevant when both parties spoke. In Browning, for 
example, Stanford and Walsh argued that only in an indenture did the law make ‘each party 
privy to the speech of the other.’ In a deed poll, the words still belonged solely to the party 
who had spoken them. As a result, they ‘ought not to make such construction of words in an 
indenture as in a deed poll.’ 53  Egerton repeated this argument in Saunders v Stanfourde, 
observing that an indenture was ‘in construction not like a deed poll,’ since it ‘contains the 
mutual agreement of both the parties, and the words in the indenture are the words of each 
party.’54 Only an indenture, therefore, would be construed ‘equally according to the meaning 
of the parties.’55 As we have seen, however, this neat dichotomy was not borne out in practice. 
In fact, the courts only consistently spoke of ‘the will of the donor’ when construing the 																																																								
47 Englefield’s Case (1591) 7 Co Rep 11b, 12b; Sir Francis Englefields Case (undated) 4 Leo 135, 141; Scrope’s 
Case (1612) 10 Co Rep 143b, 144a; Shelley’s Case (1581) 1 Co Rep 93b, 100a; Anon (undated) 1 And 67, 
67. 
48 Baldwin’s Case (1589) 2 Co Rep 23a, 23b; Dowman’s Case (1586) 9 Co Rep 7b, 9a; Mildmay’s Case (1584) 
1 Co Rep 175a, 177a; The Lord Cromwel’s Case (1601) 2 Co Rep 69b, 71a. 
49 Edward Fox’s Case (1609) 8 Co Rep 93b, 94a. 
50 Tibb v Poplewell (1599) BL Add MS 25203 f129v, f130.  
51 Englande’s Case (undated) Hunt MS El 482 f53, f54v.  
52 See 6.5.2. below. 
53 Browning v Beston (n 11) 134. 
54 Saunders & Starkey v Stanfourde (n 6) f72v.  
55 ibid f72v.  
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limitation of an entail. This was the case whether it was made in an indenture or a deed poll.56 
Here, focusing on the donor alone was mandated by the statutory language, which was 
accordingly reflected by the judges.  
 
4 .2 .2 .  THE TIM E OF THE INTENTION 
 
As we have seen, a deed did not take effect until it was delivered.57 Coke observed that, ‘when 
a deed is delivered, it takes effect by the delivery, and not from the day of the date’ on which it 
was made.58 ‘The delivery is as necessary,’ he explained, ‘to the essence of a deed, as the 
putting of the seal to it.’59 This meant that, in some cases, a further ambiguity arose. As Coke 
noted, ‘the order of making a deed is, first to write it, then to seal it, and after to deliver it.’60 
But was the parties’ intention to be identified at the time when the deed was written, or at the 
time when it became effective? 
 
In Earl of Huntingdon v Lord Clinton (1557), this issue was discussed by the serjeants and judges. 
A. had covenanted to grant B. the fee simple of his manor, discharged of all encumbrances 
except leases on which the accustomed rent was payable. Between the date of the covenant 
and the delivery of the deed, A. made a new lease, reserving the accustomed rent. The 
question was whether this was a breach of the covenant. Sjts Morgan and Bendlowes argued 
that it was; Broke CB, Saunders CJ and Whyddon and Dyer JJ that it was not. Dyer does not 
explain the court’s reasoning. Presumably, however, Morgan and Bendlowes argued that the 
permissible exceptions to the grant were to be determined at the time when the covenant was 
made, while the others thought that it was the time of the delivery that counted.61 
 
The point was apparently still unsettled almost 50 years later. In White v Columbell (1601), Ogle 
and Frith made a lease of all their lands ‘now in the tenure or occupation of Columbell.’ 
However, it seemed that Columbell had lost possession of the land in question six days before 																																																								
56 See, for example, Willion v Berkley (1562) Plow 223, 235; Shelley’s Case (1580) Dyer 373b, 374a; Rose v 
Morys (1588) Hunt MS El 482 f282, f282; Cottons Case (1590) 1 Leo 211, 212; Beresford’s Case (1607) 7 Co 
Rep 41a, 42a; Uses & Revocations de Uses (undated) Moore 608, 611. 
57 See 1.4. above. 
58 Goddard’s Case (1584) 2 Co Rep 4b, 5a. See also Le Serjaunts Case (1567) Hunt MS El 482 f3, f5; 
William Sheppard, An Epitome of All the Common & Statute Laws of This Nation, Now in Force (Lee, Pakeman 
et al 1656) 407.  
59 Goddard’s Case (n 58) 5a. 
60 ibid. 
61 Earl of Huntingdon v Lord Clinton (1557) Dyer 139a, 139a. 
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the lease was made, so that the lease was void.62 Gawdy J, however, raised another point: 
what if the land had been in Columbell’s possession when the lease was written, but he lost it 
before the deed was delivered? Gawdy maintained that, in this case, the lease would still be 
good, since ‘at the time of the writing of the lease it was in his possession, as the words of the 
lease require.’63 Fenner J thought otherwise. ‘This word “now” which is in the lease,’ he 
argued, ‘must refer to the time of the delivery of the lease and not to the writing of it.’64 
 
The position was different, however, if a feoffment were made pursuant to the condition of an 
earlier bond. Here, it was clear that the relevant time was when the obligation had been 
made. In Colthirst v Bejushin (1550), Sjt Pollard gave the example of one who was bound to 
enfeoff J.S. of a manor. If, between making the bond and the feoffment, he granted 20 acres 
of the manor to another, he would not have performed the condition. The parties’ intention 
was to be assessed at the time the bond was made: ‘the intent was that J.S. should have the 
whole manor, which intent he has not performed.’65 Similarly, in the serjeants’ case of 1567, 
Sjt Gawdy put the case of one who was obliged to make a feoffment of all his lands at 
Michaelmas. He need only grant the lands of which he was seised when he made the bond, 
explained Gawdy, ‘for the intent will be taken according to that which the words import.’66 
 
In some cases, lawyers distinguished between the times at which different parts of the deed 
had been written. We have seen that, in Browning v Beston, Sjt Ramsey argued that a lessee 
could not add a condition to a lease; it must be reserved by the lessor. The reason he gave was 
that ‘these words of the lessee are spoken after the lease is made’ by the lessor. ‘Although the 
words are contained in one indenture,’ he explained, ‘yet in consideration of law there are two 
different times therein:’ the time at which the lessor made the lease, and the time at which the 
lessee added the condition.67 The latter came too late: ‘an estate first made shall not be 
defeated by a defeasance after the estate.’68 Stanford and Walsh rejected this argument. The 
agreement had been  
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63 ibid f417.  
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66 Le Serjaunts Case (n 58) f8v. 
67 Browning v Beston (n 11) 133. 
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made by one deed indented, so that no word of it takes effect before the delivery 
of the deed, and the deed is delivered all at one instant, and therefore all the 
words shall take effect at one same instant.69 
 
Sjt Ramsey’s argument was based on a rule about the proper function of the different terms in 
a deed: a grant, once made, could not be altered by any subsequent words. However, lawyers 
also thought that a deed should be understood as a whole document. In Kidwelly v Brand 
(1551), the court held that later words in a deed must be understood by reference to the 
earlier words.70 In Sir Baptist Hix v Fleetwood (1612), it was held that earlier words could be 
understood by the later words. Thus, if land were granted to one and his heirs male, and later 
to the heirs male of his body, the first reference to ‘heirs male’ would be understood to mean 
the same as the subsequent ‘heirs male of his body.’71 
 
As a deed came to be viewed as a single entity, it became difficult to insist that later terms 
should be ignored in favour of earlier ones.72  In Baldwyn v Marton (1589), the Earl of 
Westmorland demised land to the Baldwins and their heirs, habendum for 300 years. It was 
argued that ‘the law must adjudge that it was the intent of the Earl to pass the land as is 
contained in the first part of the indenture:’ that is, as a fee simple, and not a lease.73 
However, the judges replied that they must never ‘take one part [of the deed] and ignore the 
others, for this is to no other purpose than to alter the intent of him who made the deed.’74  
 
In Carter v Ringstead (1590), on the other hand, the court equivocated on this point. John Berry 
had suffered a common recovery of all his lands to the use of him and his wife for life, and of 
the manor of Stapeley to his own use for life. Sjt Harris argued that his wife ought also to have 
an interest in Stapeley, ‘for when the whole estate is limited at the beginning of a deed, it shall 
not be abridged afterwards.’75 Peryam J replied that this rule did not apply to the limitation of 
a use, ‘which shall be expounded according to the intent and will of the limiter.’76 The court 
ultimately held that, since it was ‘expressly shown, that the manor of Stapeley shall be to other 																																																								
69 ibid 135. 
70 Kidwelly v Brand (1551) Plow 69, 70. 
71 Sir Baptist Hix, and Fleetwood and Got’s Case (1612) Godbolt 197, 198. 
72 It continued to be the case that a grant that was good by the first words could not be made void by a 
later clause: Underhay v Underhay (1592) Cro Eliz 269, 269; Seaman’s Case (1610) Godbolt 166, 166. 
73 Baldwyn v Marton (1589) 1 And 223, 224.  
74 ibid.  
75 Carter v Kungstead (1590) Owen 84, 84. 
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uses, the law shall expound it so, and [it] shall not be carried to her by the first words in the 
deed.’77 Coke, discussing the case, treated this as a general rule for all deeds, but in fact the 
court’s reasoning was closely confined to the limitation of uses by analogy to wills.78  
 
4.3. Wills  
 
4 .3 .1 .  WHOSE INTENTION? 
 
The question of whose intention was relevant to a will was a comparatively straightforward 
one. The only person whose intention mattered was the testator. This was implicit in the 
Statute of Wills, which, as lawyers reminded each other, gave ‘liberty to every owner to 
dispose of his land by devise at his will and pleasure.’79 Indeed, it was implicit in the nature of 
any will: as Robert Nowell observed in a 1561 reading, ‘it is called a will because it rests in the 
will and pleasure of him that makes it.’80 We have seen that, relying on civilian scholarship, 
common lawyers described a will as a signification of the testator’s mind.81 Lawyers argued 
that, if the testator had not thought of a term, it could not form part of his will.82 
 
Although other people might be involved in the will-making process, their intentions were 
irrelevant. A will that had been inaccurately recorded by a clerk would be void, ‘because it 
was not the will of the testator.’83 The intentions of devisees were also irrelevant. For a start, 
they were clearly not speaking the terms of the will. Thus, for example, land devised by will 
could not be bound by a covenant, which had to be spoken by the grantee. As Popham CJ 																																																								
77 Carter v Ringstead (1590) Cro Eliz 208, 208. 
78 Dr Bonham’s Case (1610) 8 Co Rep 113b, 118b. 
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BL Add MS 25203 f3v, f3v–f4; Mariot v Mascal (1587) 1 And 202, 209.  
82 Maunchel v Dodenton (1587) 1 And 197, 198. 
83 Downhall v Catesby (1594) Moore 356, 356. 
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explained, ‘a covenant ought always to come on the part of the lessee himself, which cannot 
be’ when the lease was made by will. The lessee ‘doth not speak any thing in the will to bind 
him, but they are all the words of the devisor himself comprised in a will.’84 West observed 
that ‘the active making of a testament is that which belongeth to the testator, that he have 
right and power to make a testament.’ The executor, witnesses and devisees were only 
involved as ‘passive’ participants in the process.85 
 
We have seen that the intentions of a passive grantee could be considered when interpreting a 
deed poll. However, a devisee was in a very different position. Unlike a grantee, he could not 
give anything in exchange for the devise. Nor could he rely on it, given that it would not 
become effective or even irrevocable until the testator’s death.86 Thus, the testator’s intentions 
did not have to be balanced against the interests of other parties. The courts were solely 
concerned with his own intention. When a will was too uncertain to enforce, for example, the 
concern was not that this would cause uncertainty for any other party, but simply that the 
testator had failed to make his intentions clear.87 
 
4 .3 .2 .  THE TIM E OF THE INTENTION 
 
Usually, a testator would make his will only a short time before his death.88 This meant that 
the words of his will were unlikely to change their meaning before they took effect. In some 
exceptional cases, however, the testator made his will many years in advance. In Brett v Rigden 
(1568), for example, Giles Brett made his will in 1556, devising ‘all his lands and tenements’ to 
Henry and his heirs.89 Giles later acquired twelve more acres of land. Henry had a son, 
Thomas, and died, before Giles himself died in 1561. It was clear from oral statements made 
by Giles after Henry’s death that he had intended Thomas to inherit all of his land.90 
However, there were two problems with the timing of Giles’ will. When Giles made his will, 
firstly, Thomas had not yet been born, and, secondly, Giles had not owned the new twelve 
acres of land. Two questions therefore arose: could Thomas inherit the land, although he had 
																																																								
84 Gibbons v Maltyard and Martin (n 3) 8. 
85 West (n 32) s 633. 
86 Sheppard (n 58) 932. See 1.5. above. 
87 See 3.3.2. above. 
88 See 1.5. above. 
89 Brett v Rigden (1568) Plow 340, 341. See 3.3.2. above. 
90 ibid 342. 
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not been alive when it was devised? And did ‘all my lands’ mean all the lands Giles had when 
he made his will, or all the lands he had at the time of his death?91 
 
These were clearly controversial points, since they were chosen for seven newly-appointed 
serjeants to debate in a show case in Michaelmas term 1567.92 They were then argued again 
in Brett itself the following year. Plowden’s report of Brett was based partly on the 1568 
hearings, but also on arguments made in the serjeants’ case.93 A longer report of the serjeants’ 
case is also available: a copy was made by John Boune for the benefit of an unnamed judge, 
and was subsequently acquired by Egerton.94 In Brett, the court held that Thomas could not 
inherit any of the land, and that, even if he could, the twelve acres would not pass by the will. 
On the face of it, this seems to be thwarting Giles’ clear intention to grant Thomas all his 
lands. However, the arguments made in the serjeants’ case show that the point was a much 
more subtle one. 
 
All seven of the serjeants prefaced their arguments with a declaration that the testator’s 
intentions ought to be observed. Sjt Lovelace, for example, agreed that ‘in all things in 
testaments, the intent of the devisor is most favourably to be construed.’95 However, this 
would not help a testator whose intention was unlawful or impossible to perform. A devise to 
one who had not yet been born was just as impossible to perform as a devise to a corporation 
that did not exist.96 The problem was that a testament was understood to be a once-for-all 
conveyance, and was therefore to be interpreted as at the time of writing.97 For Sjt Barham, it 
was fundamental that ‘the intent will be construed according to what was at the time of the 																																																								
91 ibid. 
92 Le Serjaunts Case (n 58). Serjeants’ cases were hypothetical cases based on controversial points of law, 
‘used to exercise the wits of the serjeants’: The Duke of Norfolk’s Case (1681) 3 Chan Cas 1, 32. 
93 Brett v Rigden (n 89) 342. 
94 Le Serjaunts Case (n 58) f12v-13. John Boune was admitted to Lincoln’s Inn in 1560: The Records of the 
Honorable Society of Lincoln’s Inn, Vol 1: Admissions from AD 1420 to AD 1799 (Lincoln’s Inn 1896) 66. In a 
letter appended to the bottom of the report, he sent his regards to (inter alia) Egerton, Thomas 
Walmesley and Peter Warburton, all of whom joined Lincoln’s Inn at a similar date. Since Egerton was 
mentioned in the third person, he was apparently not the recipient of the original letter. Boune 
described the manuscript as ‘the whole report of the serjeants’ case, as largely as I myself have it,’ and 
explained that he had it copied at such length due to ‘the brevity of Mr Plowden’s report of the said 
case’: Le Serjaunts Case (n 58) f12v. 
95 Le Serjaunts Case (n 58) f3.  
96 ibid f3v. 
97 Sir William Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol 7 (2nd edn, Methuen 1966) 366. 
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making of it. For otherwise it will be the will of the interpreter and not of the testator.’98 Giles 
had not known Thomas when he wrote his will, and the law should not create devisees when 
the testator had ‘neither respected them nor put his trust in them.’99 It was not, then, that 
Giles’ intentions were being ignored. It was that ‘the intent will be construed as if the devisor 
had died immediately’ after making his will.100 Only the intentions he could have had when 
writing the will were relevant.101 
 
Giles’ devise of ‘all his lands and tenements’ was more difficult. Sjt Manwood argued that it 
should be taken ‘according to the time of the death of the devisor, for a testament is confirmed 
by death.’102 While a ‘deed takes effect immediately by the livery… the will does not take 
effect until the death of the devisor.’103 When Giles made his will, he ‘well knew that the word 
“all” must receive some construction and exposition after his death.’ Thus, the devise of ‘all 
his lands’ must have meant ‘all that he had at the last instant of his life,’104 for ‘the death of the 
testator is precedent, and the construction of the words of his will is subsequent.’105 The time 
at which he wrote the will was simply ‘not material.’106 
 
This argument was unsuccessful. As Sjt Lovelace explained, the difficulty was, again, one of 
timing: ‘the intent is to be taken according to that which it was at the time of the making, and 
at this time it could not be intended that he spoke of’ the new twelve acres.107 It was true that 
a will did not take effect until the testator’s death, but ‘one same intent’ ran through the will, 
from the time it was made until the time it took effect.108 Thus, ‘the intent of the testator, 
which subsisted in the making of the will, and in the publication of it, and in its 
consummation, excludes the devisee from having the 12 acres.’109 Sjt Barham observed that 
‘time is a good circumstance to know the truth, and in this case, having consideration of the 
																																																								
98 Le Serjaunts Case (n 58) f11v. 
99 ibid. 
100 ibid f6. 
101 This point seems later to have been overturned: see Mirow (n 80) 207. 
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103 ibid.  
104 Brett v Rigden (n 89) 343. 
105 ibid 342. 
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time, it appears plainly that he was not seised of them at the time of the making of the will.’110 
If a testator wished to devise land he had not yet acquired, he could do so, but he must make 
that intention clear by naming the land specifically.111 Here, there were simply ‘no words 
which show[ed] his intent’ to do so.112 
 
Later lawyers and treatise writers emphasised this exception to the rule, which clearly fit 
better with their focus on the testator’s intentions.113 There was also a further exception: 
where there had been a new publication of the will since the land had been acquired. In 
Beckford v Parnecott (1596), for example, Richard Parsons had devised ‘all his lands’ in Aldworth 
to Barbara and Joan. He later acquired more land in Aldworth. Seven years after making his 
will, he had it read and added a codicil, but did not mention his new land. Gawdy J objected 
that, although the will had been newly published, it did ‘not manifest the intent to be that 
more shall pass by that than he intended at the first.’114 Clench J, however, pointed out that 
when he heard his will read again, he would have known that his new lands in Aldworth 
would pass by it.115 The court held that the new publication demonstrated ‘his intent 
sufficiently’ to pass all the land.116  
 
As with deeds, there was also a question about the different times at which the parts of a will 
were written. In Carter v Ringstead, Anderson CJ had referred to the writing of a will. If he 
devised land to J.S., he argued, and later in the same will devised the land to J.D., ‘now J.S. 
shall have nothing, because it was my last will that J.D. should have it.’117 Peryam J responded 
that the will would be void for uncertainty, but Anderson stood his ground: ‘I am sure the law 
hath been taken as I have said.’ Peryam conceded that this would be right if he wrote the first 
part of his will on one day, and the second on another day, ‘for here is a difference in time.’ 
‘So there is in my case,’ replied Anderson, ‘for when I am writing my will, I am thinking how 
I shall dispose of my estate, and it shall be intended that I have best advised concerning that 
which I have done last.’118 																																																								
110 Le Serjaunts Case (n 58) f11v.  
111 Brett v Rigden (n 89) 344. 
112 ibid.  
113 See, for example, Jelsey v Robinson (1583) Owen 88, 88; William Fulbecke, A Parallele or Conference of the 
Civill Law, the Canon Law, and the Common Law of This Realme of England (Thomas Wight 1601) 36v. 
114 Beckford v Parnecote (1596) Gould 150, 151. 
115 ibid. 
116 Beckford v Parnecott (1596) Cro Eliz 493, 493. 
117 Carter v Kungstead (n 75) 84. 
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The courts, however, were generally prepared to consider a will as a whole document, just as 
they were a deed. In Bullen v Bullen (1600), Sjt Moore attempted to argue that the first words of 
a will would always be ‘controlled by implication of the later words,’ but was told to ‘be silent’ 
by Gawdy J.119 In some cases, the courts found that ‘the first words in the will are the intent of 
the devisor, which guide the subsequent words,’120 while in others, ‘the later limitation must 
expound that which precedes.’121  
 
Lawyers emphasised that this could only be decided ‘all the words of the will being compared 
together.’122 In Paramour v Yardley (1579), for example, William Robinson had bequeathed the 
residue of a lease to his son Thomas, and then granted the occupation and profits of the land 
to his wife Grace until Thomas turned 21. The defendant claimed that the grant to Grace was 
void, because it was repugnant to the prior devise to Thomas.123 However, the plaintiff argued 
that the law must ‘marshal the words’ of wills, ‘contrary to the order in which they are 
placed,’ just as it did with deeds.124 The court agreed, holding that ‘notwithstanding the whole 
term was first devised to the son, the devise afterwards to the wife is good, and in sense and 
intent shall precede the devise to the son.125 Similarly, in Browne v Jerves (1611), William 
Browne devised all his lands to John in tail. Later in the same will, he devised his lands in 
Ham to Henry. The court held that this was not a countermand of the devise to John, but the 
limitation of a remainder to Henry. In this way, they explained, ‘all the clauses of the will 




The courts were generally concerned with a very specific kind of intention when interpreting 
a legal instrument. When construing a will, the court was interested in the intention that the 
testator had when he was writing. If his situation had changed by the time of his death, the 
court would not assume that he had expected this to happen unless he had demonstrated so 
explicitly. The position with deeds was less clear. Some thought that the parties’ intention was 																																																								
119 Bullen v Bullen (1600) BL Add MS 25203 f186, f186v.  
120 Buck v Frencham (1558) 1 And 8, 8.  
121 Mylner v Robinson (1603) BL Add MS 25203 f660v, f661.  
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124 Paramour v Yardley (n 123) 541. 
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to be assessed at the time of writing, some at the time of delivery. If it was the latter, 
intervening events could be taken into account in a way they could not be with wills. With 
both kinds of document, however, the writer was presumed to have a single, overarching 
intention when writing. The court would therefore consider the instrument as a coherent 
whole, rather than as a series of separate terms that took effect independently. 
 
In another way, the intention of the parties to a deed was conceptualised differently to that of 
a testator. When interpreting a will, only the testator’s intention was to be taken into account. 
When interpreting a deed, however, both parties’ intentions could be considered. This was 
the case even if it were a deed poll, or if its terms had been spoken by only one of the parties. 
This difference was highly significant. In the next chapter, we will see how it affected the ways 
in which the intentions behind these two kinds of document could be identified.  
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In chapter four, we saw that a will was the pure expression of a testator’s own intentions. The 
court’s aim in interpreting the will was to identify and give effect to his stated wishes. In 
contrast, common lawyers had begun to think of a deed as the product of both parties’ 
intentions. In Browning v Beston (1555), for example, Sjt Catlyn explained that ‘if any persons 
are agreed upon a thing… the law always regards the intention of the parties and will apply 
the words to that which in common presumption may be taken to be their intent.’1 This made 
identifying the intentions behind a deed much more complicated than identifying those 
behind a will. The courts were trying to find an intention that both parties shared. Lawyers 
recognised that this intention had to be, to some extent, fictitious: even Sjt Catlyn admitted 
that it was only ‘taken’ to be the parties’ intention. This gave the courts greater scope to 
introduce their own ideas of what reasonable people would have intended such a deed to 
mean.  
 
This chapter will explore the ways in which this difference between deeds and wills affected 
the process of identifying the intentions behind a document. We will see that the courts used 
different techniques to identify the intentions of a testator and the intentions of parties to a 
deed. In the former case, they were interested solely in the testator’s own intention. To find it, 
they had little to go on other than the testator’s words and the presumption that he had 
intended them to be effective. Aside from this, they developed few principles or presumptions 
that could be used to identify it. In the context of deeds, however, the courts made heavy use 
of appeals to reason. They sought to identify a ‘reasonable and equal intention’ behind the 
document,2 presuming that this must accord with what the parties had agreed. They made 
correspondingly greater use of principles and presumptions to identify the intended meaning 
of the deed. 	
5.2. Deeds 	
5.2.1 .  INTENTIONS AND W ORDS 
 
To identify the parties’ intentions, the obvious place to start was with the words of their deed. 
In chapter three, we examined cases in which the courts had overlooked the parties’ 																																																								
1 Browning v Beston (1555) Plow 131v, 140. 
2 Bold v Molineux (1536) Dyer 14b, 15a. 
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intentions and instead applied the words they had used. Here, we are looking at cases in 
which the courts did consider the parties’ intentions, but sought to identify them from the 
words of the deed. As the court explained in Edrich’s Case (1603), in the context of statutory 
interpretation, ‘nothing can so express the meaning of [the writers], as their own direct words, 
for index animi sermo’ [speech is an indicator of the mind].3 We have seen that Popham CJ 
described a deed as ‘an explanation in writing of the intent of the parties,’4 and Saunders J 
observed that the words of the deed were ‘the testimony’ of the parties’ agreement.5 
 
Sometimes, then, the parties’ intentions could simply be gleaned from the words of their deed. 
In Baldwin’s Case (1589), for example, the Earl of Cumberland had ‘covenanted, granted, 
demised and to farm let’ certain land to Anne Baldwin, her son, and his heirs, habendum for 
300 years. The question was whether the premises of the deed had granted a fee simple, 
which was repugnant to the lease in the habendum. The court held that it had not, since ‘it 
appeareth, that the intent of the parties was, that but a term should pass; for, in the premises, 
the parties use the usual words of a lease, scil. grant, demise, and to farm let.’6 Anne and her 
son therefore held a lease of the land, ‘for so are the words and the intention of the parties.’7 
Similarly, in Saunders’s Case (1599), the court concluded that the lessor’s ‘intent is as general as 
his lease is.’8  
 
Coke was particularly inclined to identify the parties’ intentions with their words. In his 
reports, he frequently elided ‘the intent of the parties’ and the meaning of the document. In 
Mildmay’s Case (1584), for example, he reported that Henry Sharington had breached a 
proviso in his family settlement by limiting further uses. This was, Coke explained, ‘as well 
against the intent of the parties, as against the words of the proviso,’ since it would ‘defraud 
the intent of the parties’ rather than ‘perform and pursue the intent and meaning of the 
proviso.’9 In other cases, judges equated ‘the words of the proviso, and the intention of the 
parties;’10 asked what ‘the intent and the words import;’11 or discussed ‘the words and intent of 
the condition.’12 																																																								
3 Edrich’s Case (1603) 5 Co Rep 118a, 118b. 
4 Broke v Smith (1602) Moore 679, 679. 
5 Throckmerton v Tracy (1555) Plow 145, 161. See 3.2.1. above. 
6 Baldwin’s Case (1589) 2 Co Rep 23a, 23b. 
7 ibid 24b. 
8 Saunders’s Case (1599) 5 Co Rep 12a, 12a. See also Cranmer, Archbishop of Canterbury’s Case (1572) Dyer 
309a, 309b. 
9 Mildmay’s Case (1584) 1 Co Rep 175a, 177a. 
10 Fitzwilliam’s Case (1604) 6 Co Rep 32a, 33b. 
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However, identifying the words with the intention of the document could get lawyers into 
conceptual difficulties. This can be seen, for example, in Moore’s report of Shelley’s Case 
(1581). Edward Shelley had suffered a common recovery to his own use for life, remainder to 
others for 24 years, remainder to Edward’s heirs male and the heirs male of their bodies. The 
question was whether Edward’s heirs took directly by the conveyance, or by descent from 
Edward: that is, whether the words ‘his heirs’ were words of purchase, or words delimiting 
Edward’s own estate. The plaintiff argued that they must be words of purchase, or the 
subsequent limitation to ‘the heirs male of their bodies’ would be void.13 Coke, on behalf of 
the defendant, responded that Edward’s intention was ‘manifestly’ to limit the estate, ‘and this 
is expressed by the words.’ If the later words of limitation would 
 
induce such construction in the sentence as to subvert the true intention of the 
gift and limitation, it is better to condemn them as superfluous and void words, 
than to receive them to do such wicked office in the deed.14 
 
Essentially, Coke was arguing that he could identify Edward’s ‘true intention’ from the first 
words of the deed, which demonstrated that the later words ‘subverted’ that intention. But 
how was the reader to tell which words really did reflect Edward’s intentions, and which were 
‘wicked’ impostors? 
 
In fact, Coke’s argument was somewhat more subtle than this. In his own report, he pointed 
out that the rest of the deed would make little sense if the words were ones of purchase. A 
whole host of other terms would become unclear,15 unnecessary,16 or impossible to fulfil.17 
Thus, the whole document had to be considered in order to identify the true meaning of the 
particular term in question.18 By looking at the context of the term, the parties’ intention 
could be ascertained. 																																																																																																																																																														
11 Englefields Case (1590) Moore 303, 336. 
12 Marsh v Curteis (1596) Moore 425, 426. 
13 Shelley’s Case (1581) Moore 136, 138. 
14 ibid 140. 
15 Shelley’s Case (1581) 1 Co Rep 93b, 101a. 
16 ibid. 
17 ibid 104b. 
18 In the context of uses, the court might even glean the parties’ intention from other documents that 
formed part of the same transaction: see, for example, Vavisor’s Case (1572) Dyer 307b, 308a; Dolman v 
Vavasor (1584) Moore 191, 192; The Lord Cromwel’s Case (1601) 2 Co Rep 69b, 75a. 
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This point was often made by lawyers. In Wrotesley v Adams (1559), Dyer CJ and Anthony 
Browne J explained that the terms of a deed could not properly be construed in isolation. ‘It is 
impossible,’ they said, ‘to form a judgment upon one part only, without taking all the parts 
into consideration; so that one part shall answer to another, one shall minister to another, and 
the one shall not confound the other.’19 Similarly, in Nokes’s Case (1599), Coke maintained that 
‘the best construction of deeds is to make one part of the deed expound the other, and so to 
make all the parts agree.’20 This was closely connected to the courts’ view that a single 
intention lay behind all the terms of the deed.21 Thus, in Mallory’s Case (1601), it was held that 
a deed should be interpreted so that all the parts ‘together may stand and satisfy the intent 
and meaning of the parties.’22  
 
In some cases, it was impossible to read all the terms of the deed consistently. The courts 
therefore had to resort to other principles to identify the parties’ intention from their words. In 
Baldwyn v Marton (1589), the court observed that ‘it is a good rule in the law to expound deeds 
according to the intent of the makers of them, if it may appear what this was, and this intent 
must be taken by the words of the deed.’23 However, they recognised that it could be difficult 
to identify this intention when the deed was ambiguous or repugnant. In such cases, there 
were other rules for ‘understanding how deeds are to be expounded’ and for finding ‘the 
intent of the donor.’24 
 
One such rule concerned the functions of the different components of a deed. The two main 
parts were the premises, containing the words of grant,25 and the habendum, containing the 
words of inheritance.26 As Coke explained, ‘the office of the premises of a deed of feoffment is 
to express the grantor, grantee and thing to be granted, and the office of the habendum is to 
limit the estate.’27 If the two parts of the deed were contradictory, the habendum would 																																																								
19 Wrotesley v Adams (1559) Plow 187, 196. 
20 Nokes’s Case (1599) 4 Co Rep 80b, 81a. 
21 See 4.2.2. above. This was not a novel approach: see, for example, (1345) YB Pas 19 Edw III pl 17, 
RS 43-47, 45. 
22 Mallory’s Case (1601) 5 Co Rep 111b, 111b. For example, if a word had been used in one part of the 
deed, it would be presumed to have the same meaning elsewhere: Anon (1564) Dyer 233b, 233b. 
23 Baldwyn v Marton (1589) 1 And 223, 225.  
24 ibid 224. See also Thurman v Cooper (1619) Popham 138, 138. 
25 JM Kaye, Medieval English Conveyances (Cambridge University Press 2009) 64. 
26 ibid 70. 
27 Buckler’s Case (1597) 2 Co Rep 54b, 55a. 
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generally be held to be void and the premises good.28 In other cases, the whole deed could fail 
if the two parts were repugnant. In Buckler’s Case (1597), for example, Buckler granted land to 
C., habendum from the Feast of St John the Baptist next following, for life. Here, the habendum 
was void, since a lease for life could not commence in the future.29 However, without the 
habendum, it was not clear which estate Buckler had intended to pass, and the law would not 
imply an estate contrary to even the void habendum. The whole deed therefore failed.30    
 
As Hobart put it, the premises of a deed could be ‘checked, restrained, corrected or explained’ 
by the habendum,31 but the habendum could would not be allowed to ‘frustrate the grant 
precedent.’32 However, it could be difficult to determine whether the habendum was in fact 
repugnant to, or simply intended to expand upon, the premises. The courts generally 
preferred to read the two parts as a consistent whole. Coke explained that ‘the general 
implication of the estate which shall pass, by construction of law, by the premises, is always 
controlled and qualified by the habendum.’33 Thus, for example, if A. granted a rent to B., 
habendum for years, the habendum would be a good explanation of the premises.34 Likewise, a 
grant to A. and B., habendum to A. for life, remainder to B. for life, was not repugnant. A deed 
could be good even if the grantee was not named in the premises: for example, if A. granted 
land, habendum to B. and his heirs.35 As Egerton explained, the function of a habendum was not 
only to limit the estate, but also to ‘express the thing granted more certainly and plainly than 
is contained in the premises,’ or to ‘declare more certainly the person of the grantee.’36 
However, Coke warned that such a deed was only good ‘by construction’, and that ‘no well 
advised man will trust to’ it.37  																																																								
28 Baldwin’s Case (n 6) 23b. There was an exception where the estate granted by the premises required 
an additional ceremony, such as livery of seisin or attornment, and the estate limited by the habendum 
passed by the delivery of the deed. Here, the habendum would take effect and the premises would be 
void: ibid 24a. 
29 Buckler’s Case (n 27) 55a. 
30 ibid 55b. 
31 Stukeley v Butler (1615) Hobart 168, 169. 
32 ibid 170. 
33 Buckler’s Case (n 27) 55a. 
34 Baldwin’s Case (n 6) 24a. 
35 Sir Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, or, A Commentary upon Littleton (The 
Societie of Stationers 1628) 7. 
36 The Dean and Chapter of Chester’s Case (1578) Hunt MS El 482 f32, f37. 
37 Coke (n 35) 7. In some cases, the courts held that this kind of deed was void: see Anon (1572) 4 Leo 
37, discussed at 3.2.2. above.  
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As well as considering the express words of the deed, the courts could find that the parties had 
settled an issue by implication. Implied terms were thought to be just as much part of the 
document as the express terms were. In a case on statutory interpretation, for example, 
Egerton included both the express words of the statute and the ‘reasonable inference or 
implication to be deduced from it’ in his analysis of the ‘compass of the words.’38 In another 
case, he observed that ‘the sages of the law have taken that which is inferred and deduced by 
necessary implication to be as strong as if it had been alleged by express and precise words.’39 
Although this was in the context of interpreting a verdict, he gave examples of the 
construction of all kinds of document, including deeds and wills.40  
 
In Kidwelly v Brand (1551), for example, rent was to be paid at Hyde Abbey at the Feasts of the 
Annunciation and St Michael, or within the next 40 days of either. Although the parties had 
not specified where the rent was to be paid on any of the 40 subsequent days, the court held 
that ‘the rent shall be paid at Hyde the last of the 40 days, although it is not so expressed in 
plain words.’41 In a similar way, the courts would infer that the person who ought to perform 
a certain task was the one with ‘the greatest knowledge and skill.’42 Thus, a customs official 
must weigh goods before duties were paid; a bellmaker must weigh a bell before recasting it; 
and a tailor must cut the cloth before making a gown.43 In contrast, the courts would not find 
such an implied term if it was ‘not reasonable’ for them to do so. In Mervyn v Lyds (1553), a 
lessor had sold all the trees on his land that might reasonably be spared, but had not 
appointed anyone to judge how many trees this was. The court noted that the seller had 
‘more knowledge’ of the trees than the buyer, but refused to appoint him as the judge because 
of his vested interest in the outcome. The agreement was therefore void for uncertainty.44  
 
Lawyers were careful not to go too far when implying terms into deeds. In Sawyer v Hardy 
(1595), for example, a messuage was leased to Margaret Sawyer for 40 years, on condition 
‘that if the said Margaret should so long continue a widow’ and dwell on the premises.45 																																																								
38 Holcrofte’s Case (undated) Hunt MS El 482 f89, f92.  
39 Marburye v Wyrrall (1577) Hunt MS El 482 f64, f68. 
40 ibid f68v-69. 
41 Kidwelly v Brand (1551) Plow 69, 70. See also Ayer v Orme (1563) Dyer 221b, 222b. 
42 Reniger v Fogossa (1550) Plow 1, 15. 
43 ibid. See (1469) YB Pas 9 Edw IV pl 13, f3b-4a. 
44 Mervyn et Ux v Lyds et Ux Executricem (1553) Dyer 90a, 91a. See also Stewkley v Butler (1615) Moore 880, 
882. 
45 Sawyer v Hardy (1595) Popham 99, 99. 
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Popham CJ and Clench and Gawdy JJ held that this condition was bad, ‘for it hath no certain 
conclusion upon the “that if.”’ The sentence was simply incomplete, and ‘none can imagine 
what the conclusion shall be in such a case.’46 While Fenner J thought that the parties must 
have intended to make a condition of re-entry, the others concluded that it was impossible to 
‘judge of their intention.’47 In Butt’s Case (1600), Coke noted that a clause of distress for rent 
amounted to a grant of the rent ‘by construction of law,’ since otherwise ‘the grant should be 
of little force or effect.’48 Similarly, the courts would imply a covenant to warrant the land 
against other titles into a lease.49 However, they would not extend this to cover trespassers 
unless the parties had made it clear that this was their intention.50 
 
In Richard Liford’s Case (1614), the court held that the grant of a power to sell trees included the 
grant of any rights necessary to exercise that power. For example, the seller could ‘enter and 
show the trees to those who would have them.’51 Coke explained that ‘the law gives power to 
him who ought to repair a bridge to enter into the land, and to him who has a conduit in the 
land of another, to enter into the land to mend it.’52 Again, however, the rule was strictly 
limited. In Dike v Dunston (1586), the defendant entered the plaintiff’s land to repair his right of 
way, which had flooded. It was held that he had no right to do so, since the way was not 
wholly unusable. Asked what remedy the defendant could have, Shute J replied, ‘If he went 
that way before in his shoes, let him now pluck on his boots.’53 Even when examining the 
terms of a deed, then, judges had plenty of scope to determine what the parties’ agreement 
ought to look like, based on what seemed reasonable or necessary. 
 
5 .2 .2 .  INTENTIONS AND CIRCUM STANCES 
 
The courts would also seek to identify the parties’ intentions by considering the context in 
which their deed had been made. Sometimes, this could demonstrate the purpose of the deed. 
In Hawes v Davye (1565), for example, Davye had bound himself to pay Hawes £60 before 24 
September, on condition that his ship took a prize before that day. Davye argued that, if the 
ship did not take a prize, he was not bound to pay the £60 at all; Hawes, that the debt would 																																																								
46 ibid. 
47 Hardy v Seyer (1595) Cro Eliz 414, 414. 
48 Butt’s Case (1600) 7 Co Rep 23a, 24a. 
49 Tisdale v Sir William Essex (1615) Moore 861, 861. 
50 Grococke v White (1583) Moore 175, 175. 
51 Richard Liford’s Case (1614) 11 Co Rep 46b, 52a. 
52 ibid. 
53 Dike and Dunston’s Case (1586) Godbolt 52, 53. 
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fall due on 24 September if no prize were taken before then. The court looked at the 
background to the bond to explain it, finding that ‘it well appears that the sum of £60 was 
due before the bond was made, and the extremity of the payment was deferred until 24 
September.’54 Similarly, in Hickmot’s Case (1610), Hickmot released all bonds owed to him by 
Oxenbridge, and agreed to deliver them to him, except for one bond of £40. Hickmot then 
brought debt on the bond of £40. Oxenbridge pleaded that he had been released from all of 
the bonds, and that the exception applied only to the clause of delivery. However, the court 
held that the bond was excepted from the whole release. ‘There was reason,’ they explained, 
‘that this bond of £40 should be excepted, for it was not then due.’55 
 
In other cases, the purpose of the deed was to make some kind of family settlement. As we 
have seen, in Bold v Molineux (1536), Bold’s father-in-law had promised to pay him £30 on a 
certain day, unless his wife had died without a son ‘then living.’ Fitzherbert J held that the 
parties had intended the payment to fail if the son died at any time before it fell due. This was, 
he explained, ‘the common practice of all men who give large sums of money with the 
marriage of their children,’ intending that ‘if the issue die, the payment shall immediately 
cease.’56 In Cooke v Baldwin (1587), a lease was made to John Trewpeny and Elizabeth Read for 
21 years, if John and Elizabeth or any of their children should so long live.57 The question was 
whether the lease ended on Elizabeth’s death without issue. The court held that it did not. As 
Anderson CJ explained, the lease had been made to the couple before their marriage. It 
therefore seemed to be intended ‘to be a jointure for the wife… and then if by the death of 
one it should be gone, and she have nothing, could not be the meaning.’58 
 
The court could also extrapolate the meaning of the deed from actions the parties had taken 
pursuant to it. As we have seen, the question in Baldwin’s Case was whether the premises of the 
deed had granted Anne Baldwin a fee simple, or only a lease. The court observed that no 
livery of seisin had been made, and so ‘it appeareth it was the intent of the parties, that it 
should take effect by the delivery of the deed’ as a lease.59 Likewise, in Tibb v Poplewell (1599), 																																																								
54 Hawes v Davye (1565) Dyer’s Notebooks (109 SS) 119, 119. 
55 Hickmot’s Case (1610) 9 Co Rep 52b, 53a; See also Shelley’s Case (n 15) 95b. 
56 Bold v Molineux (n 2) 17b. See 3.2.1. above. 
57 Baldwin v Coke (1587) 1 And 161, 161. 
58 Cooke v Baldwin (1587) Owen 52, 53. Owen’s report initially has Anderson arguing ‘that after the 
death of one the lease is determined,’ but in context, it is clear that this is a misprint. See also the report 
of Anderson’s argument in Cock v Baldwin (undated) Gould 71, 71–2. Compare Eare v Snow, &c (1578) 
Plow 504, 515. 
59 Baldwin’s Case (n 6) 24a. 
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Popham CJ noted that, if livery had been made on a deed, it could not have been intended to 
raise a use.60 Clench J agreed, adding that, if the deed had been enrolled, it suggested that the 
parties had intended to raise a use.61 
 
In the last few decades of the sixteenth century, lawyers began to refer more frequently to 
what they described as the ‘circumstances’ of a deed. By this, however, they did not simply 
mean the document’s context. Rather, they seem to have been adopting a rhetorical term of 
art. Hutson explains that, for rhetoricians, circumstances were ‘the topics that made a deed 
intelligible and able to be narrated and proved,’ including ‘motive, time, place, opportunity, 
means, method and the like.’62 As we have seen, in the ius commune, the interpretation of 
private documents had traditionally been regarded as part of rhetoric, rather than the law per 
se.63 Thus, civilian writers discussed contractual interpretation in rhetorical terms, explaining 
that a judge must look at the circumstances of the contract to discover the parties’ intentions.64  
 
It has been demonstrated that sixteenth-century common lawyers adopted this terminology in 
the law of evidence and in legal argument.65 However, they also discussed ‘circumstances’ 
when interpreting deeds. Egerton, for example, argued that the courts should ‘seek diligently 
the true intent and plain meaning of the parties, as far as the words will bear, or as may be 
collected by other circumstances.’66 They must depart from ‘the literal sense’ of words ‘when 
the intent and meaning, or the circumstance of the matter’ indicated that they should do so.67 
 
Similarly, in his Parallel, Fulbecke contrasted interpretation ‘according to the rigorous sense of 
the words’ with interpretation according to ‘the circumstances of a man’s speech or actions.’68 																																																								
60 Tibb v Poplewell (1599) BL Add MS 25203 f129v, f131v. 
61 ibid. 
62 Lorna Hutson, ‘Rhetoric and Early Modern Law’ in Michael J Macdonald (ed), The Oxford Handbook 
of Rhetorical Studies (Oxford University Press 2017) 398. 
63 Adolfo Giuliani, ‘From Presumption to Interpretation’ in Ferdinando Treggiari (ed), Giuristi 
dell’Università di Perugia (Aracne 2010) 451–3. This distinction only collapsed in the sixteenth century: 
ibid 457. See 3.2.1. above. 
64 Giuliani (n 63) 473. 
65 See generally Barbara Shapiro, ‘Classical Rhetoric and the English Law of Evidence’ in Lorna 
Hutson and Victoria Kahn (eds), Rhetoric & Law in Early Modern Europe (Yale University Press 2001); 
Hutson (n 62) 402–6. 
66 Saunders & Starkey v Stanfourde (undated) Hunt MS El 482 f70, f73v.  
67 ibid f76v. 
68 William Fulbecke, The Second Part of the Parallele, or Conference of the Civill Law, the Canon Law, and the 
Common Law of This Realme of England (Thomas Wight 1602) 68v–69. 
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He provided more detail in his Direction to law students. When the meaning of a document 
was unclear, he explained, it could be interpreted by ‘probable conjecture.’69 Its ‘probable’ 
meaning could be established in many ways, including ‘by the common use of speech,’ by 
‘agreement with the law,’ or ‘by the circumstances of a man’s actions.’70 The writer’s mind 
could not only be known by his ‘speech,’ but also by ‘the concurrence of circumstances,’71 
including ‘quantity, quality, place, time, precedents [and] consequents,’ 72  and ‘the 
circumstances before the act, in the act, and after the act.’73 Fulbecke concluded that ‘the law 
traceth the meaning of a man by the circumstances, even as the hunter traceth the hare by the 
print of his foot.’74 
 
Which ‘circumstances’ were discussed by common lawyers in practice? In some cases, they 
were indications of the parties’ intention in the document itself. In Tibb v Poplewell, for 
example, Coke ‘observed four circumstances in the deed by which it appears clearly that they 
did not have any intent to raise a use.’75 These included the tense in which it was written, the 
terms that had been included, and the specific words that had been used. In other cases, the 
circumstances were facts external to the document. Moore, for example, specifically 
contrasted words and circumstances, explaining that the limitation of a use could be 
‘expressed by writing, words or circumstances.’76 In the context of statutory interpretation, 
Egerton distinguished the words of the Act from its ‘foreign circumstances.’77 
 
Sometimes the two were mingled. In Humphreston’s Case (1575), for example, ‘circumstances’ 
included both the terms of a separate document and the wider context of the settlement. As 
we have seen, the question was whether William Humphreston had intended to grant a 
remainder to his eldest child, a daughter, or to his eldest son.78 Having concluded that the 
words of the common recovery were ambiguous, the judges agreed that they ‘ought to 																																																								
69 William Fulbecke, A Direction or Preparative to the Study of the Lawe (Thomas Wight 1600) 33v. 
70 ibid. 
71 ibid 34. 
72 ibid. 
73 ibid 35. 
74 ibid 34v. This is very similar to an image used by Swinburne: the ‘meaning of the testator… ought to 
be sought for as earnestly as the hunter seeketh his game.’ Henry Swinburne, A Briefe Treatise of 
Testaments and Last Willes (John Windet 1590) 9v. 
75 Tibb v Poplewell (n 60) 130. 
76 Uses & Revocations de Uses (undated) Moore 608, 610. 
77 Holcrofte’s Case (n 38) f93. 
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consider the cause upon the circumstances.’79 Southcote J and Wray CJ focused on ‘the 
circumstances, which appear upon the parts of the indentures,’ where Humphreston had used 
the words ‘eldest child.’80 Gawdy J, however, thought that there were ‘many circumstances to 
prove that he intended this [to go] to his son.’ Because Humphreston had made the settlement 
‘for settling his inheritance… it shall not be supposed that he intended his daughter to have 
it.’81  
 
Similarly, in Shelley’s Case, Coke sought to identify Edward Shelley’s intentions by ‘diverse 
circumstances apparent in the record.’82 He combined an analysis of the words of the deed 
with observations about its practical effects. For example, if Edward had intended his younger 
son Richard to have the land, it would have been strange for him to name only his ‘heir male,’ 
knowing that he might later have a grandson who would take precedence over Richard. It 
would also be odd to institute a 24 year gap before the 18-year-old Richard could take the 
land, and to let his recoverers circumvent the gift to Richard by waiting until a grandson was 
born.83 In Scott v Scott, Egerton claimed that his construction of a proviso was derived ‘from 
good consideration of the circumstances of the deed.’ He argued from both the words and the 
context of the document. Firstly, the proviso must be an explanation of the preceding 
covenant, since, otherwise, the covenant would be uncertain. Secondly, it could not be a 
condition, because this would be inconsistent with the will that the deed had been made to 
implement.84 
 
Both Coke and Egerton also linked their discussion of ‘circumstances’ to reason. Coke 
concluded that, if Richard had been intended to have the land, the consequences would be 
‘very absurd in reason.’85 Egerton thought that it was ‘against sense and common reason’ to 
read the proviso as a condition.86 Other lawyers connected circumstances with presumptions: 
again, terminology borrowed from rhetoricians.87 In Dolman v Vavasor (1584), for example, the 																																																								
79 Humphreston’s Case (1574) 2 Leo 216, 217. 
80 ibid. 
81 Lane v Coups (undated) Owen 64, 64. 
82 Shelley’s Case (n 15) 101a. 
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court held that the intention of the parties to a common recovery was to be ‘proved by 
presumptions and circumstances.’ 88  If the jury found ‘circumstances and presumptions 
vehement enough to satisfy them of the intent’ to raise a use, they must give judgment 
accordingly. 89  Circumstances, then, covered a wide range of indicators of the parties’ 
intentions: the words of the document itself, its wider context, and presumptions and reason.  
 
5 .2 .3 .  INTENTIONS AND REASON 
 
We have seen that the courts would use reason to extrapolate the parties’ intentions from the 
words of their deed, or from the circumstances in which it was made. However, the parties’ 
intentions could also be deduced directly from reason. In many cases, the courts sought a 
‘reasonable’ or ‘equitable’ interpretation of the instrument, and simply assumed that this was 
what the parties would have intended. In chapter six, we will see how the two ideas could also 
be detached: the courts could choose a reasonable construction of the document without 
reference to the parties’ intentions.90 Here, however, we are considering only cases in which 
the courts explicitly identified the parties’ intentions with reason. Once again, Plowden’s 
Commentaries were highly influential in linking the two ideas.91 
 
In Chapman v Dalton (1565), for example, Robert Dalton had covenanted to make a lease to 
‘John Chapman and his assigns’ in 21 years’ time. Chapman died before the time elapsed 
without naming any assigns. Edward Baber and Christopher Wray claimed that Chapman 
had intended the lease to be made to both him and his assigns, which was clearly impossible 
after his death. After all, if he had meant him or his assigns, he would have named assigns in 
his will.92 However, Fleetwood and Plowden successfully argued that this could not have been 
Chapman’s meaning: ‘he who puts this exposition upon it expounds it contrary to all reason.’ 
On this construction, Chapman would not have been able to take the lease by himself even if 
he had been alive, which was ‘contrary to the intent of the parties to the covenant, and 
contrary to all common construction of the word “assigns” and merely absurd.’93 Since the 
literal sense of the words ‘would be nonsense,’ they argued, ‘we ought not to follow it, but to 																																																								
88 Dolman v Vavasor (n 18) 192. 
89 ibid 192. Noy, too, wrote that ‘all incertainty may be known by circumstances,’ and linked these 
circumstances to presumptions: William Noy, A Treatise of the Principall Grounds and Maximes of the Lawes of 
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make some other sense of it, and such as may stand with reason, and the intent of the parties, 
and that is, to take the word “and” for “or”.’94 In this way, the lease could be made to 
Chapman’s assigns even if he had died. Nobody could ‘imagine that he would be guilty of so 
much folly’ as to make a covenant that would be dissolved by his death, so ‘it shall be 
presumed that it was the intent of both the parties, that the lease should be made 
notwithstanding the death of him who should take it.’95 And, since the parties’ intention was 
‘the principal point in all agreements,’ the lease ought to be made to someone, even if he was 
not, strictly speaking, an assign of Chapman.96  
 
Here, it is clear how closely the courts identified the parties’ intentions with what was 
reasonable. The same was true in Hill v Grange (1556). We have already encountered the 
argument about the word ‘appertaining,’97 but the plaintiff also claimed that he was not 
obliged to pay any rent for the first six months of his lease. The rent, he explained, had been 
reserved to be paid at the Feasts of the Annunciation and St Michael, and, since the 
Annunciation was named first, it should also be the first day of payment.98 The court was 
unimpressed. This would give the defendant ‘half a year’s profit, without paying any rent for 
it; and there is no sort of reason to induce us to believe that the intent of the parties was 
such.’99  
 
Again, this approach continued to influence later lawyers and treatise writers. Hake wrote that 
a grant should not be interpreted ‘contrary to reason, which no doubt it should be if it were 
construed against the intent of the parties.’100 Egerton also linked the parties’ intentions to 
reason. It will be remembered that, in Saunders v Stanfourde, the question was whether a lease 
had been avoided by an entry after the lessee’s death. We have already seen that Egerton’s 
argument about the parties’ intentions was strongly influenced by Plowden.101 Like Plowden, 
he also connected a reasonable interpretation of the lease to the intentions of the parties. His 
opponent’s construction, he argued, would be ‘absurd, contrary to reason and the meaning of 																																																								
94 ibid 289. 
95 ibid 291. 
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the parties.’102 Instead, the court should seek ‘an apt and reasonable construction according to 
the intent of the parties.’103 He lauded his own construction as ‘more reasonable, and more 
consonant to conscience and equity, and more agreeable to the intent and meaning of the 
parties,’104 citing Chapman in support of his approach.105 Coke, too, connected the two ideas. 
In Humfrey Lofield’s Case (1612), for example, the defendants seized on a drafting error in a 
lease to argue that no rent was due for the first year. Citing Hill v Grange, the court rejected 
their argument. Coke observed that ‘a reservation shall be expounded according to the 
reasonable intention of the parties’; here, it was ‘apparent’ that they had intended the rent to 
be paid for the whole time the lessee was in occupation.106  
 
One form in which the reason of the common law was expressed was in maxims,107 and the 
courts often used interpretive maxims to identify the parties’ intentions. The two interpretive 
maxims that were most commonly linked to the intention of the parties were enjoinders to 
construe a deed ut res magis valeat quam pereat [so that the thing may take effect rather than be 
destroyed] and contra proferentem [against the one who put it forward]. In Throckmerton v Tracy 
(1555), for example, Stanford J connected both of these maxims to the parties’ intentions, 
explaining that there were ‘three rules for the understanding of deeds’: 
 
First, that they shall be taken most beneficially for the party to whom they are 
made; secondly, that a deed shall never be void, where the words may be applied 
to any intent to make it good; and… thirdly, that the words shall be construed 
according to the intent of the parties, and not otherwise.108 	
Similarly, Saunders J argued that ‘contracts shall be as it is concluded and agreed between the 
parties, according as their intents may be gathered.’ However, he also emphasised that ‘deeds 
ought to have a reasonable exposition,’ explaining that there was ‘a kind of equity in grants, so 
that they shall not be taken unreasonably against the grantor, and yet shall with reason be 
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extended most liberally for the grantee.’109 Neither Stanford nor Saunders thought that there 
was any need to explain precisely how all of these principles interacted. The parties’ intentions 
were so strongly identified with reason that a ‘reasonable exposition’ and one in accordance 
with the parties’ intentions would inevitably correspond. These maxims, and their 
relationships with the parties’ intentions, will be explored in more detail in chapter six.110 
 
The courts also used presumptions to understand ambiguous words. For example, they 
presumed that the parties would have intended to use words in their ‘most excellent’ sense.111 
Thus, as Gawdy J explained, a rent reserved at Michaelmas would be payable ‘at the chiefest 
feast,’ and a conveyance to J. S. would be to a J. S. who was a relative or neighbour of the 
grantor.112 Similarly, Wray CJ argued that the court must ‘have regard to the meaning of the 
parties,’ and that a donor would prefer to make his grant to ‘the most worthy’ person. For 
example, an eldest daughter was more worthy than her younger sister, but a son was more 
worthy than a daughter.113 Egerton noted that ‘St Stephen’ would be taken to refer to the 
Protomartyr, and ‘St James’ to the Apostle.114 
 
5.3. Wills  
 
5 .3 .1 .  INTENTIONS AND W ORDS 
 
As we saw in chapter three, the words of a will were presumed to be an unreliable guide to the 
testator’s intentions.115 However, the courts were also increasingly concerned that they should 
not interpret the will according to a ‘secret intent’ that could not be identified from its 
words.116 This meant that the testator’s intention was, in fact, often identified by examining 
the words he had used in his will. Coke exposed the tensions of the courts’ position in a 
somewhat convoluted formulation in Matthew Manning’s Case (1609). He explained that ‘the 
intention of the devisor expressed in his will is the best expositor, director, and disposer, of his 
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words.’117 Thus, the testator’s intention could be used to understand his words, but must itself 
have been expressed in the words of the will. As we have seen, the courts would overlook the 
technical meaning of words if the testator seemed to have intended another meaning. 
However, indications of that intention generally had to be found elsewhere in the will.  
 
The words of a will, then, were used as a guide to the writer’s intentions, just as the words of a 
deed were. Egerton, for example, wrote that ‘the words [of a will] are significant to express the 
will and intent of the donor.’118 Sometimes, judges would identify the particular words that 
had persuaded them as to the testator’s intentions. In Hawes v Coney (1589), for example, 
Robert Smith had devised ‘all his lands’ to his executors for the performance of his will. The 
question was whether this included land he held in reversion, or only land in possession. Wray 
CJ held that it included land in reversion, and ‘said, the word “all” persuaded him much that 
his intent was so.’119 Similarly, in Ewar v Haydon (1599), Rafe Haydon devised ‘all his… lands, 
meadows and pastures’ in Watford. The court held that this did not include his houses. 
Kingsmill J explained that, if Haydon had intended ‘lands’ to include his houses, he would not 
have added ‘meadows and pastures’ to explain its meaning.120 
 
In chapter three, we saw that a testator was presumed to be inops consilii and ignorant of the 
law. In practice, however, judges sometimes seemed to assume that a testator understood how 
his will would be interpreted by the courts. In Brett v Ridgen (1568), the serjeants were not just 
asking what the testator’s words meant, but how he had expected them to be interpreted. 
Thus, Sjt Manwood argued that ‘all my lands’ meant all the lands the testator held at the time 
of his death, because he ‘well knew that the word “all” must receive some construction and 
exposition after his death.’121 In Wild’s Case (1599), the question was whether a devise to 
‘Rowland Wild and his wife, and after their decease to their children’ passed a fee tail or an 
estate for life with a remainder to the children. The court held that, if these words had been 
used in a deed, they would only pass a life estate.122 Because the case concerned a will, the 
words could pass ‘an estate tail by construction,’123 but only if the testator’s intent was 
‘manifest and certain, and so expressed in the will.’124 If ‘no such intent appear[ed],’ the court 																																																								
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would have to assume that ‘his meaning was to agree with the rule of the law’ and that he 
wished to grant a life estate.125  
 
Similarly, in Lowen v Coxe (1599), Lowen devised land to his two sons ‘equally, and to their 
heirs.’126 The question was whether he had intended the brothers to be joint tenants or 
tenants in common. The lawyers and judges involved in the case assumed a high degree of 
legal literacy on the part of the testator. Coke, for example, argued that ‘this word “equally” 
may not show any intent in the devisor to make a tenancy in common.’127 To demonstrate 
this intention, he referred to a number of cases in which fine distinctions had been made on 
the basis of language in a will: for example, the words ‘equally divided’ would create a tenancy 
in common, but ‘equally to be divided’ created a joint tenancy.128 Altham and Tanfield, who 
were also counsel in the case, relied similarly on precedents to demonstrate what ‘the intent of 
the devisor’ must have been.129 Gawdy J opined that the word ‘equally’ should be given ‘a 
reasonable construction according to the intent of the devisor,’ which seemed to be the 
creation of a tenancy in common.130 However, he added that, if Tanfield could show him the 
case he had vouched, ‘peradventure he would change his opinion.’131 Even though Gawdy 
claimed to be identifying the intention of this particular devisor, he was evidently prepared to 
rely on previously-judged cases in order to do so. Precedent, then, could be important for the 
interpretation of wills. In the absence of any other indication of the testator’s intention, it 
would be assumed that he had intended to use words in their ordinary legal sense.  
 
As we have seen, however, the proper signification of the testator’s words was not always 
conclusive.132 A more popular approach was to look at the whole will for indications of what a 
particular term was intended to mean. In Paramour v Yardley (1579), for example, William 
Robinson had devised ‘the occupation and profits of all his lands’ to his wife Grace.133 One 
question was whether Grace took the land itself, or only a profit a prendre.134 Plowden argued 
that it must be the land itself, or Grace would be without a remedy if she were ousted. William 																																																								
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had provided that Grace was to use the profits to educate their son and to perform his will. 
This was a ‘matter of great importance, and shows how dear his issues were to him, and how 
desirous he was that they should be nourished and educated.’ It could therefore not ‘be 
presumed that it was the intent of the devisor to make a devise of a thing’ that Grace could 
not defend.135 We have also seen that, in Newis v Lark (1571), the court read a condition in a 
will as a limitation in order to fulfil the testator’s intention.136 This intention, they found, 
‘manifestly’ appeared in another clause of the will, where the testator had expressly declared 
that ‘he would not have the estates defeated, but that they should endure in frugal and 
profitable manner, with thanks towards him for such his gentle remembrance of them.’137 He 
therefore could not have intended the entail to be defeated by a breach of the condition. 
 
Where an estate had not clearly been limited to a devisee, the court would look for the 
testator’s ‘intent through the whole will.’138 In Lovice v Goddard (1604), for example, Leonard 
Lovice devised land to his son Thomas and the heirs male of his body for 500 years.139 The 
question was whether Thomas was to have a fee tail or a lease. The court concluded that 
Leonard had intended to devise a fee tail, and that the limitation of 500 years was void. They 
reached this conclusion on the basis of a proviso that restrained Thomas’s male issue from 
alienating the land: Leonard’s intention to benefit the heirs male, they explained, was ‘proved 
by his care to advance them in the proviso.’140 Similarly, in Sonday’s Case (1611), Merrick 
Sonday devised a house to his son Thomas and, if he had male issue, to his son, without 
specifying whether Thomas was to have a fee tail or a life estate with a remainder over.141 It 
was held that he must have intended the former. Later in the will, he had included a clause 
prohibiting Thomas or his heirs male from alienating the house. The mention of ‘heirs male’ 
suggested that Thomas’s son was intended to be his heir; the prohibition also implied that he 
would otherwise have had the power to alienate, which would not have been the case if he 
were only a tenant for life.142 
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Changes in the drafting of the will could also be significant. Coke observed that the ‘several 
pennings’ of different devises could ‘prove several intents in the testator.’143 Thus, in Kerry v 
Derick, Richard Hunt devised his land in Middlesex and the rent of his land in Surrey to his 
wife Margaret. The question was whether the devise of the rent in Surrey was sufficient to 
give Margaret the land itself on the expiry of the lease.144 Moore pointed out that this was 
especially doubtful ‘where the devisor in the same will makes a distinction in giving the rent of 
the land in Surrey, and the land itself in Middlesex,’ both lands being leased out at the time.145 
Similarly, in Ward v Downing, Robert Brown devised that, if his son George did not pay an 
annuity to William and Thomas, his land would remain to William, and William was to pay 
the annuity to Thomas.146 Popham CJ held that Thomas had no remedy at common law if 
William did not pay. Robert had not bound William ‘upon condition, as in the other cases, 
which he might have done by express words of condition, if his intent had been so, as well he 
did in the other cases.’147 He was, he noted, ‘the rather moved to be of his opinion’ because 
the devise to George ‘had an express condition’ annexed to it.148 
 
Sometimes it could be difficult to reconcile different parts of the will. In Wodden v Osborne 
(1599), the testator held land called Heysland in both Cookefield and Cranfield. He devised 
his land in Cookefield to his younger son, and provided that, if the son died without issue, his 
wife Johan would have Heysland. The question was whether Johan would have all of 
Heysland, or only the part in Cookefield. It was argued that the devisor had expressly stated 
that his will covered ‘the disposition of all [his] lands and tenements and hereditaments,’ and 
he had not disposed of the land in Cranfield elsewhere.149 However, the court ultimately held 
that the devise did not extend to Cranfield. ‘The said words,’ they concluded, ‘will be 
expounded that this was his will touching all the lands that he intended to devise, and not all 
his lands generally.’150 
 
The court could also look at other written documents to establish the meaning of the will. In 
Ross v Morris (1588), for example, the testator devised his manor to one for life, and then to his 																																																								
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right heirs in perpetuity, ‘secundum antiquas evidencias’ [according to the ancient evidence].151 
Egerton argued that he must have been referring to a grant of the land in tail which had been 
made in 1351.152 The heirs would therefore have an estate tail ‘according to the intent of the 
devisor.’153 It seemed that the evidence of the 1351 grant was, in principle, admissible. 
However, the court held that the testator had failed to identify it clearly enough. There were 
‘diverse evidences’ relating to the land, and the testator had not specified the one to which he 
was referring. ‘It is hard for a man in extremity to remember’ the terms of such grants, 
observed the court, especially one that was made such a long time before.154 
 
The courts were prepared to imply terms into wills, just as they were with deeds. Again, this 
seems to have been viewed as an aspect of interpreting the express words. In Inchley v Robinson 
(1587), Sjt Shuttleworth quoted Fyneux CJ: ‘every will ought to be construed and taken 
according as the words do import, or as it may be intended or implied by the words, what the 
meaning of the testator was.’155 In contrast, the devisor’s intention could not be implemented 
if ‘it doth not appear upon the words of the will.’156 
 
When the courts waived the usual words required to limit an estate, they often explained that 
an estate had been limited ‘by implication’ of the will. For example, Egerton wrote that if a 
man devised land to J.S. after the death of his wife, ‘the wife has an estate for life by 
implication.’157 Precisely the same conclusion was reached in one 1616 case.158 In the same 
case, the testator also devised land to his son and the son’s heirs, and to his daughters if they 
outlived the son and his heirs. The court held that the son had a fee tail, rather than a fee 
simple, ‘by implication of the words.’ It was ‘the apparent implication that the heirs are 
intended to be the heirs of his body, not heirs in fee, because so long as the daughters live, the 
son cannot die without a collateral heir.’159 Implications could also be made from conditions. 
In Warren v Lee (1556), for example, it was held that the heir could enter on the devisee for 
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breach of a condition ‘although no re-entry or entry are expressly reserved to him, because it 
is tacitly implied in law when the condition is to be performed by the devisee.’160 
 
It might be thought that implication could be deprecated as an illicit pursuit of a testator’s 
‘secret intent’, contrary to the express words of his will. However, lawyers very rarely made 
this point. In the context of ‘superstitious’ uses, which had been prohibited by a statute of 
Edward VI, the courts would refuse to save a devise by implying another intention alongside 
the express intention to provide for divine services.161 Moore warned that, in these cases, ‘no 
implied intent will be received contrary to that which is expressed.’162 Outside this special 
context, lawyers only occasionally cautioned against taking implication too far. In Sanders v 
Byng, for example, Egerton explained that ‘the intent is not to be imagined and hunted out of 
the words of the will according to our fancy,’ but was ‘to be plausibly collected and inferred, 
from the words themselves.’ In this case, he argued, his opponent had gone too far, and had 
‘strained’ the words, seeking to ‘by implication vest the inheritance’ contrary to ‘sense or 
reason.’163 In Bacon v Hill (1597), the court warned that ‘the intent of the devisor may be 
implied where the words are defective, but never against the express words of the will.’164 In 
general, though, this point does not seem to have overly concerned the courts.165 
 
5 .3 .2 .  INTENTIONS AND CIRCUM STANCES 
 
The courts might also use the context in which the will had been made as a guide to the 
testator’s intentions. For example, if the testator did not limit an estate when devising ancient 
demesne land, it would be presumed that he intended it to pass by the custom of the 
manor.166 A devise to a man and his wife for life, and then to their children, would ordinarily 
take effect as an estate for life with a remainder over. However, where the couple had no 
children at the time of the devise, the court would find that an estate tail had been passed,  
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for the intent of the devisor is manifest and certain that his children or issues 
should take, and as immediate devisees they cannot take, because they are not in 
rerum natura [in existence]; nor were they intended to take by way of remainder.167  
 
Where testators had provided for ‘superstitious’ uses, it would ‘be intended that their 
intentions were to advance such uses, and not the private advantages of the devisees.’ After 
all, the devisors had been ‘taught’ and ‘persuaded’ that such uses were necessary ‘for the 
health of souls,’ and it would therefore have been sacrilegious for the devisees to benefit by 
them.168 
 
Lawyers were also beginning to adopt the language of ‘circumstances’ when interpreting wills, 
just as they were with deeds. English civilians used this terminology to discuss the 
interpretation of wills. The canon lawyer Swinburne, for example, wrote that a testator’s 
‘mind and purpose must be proved by circumstances,’ appending a note to the writings of 
Giacomo Menochio.169 Common lawyers, too, had adopted the term. In Portman v Willis 
(1594), for example, it was held that the court would allow ‘circumstances to guide the intent 
of the devisor.’170 In the serjeants’ case of 1567, Sjt Barham explained that ‘where the will is 
obscure in words it will be expounded by the circumstances.’171 Here, there were ‘no 
circumstances’ to suggest that the devisor had intended to pass land he bought after making 
his will. Indeed,  
 
by the circumstance of time it appears directly contrary… The time is a good 
circumstance to know the truth, and in this case, having consideration of the 
time, it appears plainly that he was not seised of [the land] at the time of the 
making of the will.172 
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Lawyers generally emphasised that circumstances could only be used to explain ambiguous 
words.173 In Lovice v Goddard, the court held that, if ‘the circumstances’ established ‘the mind of 
the devisor,’ they were ‘to be preferred,’ but only in cases ‘where the words will serve.’174 
Again, these circumstances might simply be other parts of the will. In both Englande’s Case and 
Sanders v Byng, Egerton discussed Clache’s Case (1573).175 In the former, he explained that the 
court there had identified the testator’s intention from ‘other circumstances,’176 but in the 
latter, he described the intention as ‘collected from the other words’ of the will.177 Indeed, in 
Englande, Egerton’s argument was not based on circumstances extraneous to the will, but on 
the testator’s declaration of his intentions elsewhere in the document. 178 In Sanders, he 
emphasised the close connection between the words of the will and its circumstances, twice 
explaining that the testator’s intention must be ‘inferred by the words and circumstances of 
the will.’179 
 
In other cases, the circumstances did not seem to relate to the facts of the case at hand, but 
were rather general presumptions about what any testator would be likely to intend. For 
example, it was presumed that a testator would intend to follow the common law rules of 
descent.180 In Towers v Burrows (1575), the court held that ‘by the circumstances of the will… it 
cannot be intended that the father designed otherwise, but that every daughter should have 
an equal portion and advancement,’ as she would at common law.181 In Sanders v Byng, 
Egerton strongly emphasised the circumstances of the will. His argument was that the testator 
must have intended all of his daughters to inherit, because it would have been ‘unnatural and 
wrongful’ to exclude two of them.182 This is similar to Gawdy J’s argument about the common 
recovery in Humphreston’s Case: as we saw above, he thought that, ‘upon the circumstances,’ it 
would be ‘intended that W. Humphreston had a greater desire that his son should have his 
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inheritance, than his daughter.’183 The circumstances of this particular testator, then, could be 
extrapolated from the circumstances of testators in general. 
 
5 .3 .3 .  INTENTIONS AND REASON 
 
Lawyers also maintained that a testator’s intention could be deduced from reason. In The Case 
of Thetford School (1609), for example, the testator had devised land worth £35 to maintain a 
preacher, a grammar school, and certain poor people. The land was now worth £100, and 
the question was whether the devisees could take the surplus. The judges held that they could 
not: the testator ‘had intended the whole should be employed in works of piety and charity.’ 
Their conclusion, they explained, was ‘grounded on evident and apparent reason.’ If the lands 
had decreased in value, the charities would have lost out, so it was only fair that they should 
gain now. They also noted that ‘the price of victuals’ had increased along with the value of 
land.184  
 
As with the intentions of parties to a deed, the intentions of the testator could be presumed to 
correspond with what was reasonable. In Paramour v Yardley, Plowden claimed that the 
defendant’s interpretation of the will ‘cannot reasonably be presumed to be [the testator’s] 
intention.’185 In Ross v Morris, Egerton argued that ‘reasonable and favourable construction 
ought to be made of this devise according to the intent of the devisor,’186 and in Sanders v Byng, 
he advised the court to seek ‘an apt and reasonable intent’ in the will.187 Similarly, in Ewer v 
Heydon (1599), the court held that wills would be ‘taken most reasonably and according to the 
intention of the devisor.’188  
 
However, the idea of a reasonable intention was discussed less often in connection with wills 
than with deeds. The courts also had a more limited conception of exactly what it would 
entail. In most cases, it would simply be presumed that a testator had intended his will to be 
effective, and, in particular, to pay his debts. Coke, in his Commentary upon Littleton, wrote that 
wills were to be construed so as to provide ‘for the speedy payment of debts.’189 In one 1580 
case, the testator had devised land to pay his debts. It was held that the executor would have 																																																								
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the power to sell the land and use the money for this purpose, since ‘that by good reason and 
circumstance was the intention of the testator… for the speedy payment of his debts.’190 In 
Boraston’s Case (1587), the court observed that Thomas Boraston had devised a twelve year 
term to his executors for the payment of his debts and the performance of his will. It would be 
presumed, they explained, that ‘he hath computed’ that twelve years’ worth of profits from 
the land ‘would suffice to pay his debts, and perform his will.’ As a result, they found that ‘he 
did not intend’ the term to end early, since this would leave his debts unpaid and his will 
unperformed.191  
 
The courts would also presume that the testator intended his will to be performed for the 
benefit of his devisees. In Hawes v Coney (1589), for example, Wray CJ observed that a ‘devise 
shall be taken in the most liberal manner for the performance’ of the bequests.192 In Collier’s 
Case (1595), the testator had devised land to his brother, on condition that he pay certain sums 
of money to others. It was held that, if the sums were required to be paid annually, the 
brother would have only a life estate, since he could pay them out of the annual profits of the 
land and was ‘sure to have no loss.’ However, since they were one-off payments, he might die 
before he recouped them from the profits of the land. The brother would therefore have a fee 
simple, ‘for the law doth intend that the devise was for his benefit, and not for his 
prejudice.’193 In Whitlock v Harding, the testator had devised land to one for 99 years, and then 
to his daughter Agnes.194 It was held that Agnes would have the fee simple of the land, rather 
than a life estate to commence following the 99 year term. ‘The intent appeared [to be] to 
pass the inheritance,’ explained Moore, ‘because an estate for life after 99 years was of little 
value, and could not be understood.’195 
 
Such cases were clearly linked to the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat, since the court was 
seeking to secure an effectual performance of the testator’s will. This maxim was occasionally 
cited in cases involving wills. Egerton, for example, observed that deeds were to be taken ut res 
magis valeat quam pereat,196 and ‘thus, in construction of wills, it has been received as a principle 
that the intent of the devisor will be preferred.’197 Similarly, Coke wrote that the law would 																																																								
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‘supply the intent of the devisor’ and construe ambiguous words ‘so that they might take 
effect.’198 Both Coke and Egerton cited Newis v Lark as authority for this approach, which will 
be considered in more detail in chapter six.199 
 
The courts also presumed that ambiguous words in wills were intended in their ‘most worthy’ 
sense, as they were in deeds. In Chapman’s Case (1575), for example, Richard Chapman 
devised two houses to remain to his ‘house,’ being ‘the next of the name and blood that are 
males.’ It was held that he had intended them to pass to an elder brother’s son, rather than to 
a younger brother, as ‘the chief and most worthy and eldest person of the family.’200 It could 
not, however, be assumed that a devise to the testator’s son, where he had two sons, referred 
‘to the eldest more than to the other.’ Such a devise would fail for uncertainty.201 The word 
‘purchase’ would be taken to mean ‘an absolute purchase in fee,’ as it did ‘in common 
speech.’ In the same way, ‘fee’ would mean ‘fee simple, and the Feast of St Michael the most 




In his treatise on the law of conscience, Christopher St German warned that ‘of the intent 
inward in the heart, man’s law cannot judge.’203 However, this did not seem overly to concern 
early modern lawyers, who had a whole host of methods for doing so. Indeed, they thought 
that intentions were so ‘apparent’ that ‘every man may discover’ them.204 
 
To an extent, the courts used similar techniques to identify the intentions of parties to a deed 
and the intentions of a testator. In both cases, they looked at the instrument as a whole, 
drawing out its implicit meanings and the connections between its different provisions. They 
also made general presumptions about what a writer would ordinarily intend in the relevant 
context. Both of these techniques could be described as extrapolating intentions from the 
‘circumstances’ of the document, terminology likely adopted from the field of rhetoric.  																																																								
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However, there were also differences between the courts’ approaches to deeds and wills. We 
saw in chapter four that only one person’s intention was relevant to the construction of a will. 
In contrast, the creation of a deed involved at least two parties, even if one had played only a 
passive role. As a result, when seeking the intention of a testator, lawyers tended to hew 
closely to expressions of that intention in the will itself. Although they presumed that a 
testator’s intention was reasonable, they would make only limited assumptions about what 
that would entail. For example, they would presume that a testator intended to follow the 
common law rules of inheritance, to pay his debts, and to make effective devises. Beyond that, 
reason could not help them to identify the testator’s intentions.  
 
However, the courts derived more assistance from reason when identifying the intentions of 
parties to a deed. Reason could even mediate between the interests of the two parties. Thus, 
for Saunders J, a ‘reasonable exposition’ of a deed was one that created ‘a kind of equity’ 
between the parties.205 Reason, in the context of deeds, encompassed principles like the contra 
proferentem rule, which directed the courts towards an even-handed result. Judges were not 
interested in the parties’ inner thoughts, but in the ‘reasonable and equal intention’ that could 
be extracted from their agreement.206 They were therefore more inclined to formulate rules 
and presumptions for the identification of this intention. 
 
It is worth briefly comparing this to the process by which the courts identified the legislator’s 
intention when interpreting a statute. Statutes, like deeds, were made by multiple parties: ‘so 
many statute makers, so many minds.’207 Parliament, too, was presumed to intend what was 
reasonable, so that the meaning of a statute could be identified by asking what ‘an upright and 
reasonable man’ would have intended it to mean.208 The construction of statutes was ‘guided 
by the intent of the legislator,’ which the courts took ‘according to that which is consonant to 
reason.’209 Indeed, lawyers were prepared to admit that this Parliamentary intention was 
sometimes all but fictitious. Robert Broke observed that the courts had ‘construed the minds 
of the makers of the statute, out of mere necessity to avoid a mischief.’210 As Georg Behrens 																																																								
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puts it, the search for the legislator’s intention was ‘guided principally by normative rather 
than by factual constraints’, seeking a just result rather than an ‘actual state of mind.’211 
 
It was less often acknowledged in the case of deeds or wills that the courts were eliding the 
difference between the writer’s actual intentions and the intentions he was simply presumed to 
have. However, it is clear that the courts relied heavily on reason to help them to identify a 
writer’s meaning, especially when interpreting a deed. In chapter six, therefore, we will look 
beyond the writer’s intentions. We will examine other sources of guidance on the 
interpretation of legal documents: in particular, reason and authority.  
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6 .  R E A S O N ,  A U T H O R I T Y  A N D  M A X I M S  
 
6.1. Introduction 	
In chapter five, we saw that lawyers could use reason to identify what the intentions of a 
writer had been. The role of reason in the interpretation of legal documents will now be 
examined in more detail.  We will see that reason could also be an important principle in its 
own right. Lawyers argued that the common law required deeds to be given a ‘reasonable 
construction,’ quite aside from the intentions of the parties who had made it. In contrast, they 
very rarely asserted that wills ought to be given this kind of reasonable construction. 
 
We will also examine a shift in lawyers’ styles of argument, as the ways in which they argued 
from reason changed during our period. In the mid-sixteenth century, lawyers generally relied 
on a priori reason and intellectual persuasiveness to identify the right interpretation of a 
document. By the end of the century, however, they had grown more sceptical about the 
powers of ‘natural reason.’ Arguments from authority became more important than 
arguments from reason per se, and previously-judged cases took on a greater role in the law of 
interpretation. Lawyers were also keen to present interpretation as a logical system of rules 
and maxims. Rather than making broad claims about what was reasonable or what the 
parties had intended, writers like Coke and Bacon preferred to distill the results of 
interpretation cases into specific interpretive maxims. The result was a fundamental change in 
the common law’s approach to the construction of documents. 
 
This chapter will conclude by examining two popular interpretive maxims: ut res magis valeat 
quam pereat and the contra proferentem rule. In one form or another, these were the maxims that 
were most frequently cited by lawyers in our period. It is therefore important to understand 
their operation. They also provide useful illustrations of the developments discussed 
throughout this chapter. Through the lens of these two maxims, we will see how lawyers 
sought to balance the parties’ intentions, the words of the document, the requirements of 
reason and the dictates of authority. We will also see further evidence of lawyers’ different 
approaches to the construction of deeds and wills. 
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6.2. Reason and intentions 
 
In chapter five, we saw that lawyers presumed that testators and parties to a deed would have 
had reasonable intentions.1 By arguing that an instrument should be construed according to 
the writer’s intention, and that this intention was a reasonable one, the courts were able to 
give the document a reasonable interpretation. However, lawyers also directly asserted that 
deeds should be given a reasonable construction, without resting this point on the parties’ 
intentions. It might be thought that they were only arguing from reason on the implicit 
presumption that the parties had had reasonable intentions. However, it is notable that 
lawyers very rarely asserted that wills should be given a reasonable construction. This suggests 
that construing a deed reasonably was seen as desirable per se, even if the parties had not, in 
fact, had reasonable intentions.  
 
The idea that ‘every deed must have a reasonable construction’2 was well-established by the 
end of the fifteenth century. The courts discussed this ‘reasonable construction’ as if it were a 
requirement of the common law, rather than something the parties had intended. Thus, a 
bond would not be construed so as to require the impossible, because ‘the law is about 
possibility and reason.’3 A party would be given a reasonable amount of time to perform a 
condition in his deed, because ‘the law is reasonable, and it wills that everyone should have 
what reason wills.’4  
 
Plowden, on the other hand, was careful to connect reasonable construction to the intentions 
of the parties. We saw in chapter five that, in his reports of cases like Chapman v Dalton (1565) 
and Hill v Grange (1556), lawyers and judges maintained that ‘reason, and the intent of the 
parties’ would lead them to the same conclusions.’5 However, even in Plowden’s reports, there 
was some ambiguity about the relationship between the two. In Colthirst v Bejushin (1550), for 
example, Bejushin had been granted land on the proviso that he reside there during his whole 
term.6 Hales J held that, since ‘conditions have always a reasonable construction,’ Bejushin 
ought to live on the land for the whole term. Any other construction would be ‘contrary to 
reason, and the apparent intent of the lessor.’7 Mountague CJ agreed that a condition ‘ought 																																																								
1 See 5.2.3. and 5.3.3. above. 
2 Ferrers v Prior of Newark (1501) YB Trin 16 Hen VII pl 2, f9a-10b, f10b.  
3 (1468) YB Mich 8 Edw IV pl 9, f8a-13a, f12b. 
4 Southwall v Huddelstone and Reynoldys (1523) YB Hil 14 Hen VIII pl 1, 119 SS 150-163, 160. 
5 Chapman v Dalton (1565) Plow 284, 289. See 5.2.3. above. 
6 See 3.2.3. above. 
7 Colthirst v Bejushin (1550) Plow 21, 30. 
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to be taken according to the intent of it… so that conditions have a reasonable intendment.’8 
Both men, therefore, linked the reasonable construction of the condition to the intentions of 
the parties. However, Mountague CJ added that, if Bejushin were sometimes away from the 
land, and his family remained behind, ‘this shall be a performance of the condition; for our 
law construes all things with reason.’9 He did not connect this point to the lessor’s intentions: 
it was simply the law that required the condition to be reasonably understood. Similarly, in 
Browning v Beston (1555), Sjt Catlyn explained that ‘the reasonable construction of the law… 
inclines the words of the party to the minds of the parties, and to that which may most aptly 
stand with reason.’10 Here, it was the law’s ‘reasonable construction’ that was paramount, 
nudging the courts towards an interpretation of the words which accorded both with the 
parties’ intentions and with the demands of reason. 
 
Even in Plowden’s Commentaries, then, a reasonable construction might simply be mandated by 
the common law itself. In particular, the courts were always keen to give destructive 
conditions a reasonable construction. We saw in chapter three that these conditions were 
viewed as ‘odious’ because they led to the destruction of estates.11 There was a tension 
between lawyers’ consequent desire to construe conditions as narrowly as possible, and their 
general inclination to take every part of a deed according to the parties’ intentions. 
Sometimes, a narrow construction was ‘reasonable’: thus, it would not be a breach of the 
condition if Bejushin were briefly absent from his land. At other times, reason required the 
condition to be interpreted more extensively than was suggested by the words. In Andrews v 
Blunt (1573), for example, Dyer CJ argued that a condition must be performed in ‘due and 
reasonable time,’ even if no time limit had been specified.12 In Hill v Grange, the court held 
that, if a condition required the payment of rent on a certain day, the lessee would have until 
‘the last instant’ of that day to tender it.13 However, Broke CJ and Saunders J added that, if 
the lessee owed a ‘great sum,’ he ought to pay it ‘a convenient time before sunset,’ so that the 
lessor could count the money before darkness fell.14 This principle did not just apply to 
																																																								
8 ibid 34. 
9 ibid. Hales J also thought that Peter would be excused for his breach if he were absent from the land 
‘for some reasonable cause’: ibid 30. 
10 Browning v Beston (1555) Plow 131v, 140. This is my own translation from the Law French. The usual 
English translation does not convey the nuance of Sjt Catlyn’s argument. 
11 See 3.2.3. above. 
12 Andrews v Blunt (1573) Dyer 311a, 311b. 
13 Hill v Grange (1556) Plow 164, 172. 
14 ibid 173. 
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conditions: as Anthony Browne J explained in another case, ‘the law allows convenient time 
for the doing of every act.’15 
 
Later lawyers also maintained that the law would not require the impossible or the 
inconvenient. In Grococke v White (1583), for example, the question was whether a condition 
requiring the defendant to ‘warrant and defend’ land included defence against trespassers. 
Anderson CJ explained that, ‘because it is not convenient or easily possible to defend land 
against all trespassers, the law has construed this word “defend” solely as defence against 
titles.’16 In The Earl of Pembroke v Syms (1600), the court refused to give a condition a meaning 
that was ‘insensible and impossible,’ holding that, instead, ‘it shall be as it may well stand with 
reason.’17 And in Bothy’s Case (1605), the court explained that a condition must usually be 
performed ‘in convenient time.’18 However, if the condition was to make livery of seisin, the 
obligee must make an appointment with the obligor for performance. It was ‘not reasonable’ 
for the obligor to perform whenever he chose, because ‘then the obligor will be forced to stay 
always upon the land, which will be inconvenient.’19 
 
In other cases, lawyers appealed to reason in the sense of avoiding absurdity. In Hungate’s Case 
(1601), for example, Hungate brought debt on a bond against Mese and Smith. The condition 
of the bond was that they would perform the arbitration that would be delivered to ‘utrique 
partium’ [each party].20 The defendants pleaded that the arbitration had not been delivered to 
Smith, and judgment was given in their favour. Coke explained that the word ‘uterque’ could 
be taken jointly or severally, and that ‘the rule to know in what sense it shall be taken’ was ‘to 
make construction according to congruity of reason, ut evitetur absurdum’ [to avoid absurdity]. 
Here, it was ‘reason’ that the bond required the arbitration to be delivered to both the parties, 
since both were ‘subject to penalty and danger.’21 In Justice Windham’s Case (1589), the 
absurdity was that the deed would lose its effectiveness. Coke argued that a grant should be 
construed ‘ne res destruatur, & ut evitetur absurdum’ [that the thing may not be destroyed, and to 
avoid absurdity], and so that ‘by reasonable construction, the words may well stand 
																																																								
15 Say v Smith (1564) Plow 269, 272. See also Wade’s Case (1601) 5 Co Rep 114a, 114b. 
16 Grococke v White (1583) Moore 175, 175. 
17 The Earl of Pembroke v Syms (1600) Cro Eliz 781, 782. 
18 Bothy’s Case (1605) 6 Co Rep 30b, 30b. 
19 ibid 31a. 
20 Hungate’s Case (1601) 5 Co Rep 103a, 103a. 
21 ibid. 
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together.’22 Similarly, in Saunders v Stanfourde, Egerton argued that it would be ‘a manifest and 
gross absurdity’ if part of the lease were held to be void.23 
 
Like Plowden, Coke slid between references to the reasonable intentions of the parties and a 
reasonable construction imposed by the law. However, Coke’s understanding of a reasonable 
construction was different to Plowden’s. In Knight’s Case (1588), for example, Coke observed 
that ‘the true intent of the parties… is always to be observed, when it may by reasonable 
construction consist with the rule and reason of the law.’ 24  For Plowden, reasonable 
construction had pointed both towards the parties’ intentions and towards reason. For Coke, 
in contrast, reasonable construction mediated between the parties’ intentions and reason, with 
reason acting as a limiting factor on the implementation of those intentions. The reason in 
question, moreover, was no longer reason in general, but the specific reason of the law. As we 
will see below, the ‘reason of the law’ was a concept to which Coke was deeply committed, 
and which he thought could be important enough to trump even the intentions of the parties. 
 
There was, then, a presumption that the law required deeds to be taken reasonably, 
independent of the presumption that the parties had reasonable intentions. By Coke’s time, 
there even seems to have been a shift towards explaining certain cases in terms of reason, 
rather than in terms of the parties’ intentions. For example, in Chapman v Dalton, the court held 
that a duty owed to ‘Chapman and his assigns’ ought to be performed to Chapman’s 
executor, if he had not nominated an assign before his death.25 The judges’ reasoning was 
based on the parties’ presumed intention ‘that the lease should be made notwithstanding the 
death of him who should take it.’26 In contrast, in Goodall’s Case (1597), the King’s Bench 
discussed a 1581 case in which John Brown had owed £400 to Edward ‘Randal, his heirs or 
assigns.’27 The Court of Wards had held that, if Randal failed to nominate an assign before his 
death, the law would ‘make construction what person will be most proper as his assignee in 
law to receive the said money.’ This was because ‘the law… will never reject any word, if by 
any reasonable construction it may take effect.’28 Here, the court preferred to reason on the 
basis that it was ‘the law’ which appointed the executors to receive the money. In contrast to 
																																																								
22 Justice Windham’s Case (1589) 5 Co Rep 7a, 8a. 
23 Saunders & Starkey v Stanfourde (undated) Hunt MS El 482 f70, f76. 
24 Knight’s Case (1588) 5 Co Rep 54b, 55a. 
25 See 5.2.3. above. 
26 Chapman v Dalton (n 5) 290a. 
27 Goodall’s Case (1597) 5 Co Rep 95b, 96b. 
28 ibid 97a. 
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Chapman, the judges did not base their conclusion on the intentions of the parties, but on the 
law’s mandate to construe words reasonably. 
 
Again, it is worth briefly comparing this development with the courts’ approach to statutes. 
Thorne explains that, in the Year Books period, the extension of a statute by equity was not 
connected to the intentions of Parliament.29 Only in the mid-sixteenth century did lawyers like 
Plowden begin to link the two, justifying an equitable construction of a statute on the basis 
that Parliament must have intended it.30 At the same time, other lawyers continued to hold 
that it was the reason of the common law that ultimately determined how a statute must be 
understood.31 Famously, Coke would argue strongly for this view in Dr Bonham’s Case (1610).32 
There seems, then, to have been general disagreement as to whether a reasonable 
construction of a deed or statute was required by the common law, or whether it could simply 
be mandated by the document’s writer. 
 
In stark contrast, however, lawyers hardly ever asserted that the law required wills to be taken 
reasonably. An isolated incidence was in Bullen v Bullen (1601), where Tanfield argued that a 
will ought to have a ‘reasonable construction.’33 Similarly, in Englande’s Case, Egerton argued 
that it would be ‘unreasonable’ to interpret the testator’s instructions so that they were 
‘impossible’ and ‘against the law.’ The true meaning of the will, he argued, should be 
identified using ‘reason and common sense.’34 However, aside from the presumption that wills 
should be construed so as to be effective, reason generally played little explicit role in the 
interpretation of wills.35 
 
																																																								
29 Samuel Thorne (ed), A Discourse upon the Exposicion & Understandinge of Statutes (Huntington Library 
1942) 47. 
30 ibid 59; Georg Behrens, ‘Equity in the Commentaries of Edmund Plowden’ (1999) 20 Journal of 
Legal History 25, 32–35. 
31 Behrens (n 30) 42. 
32 Dr Bonham’s Case (1610) 8 Co Rep 113b, 118a; see also Sir Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of 
the Laws of England, or, A Commentary upon Littleton (The Societie of Stationers 1628) 272v; Ian Williams, 
‘Dr Bonham’s Case and “Void” Statutes’ (2006) 27 Journal of Legal History 111, 121. 
33 Bullen v Bullen (1601) BL Add MS 25203 f285v, f285v. This seems to have been an appeal to reason in 
the sense of avoiding absurdity: Tanfield was arguing that the devisor would not have intended his 
devisees to pay for the same land three times. 
34 Englande’s Case (undated) Hunt MS El 482 f53, f57. 
35 See 5.3.3. above. 
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6.3. Reason and authority 
 
Lawyers’ understanding of reasonable construction, then, was evolving throughout the 
sixteenth century. However, attitudes to reason were also changing in another way. Ian 
Williams has shown that, during the sixteenth century, there was a general shift in common 
lawyers’ approach to legal reasoning. In the early part of the century, when St German was 
writing, reason was central to legal theory, and a successful legal argument was one that was 
intellectually persuasive.36 For Plowden, too, reason was a concept that every lawyer could 
access, simply by applying his intellect. In Eyston v Studd (1574), for example, he advised his 
readers how to identify the legislator’s intention when construing a statute. They must 
‘suppose that the law-maker is present,’ and ask him what the statute meant, then ‘give 
yourself the same answer which you imagine he, being an upright and reasonable man, would 
have given.’ In this way, the reader would ‘form a right judgment’ on the statute’s meaning.37 
Plowden assumed that his reader would be able to identify the interpretation that reason 
required, simply through his own processes of reasoning. In a similar discussion in Nichols v 
Nichols (1575), he proclaimed that ‘every reasonable man’ would construe a statute in a way 
that ‘stands with reason and justice.’38 
 
Later in the century, however, lawyers began to doubt whether reason alone was enough to 
identify the correct legal answer in every case. Coke and Bacon, for example, both 
acknowledged that there might be a range of possible solutions to a case, all of which 
complied with reason. 39  Relying on reason alone, therefore, meant that the law was 
underdetermined. Coke’s solution was to redefine reason. He contrasted ‘every man’s natural 
reason’ with the reason of the law, which was ‘an artificial perfection of reason.’40 The law’s 
reason had been refined by ‘long experience’ so that it was now wiser than any individual’s 
‘own private reason.’41 Unlike Plowden, Coke did not think that an individual could access the 
law’s reason through his own powers of reasoning. Rather, he must identify it by studying the 
rules of the law.42 A good law report would enable ‘the right reason of the rule (the beauty of 
the law)’ to ‘be clearly discerned’ by studious readers.43  																																																								
36 Ian Williams, ‘English Legal Reasoning and Legal Culture, c.1528-c.1642’ (PhD thesis, University of 
Cambridge 2008) 11, 68, 151. 
37 Eyston v Studd (1574) Plow 459, 467. 
38 Nichols v Nichols (1575) Plow 477, 487. 
39 Williams, ‘English Legal Reasoning and Legal Culture, c.1528-c.1642’ (n 36) 13–14. 
40 Coke (n 32) 97b. 
41 ibid; Calvin’s Case (1608) 7 Co Rep 1a, 3b. 
42 Coke (n 32) 62; see Williams, ‘English Legal Reasoning and Legal Culture, c.1528-c.1642’ (n 36) 23. 
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By the late sixteenth century, common lawyers were increasingly inclined to make arguments 
from authority.44 Legal texts, cases, and especially judgments in cases were coming to be 
described as ‘authorities.’45 Williams argues that, by the end of the century, the basis of legal 
reasoning had shifted from a priori reason to the authority of previously-judged cases.46 He 
suggests that this resulted from procedural changes, which abolished tentative pleading and 
focused lawyers’ minds on final judgments dealing with points of law. Lawyers may also have 
been influenced by styles of argument in the rhetorical tradition,47 and by the new availability 
of reliable printed texts.48 Although reason remained centrally important to legal argument at 
the turn of the century, it was conceptualised and implemented in a very different way.49 It 
was now the reason of the law, not natural reason, that was key. 
 
These changes affected the way in which lawyers approached the interpretation of 
documents. This can be seen most clearly by comparing the approaches of Plowden and 
Coke. While Plowden was content to leave the identification of the right construction to 
lawyers’ natural reason, Coke consistently linked interpretation to ‘the rule and reason of the 
law.’50 Thus, he emphasised that a correct interpretation was one made in accordance with 
the authority of previous cases, rather than an individual’s idea of what was reasonable. In 
Vynior’s Case (1609), for example, the condition of a bond was that William Wilde would 
perform an arbitration made by William Rugge, who had been appointed by the two parties. 
Wilde subsequently revoked the authority he had given to Rugge. It was held that this was a 
breach of the condition. Coke explained that the condition in question had been ‘invented by 
prudent antiquity’ precisely in order to ensure that the obligor did not revoke the arbitrator’s 
authority. ‘It is good,’ he continued, ‘to follow in such cases the ancient forms and precedents, 
																																																																																																																																																														
43 The Reports of Sir Edward Coke, vol V (Joseph Butterworth and Son 1826) 9 Co Rep xxxviii. 
44 Williams, ‘English Legal Reasoning and Legal Culture, c.1528-c.1642’ (n 36) 24; David Ibbetson, 
‘Authority and Precedent’ in Mark Godfrey (ed), Law and Authority in British Legal History, 1200-1900 
(Cambridge University Press 2016) 72–3. 
45 Williams, ‘English Legal Reasoning and Legal Culture, c.1528-c.1642’ (n 36) 25, 68; Ibbetson, 
‘Authority and Precedent’ (n 44) 74–83. 
46 Williams, ‘English Legal Reasoning and Legal Culture, c.1528-c.1642’ (n 36) 71, 94, 151. 
47 ibid 75–7; Ibbetson, ‘Authority and Precedent’ (n 44) 80. 
48 See generally Ian Williams, ‘“He Creditted More the Printed Booke”: Common Lawyers’ 
Receptivity to Print, c. 1550-1640’ (2010) 28 Law and History Review 39. 
49 Williams, ‘English Legal Reasoning and Legal Culture, c.1528-c.1642’ (n 36) 13. 
50 Knight’s Case (n 24) 55a. 
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which are full of knowledge and wisdom,’51 and cited a 1465 case in which the meaning of 
such a condition had been considered.52 He did not mention reason or the parties’ intentions. 
 
Another striking case is Edward Altham’s Case (1610). Marcia Lawrence made a deed releasing 
all her ‘actions… suits, quarrels and demands’ against Thomas Nash.53 The question was 
whether her dower had thereby been extinguished. As we have seen, Coke relied heavily on 
authorities in which these words had previously been interpreted.54 To define ‘right,’ for 
example, he cited 14 cases from the Year Books, Broke’s Abridgement, Littleton’s Tenures, and 
Nichols v Nichols from Plowden’s Commentaries.55 It is particularly interesting to compare Coke’s 
method to that recommended by Plowden in Nichols. Plowden did not provide any authorities 
for his definition of the word ‘right,’ but asserted that ‘every reasonable man’ would interpret 
it so that it ‘stands with reason and justice.’56 Indeed, he specifically warned that ‘to rest upon 
the strict definition of the word’ was ‘manifestly injurious,’ since ‘reason is the key which 
pierces and opens the sense of obscure words.’57  
 
Coke’s approach was very different. For Coke, the apparent demands of reason could be 
outweighed by sufficient authority. In Lewis Bowles’s Case (1615), for example, the question was 
whether a ‘without impeachment of waste’ clause in a feoffment to use would entitle the 
feoffees to the timber of a barn that had blown down. The court held that it was ‘the 
continual and constant opinion of all ages’ that it did. ‘It would be dangerous now to recede 
from’ this view, they proclaimed, since ‘it is better that there should be a defect, than that the 
law should be changed.’58 In The Lord Cromwel’s Case (1601), Coke warned that ‘fucatus error nuda 
veritate in multis est probabilior, & saepenumer rationibus vincit veritatem error’ [artificial error is in many 
cases more probable than naked truth, and error often overcomes truth by reasoning].59 He 
approvingly cited similar dicta from the philosopher Theophrastus (‘qui rationem in omnibus 
quaerunt, rationem subvertunt’ [he who seeks reason in everything, subverts reason])60 and the 
jurist Paul (‘non est recedendum a communi observantia, & minimè mutanda sunt quae certam 																																																								
51 Vynior’s Case (1609) 8 Co Rep 81b, 82b. 
52 (1465) YB Trin 5 Edw IV pl 2, f3b. 
53 Edward Altham’s Case (1610) 8 Co Rep 150b, 150b. 
54 See 2.3. above. 
55 Edward Altham’s Case (n 53) 151b-152b. 
56 Nichols v Nichols (n 38) 487. 
57 ibid 488. 
58 Lewis Bowles’s Case (1615) 11 Co Rep 79b, 83a. 
59 The Lord Cromwel’s Case (1601) 2 Co Rep 69b, 73a. 
60 ibid 75a. 
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interpretationem habuerunt’ [there should be no departure from common usage, and those things 
which have had a certain interpretation should be changed least]).61 Again, he insisted that 
natural reason was unreliable, and that it was better to trust in the rules of the common law to 
achieve the right result. 
 
Lawyers also emphasised that the interpretation of a document should not be permitted to 
undermine substantive rules of law. This was not a new idea. In Colthirst v Bejushin, for 
example, Hales J observed that a person may dispose of his property ‘where, when, and how 
he pleases, so that his intent be not against law or reason.’62 However, it is striking how often 
Coke, in particular, thought it necessary to insist that deeds must be construed in accordance 
with rules of substantive law. In Baldwin’s Case (1589), for example, he explained that ‘such 
construction shall always be made, that the intent of the parties shall take effect, if the same by 
any construction may stand with the rule of law.’63 Likewise, in Butt’s Case (1600), he observed 
that ‘the law will not make an exposition against the express words and intent of the parties, 
when it may stand with the rule of law.’64 In Shelley’s Case (1581), as in Knight’s Case (1588), he 
coupled this with a reference to reason: ‘such construction is always to be made of a deed that 
all the words (if possible) agreeable to reason and conformable to law, may take effect 
according to the intent of the parties.’65 
 
Lawyers were particularly keen to establish this point in the context of uses. Newis v Lark (1571) 
had sanctioned the use of perpetuity clauses in the limitation of a use, although they were 
abhorred by the common law. As we have seen, the court’s reasoning in Newis was based on 
principles of interpretation: the court did not wish to thwart the testator’s intention by 
destroying the entail he had limited.66 Newis was reversed in a series of cases at the turn of the 
century.67 In Corbet’s Case (1600), the first of the three, the judges emphasised that rules of law 
must take priority over principles of interpretation. Anderson CJ held that the settlor’s ‘intent 
is repugnant to the rules of law, and against sense and reason,’ and that the perpetuity ‘clause 
																																																								
61 ibid 74a. See D.1.3.23. 
62 Colthirst v Bejushin (n 7) 31. 
63 Baldwin’s Case (1589) 2 Co Rep 23a, 23b. 
64 Butt’s Case (1600) 7 Co Rep 23a, 24a. 
65 Shelley’s Case (1581) 1 Co Rep 93b, 95b. 
66 See 3.3.1. above. 
67 AWB Simpson, A History of the Land Law (2nd edn, Clarendon Press 1986) 211, fn 7. 
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which he hath inserted out of his own conceit and imagination [is] repugnant to law and 
reason.’68  
 
Lawyers were also insistent that the intention of a testator must comply with the rules of law. 
In Lovice v Goddard (1605), the judges agreed that ‘the intent of the devisor… ought to be 
maintained if it stands with law.’69 Thus, in Butt’s Case, a man was seised of Blackacre in fee 
and Whiteacre for years, and granted a rent out of both for the grantee’s life. It was held that 
this contravened a rule of law: ‘one entire rent cannot be a freehold out of Black-acre, and a 
chattel out of White-acre.’ Although the ‘mutual agreement of the parties’ was clear, they 
could not ‘charge such thing with rent, which is not chargeable by the law.’70  
 
This point seems to have caused some difficulty towards the end of the sixteenth century. 
After all, the Statute of Wills had authorised devises ‘at the free will and pleasure of the 
devisor.’71 In Bottenham v Herlakenden (1587), for example, the question was whether rent could 
be reserved on a devise of land. ‘Wherefore,’ asked Sjt Gawdy, ‘cannot a man devise land, 
reserving rent, when by the statute 32 H. 8. he may devise at his pleasure?’ ‘Because,’ replied 
Peryam J, ‘his pleasure must correspond with the law.’72 Similarly, in Soulle v Gerrard (1594), Sjt 
Glanvile argued that a remainder could not depend on a fee simple at common law. 
However, he continued, ‘the statute gives liberty to every owner to dispose of his land by 
devise at the will and pleasure: so thereby the land ought to pass according to the will of the 
devisor.’73 Anderson CJ replied that ‘he may dispose at his will and pleasure, so as it be 
according to the rules of law, otherwise it is a vain will: and if other construction should be 
made thereof, there would many absurdities ensue thereupon.’74 Walmsley and Beaumont JJ 
agreed: the Statute of Wills enabled the testator to devise ‘to what person what quantity of 
land and what estate he will according to the rules of law; but it enables him not to make any 
devises against the rules of law.’75 
 
																																																								
68 Corbet’s Case (1600) 1 Co Rep 83b, 84b. Corbet’s Case was a fictitious case, though the judges were 
unaware of this: Simpson, A History of the Land Law (n 67) 211, fn 7. 
69 Loves v Goddard (1605) Cro Jac 61, 61. 
70 Butt’s Case (n 64) 23a. 
71 32 Hen VIII c. 1. See Simpson, A History of the Land Law (n 67) 197. 
72 Bottenham v Herlakenden (1587) Owen 92, 92. 
73 Soulle v Gerrard (1594) Cro Eliz 525, 525. 
74 ibid. 
75 ibid 526. 
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Lawyers, then, were increasingly deferential to legal rules and precedents when interpreting a 
document. Similarly, they were no longer content to derive principles of interpretation from 
reason alone. Instead, they sought to demonstrate that these principles were founded on good 
authority. Williams observes that, throughout the sixteenth century, there was a decline in 
putting hypothetical cases and an increase in the citation of genuine, judged cases.76 In 
Throckmerton v Tracy (1555), for example, Stanford J cited Bracton, two specific Year Books 
cases, and ‘put several cases’ to ground his approach to interpretation.77 Saunders J cited 
several specific cases, as well as the writings of Cicero, but largely relied on putting apparently 
hypothetical cases: for example, ‘if an abbot grants a corody to one for him and his servant to 
sit at his mess, he may not bring one that has a noisome disease.’78 Humphrey Brown J cited 
no authorities, while Broke CJ cited a handful of specific cases.79 However, the relative 
paucity of case law here may be due less to the judges’ predilections than to the reporter’s. 
Plowden noted that Stanford J’s judgment was ‘much more amplified with many cases,’ but 
apparently did not think that these were worth recording.80 In Hill v Grange, Plowden recorded 
only four specific cases cited by the judges in their speeches, though he noted that ‘many other 
cases were put where a word shall be taken out of its natural sense.’81 He did not record any 
other authorities relied on by the judges, except for Bracton.82 Instead, he focused on reporting 
their arguments from first principles.83 
 
In Coke’s Reports, in contrast, any statement about principles of interpretation tended to be 
supported by the citation of multiple cases.84 For example, we have seen that, in Hungate’s 
Case, Coke argued that a deed should be interpreted reasonably, so as to avoid absurdity. He 
cited two cases as authority for this principle.85 In Mallory’s Case (1601), Coke reported that 
words in a deed should be interpreted so that ‘all together may stand and satisfy the intent and 																																																								
76 Williams, ‘English Legal Reasoning and Legal Culture, c.1528-c.1642’ (n 36) 66–68. 
77 Throckmerton v Tracy (1555) Plow 145, 160. 
78 ibid 161. 
79 ibid 162. 
80 ibid 161. 
81 Hill v Grange (n 13) 171. 
82 ibid 170. 
83 ibid. 
84 In terms of raw numbers, Plowden may have included more references to cases in each of his reports. 
However, given that Plowden’s reports were so much longer than those of his contemporaries, the 
proportion of points he referenced with a specific case was considerably smaller. 
85 Hungate’s Case (n 20) 103a. Coke cited ‘39 Hen 6 7’, but seems to have meant (1460) YB Mich 39 Hen 
VI pl 15, f9a-12a, as well as Anon (1536) Dyer 19b. 
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meaning of the parties.’ He cited Hill v Grange for the point, as well as discussing Chapman v 
Dalton and three Year Books cases.86 In Butt’s Case (1600), he explained that a grant of a 
distress for rent amounts to a grant of rent, on the basis of the principle ‘ut res magis valeat.’87 
He emphasised that this point was ‘often ruled and resolved,’ citing eleven cases from the 
Year Books as well as Littleton’s Tenures.88 Similarly, Moore, reporting his own argument in 
Bullen’s Case (1594), cited eight cases on the words needed to grant a fee tail in a will:89 five 
from Dyer and three from the Year Books, two of which were taken from Broke’s 
Abridgement.90 
 
Egerton also cited many cases as authorities for his approach to interpretation. Since 
Egerton’s draft arguments have not been edited by a reporter, we have references to all of the 
cases on which he relied. In his notes for The Dean and Chapter of Chester’s Case, for example, 
Egerton made 75 references to earlier cases, including six to cases in Plowden. The rest came 
from the Year Books.91 His draft argument in Saunders v Stanfourde included 45 references to 
cases, 36 from the Year Books and nine from Plowden.92 Egerton also referred frequently to 
Bracton93 and, less often, to Broke,94 Littleton,95 or St German96 for arguments relating to 
interpretation. It is clear that, following the publication of Plowden’s and Dyer’s reports, 
lawyers were fully exploiting the opportunity to cite cases that specifically discussed principles 
of interpretation in detail. Egerton had both the Year Books and Plowden’s Commentaries in his 
library, while Coke owned many volumes of reports, including Dyer’s and Plowden’s.97 
 
Approaches to legal reasoning in interpretation cases had therefore changed in a number of 
ways. Authorities were increasingly used to establish the meaning of words or phrases in a 
document, and could even trump the apparently reasonable meaning of a term. Lawyers drew 																																																								
86 Mallory’s Case (1601) 5 Co Rep 111b, 111b. 
87 Butt’s Case (n 64) 24a. 
88 ibid. 
89 Bullens Case (1594) Moore 361, 362. 
90 Robert Brooke, La Graunde Abridgement (Richard Tottell 1573) 264, 296v. 
91 The Dean and Chapter of Chester’s Case (1578) Hunt MS El 482 f32. 
92 Saunders & Starkey v Stanfourde (n 23). 
93 The Dean and Chapter of Chester’s Case (n 91) f34v; Englande’s Case (n 34) f55; Saunders & Starkey v Stanfourde 
(n 23) f72; Fysher v Boys (undated) Hunt MS El 482 f190, 190v. 
94 Englande’s Case (n 34) f78v; Lepur v Woolf (undated) Hunt MS El 482 f157, f159. 
95 Saunders & Starkey v Stanfourde (n 23) f78v. 
96 Lepur v Woolf (n 94) f159. 
97 WO Hassall, A Catalogue of the Library of Sir Edward Coke (Yale University Press 1950) 22–37. 
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clear boundaries for the province of interpretation: it must not be allowed to undermine 
existing legal rules. And principles of interpretation themselves were to be supported by 
previously-judged cases, rather than derived from a priori reason. In all of these ways, legal 
authority began to displace reason in the law of interpretation. 
 
6.4. Reason and maxims 
 
Another significant trend in our period was the rise of maxims of interpretation. Today, 
maxims are often associated with short Latin sentences. However, early modern lawyers took 
a broader approach to maxims, understanding them to include legal rules and principles in 
general.98 Coke, for example, wrote that a maxim was ‘all one’ with ‘a principle… a rule, a 
common ground, postulatum or an axiom.’99 Some maxims were very general principles, 
while others were quite specific rules.100 Maxims were ‘conclusions of reason,’101 and could 
not be ‘questioned’102 or ‘proved,’103 since, as Coke put it, ‘nothing may be more high and 
supreme than the principles themselves.’104 Though maxims could not logically be proved, 
their existence could be proved by citing previous cases.105  
 
An inclination to set out maxims of interpretation is evident in Plowden’s Commentaries, as 
judges attempted to systematise the principles of construction. For example, we have seen that 
Stanford J sought to lay ‘down three rules for the understanding of deeds’ in Throckmerton v 
Tracy,106 and that the court in Hill v Grange gave instructions about ‘the office of judges’ in 
interpretation cases.107 The principles they established, however, were relatively general. One 
of Stanford J’s rules was simply that ‘the words shall be construed according to the intent of 
the parties,’108 and the court’s direction in Hill was that words should be understood according 
to their intended meaning.109  																																																								
98 Williams, ‘English Legal Reasoning and Legal Culture, c.1528-c.1642’ (n 36) 27–28. 
99 Coke (n 32) 11. 
100 Williams, ‘English Legal Reasoning and Legal Culture, c.1528-c.1642’ (n 36) 28. 
101 Colthirst v Bejushin (n 7) 27; Coke (n 32) 11. 
102 Coke (n 32) 11. 
103 Ratcliff’s Case (1592) 3 Co Rep 37a, 40a. 
104 ibid. 
105 Williams, ‘English Legal Reasoning and Legal Culture, c.1528-c.1642’ (n 36) 32. 
106 Throckmerton v Tracy (n 77) 160. 
107 Hill v Grange (n 13) 170. 
108 Throckmerton v Tracy (n 77) 160. 
109 Hill v Grange (n 13) 170. 
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This didactic tone continued to appear in cases throughout the sixteenth century. However, 
the rules that judges laid down became increasingly specific. In Baldwyn v Marton (1589), for 
example, the court began by echoing the language of cases like Throckmerton and Hill: ‘it is a 
good rule in the law, to expound deeds according to the intent of their makers,’ and ‘it is not 
the office of the justice’ to ‘alter the intent of him who made the deed.’110 They continued, 
however, to  
 
make diverse good divisions for understanding how deeds will be expounded: for 
instance, when the words are ambiguous, and do not include any certain thing: 
for instance, when one grants land, and limits no interest, there is no estate 
except at will without livery, if there is livery it is franktenement; for the livery 
makes the estate of franktenement, and by this the intent of the donor appears… 
and they further spoke of repugnancies in words, one sentence, and diverse 
sentences, and put diverse cases on this… and also when words in deeds will be 
void, and when not.111 
 
As well as asserting the general principle, that deeds ought to be construed according to the 
writers’ intention, the judges also sought to deal with specific problem cases: ambiguous, 
repugnant or void words. They also gave examples of when these problems might arise in 
practice, and how they should be resolved. As such specific rules of interpretation grew more 
popular, they began to displace other, broader principles of construction.  
 
Coke, in particular, preferred to present cases on interpretation as if they had been resolved 
by a specific rule or maxim, rather than on the basis of reason or the parties’ intentions. In 
Shelley’s Case, for example, much of the argument was couched in terms of establishing Edward 
Shelley’s intention.112 However, when Coke came to report the court’s decision, he did not 
mention Edward’s intention at all. In Coke’s telling, Wray CJ simply held that the words of 
the conveyance were ‘words of limitation, and not of purchase.’113 The reason was left 
obscure.114 Baker finds it ‘significant that the judges rejected the defendant’s argument that it 
was simply a matter of giving effect to the settlor’s intention.’115 However, as David A. Smith 																																																								
110 Baldwyn v Marton (1589) 1 And 223, 225. 
111 ibid. 
112 See 5.2.1. and 5.2.2. above. 
113 Shelley’s Case (n 65) 106b. 
114 AWB Simpson, Leading Cases in the Common Law (Oxford University Press 1995) 33. 
115 JH Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2007) 287. 
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has observed, it is not clear that this was in fact what happened: Edward’s intention had, after 
all, been crucial to the defendant’s argument.116 His intention also seems to have been playing 
on the judges’ minds. In Dyer’s report of the case, he recorded that the land passed by 
descent, ‘and that seems also to have been the intent and will of the creator of this special 
tail.’117 A number of commentators have suggested that Coke’s report was a ‘sleight of 
hand.’118 He may have been deliberately suppressing the importance of Edward’s intention in 
favour of establishing a legal rule. As Smith points out, the purpose of Coke’s reports was to 
provide clear and certain legal rules to guide future lawyers.119 A clear-cut rule on the 
meaning of specific words was more useful for this purpose than a direction to establish the 
settlor’s intention. 
 
Lawyers’ increasing fondness for specific maxims was starting to displace broader discussions 
about the parties’ intentions and about reason. Analysis that would once have turned on 
identifying the parties’ reasonable intentions was now expressed in terms of maxims. In 
Goodall’s Case, for example, the court explained that the payment of £400 could not be made 
to Randal’s executors, since he had ‘expressly named’ his heir to receive it, and ‘expressum facit 
cessare tacitum’ [what is express silences what is implied].120 Exactly the same issue had arisen in 
a 1560 case reported by Dyer. For Dyer, however, no maxim was needed: the question was 
simply one of identifying the parties’ intentions. ‘The law,’ he explained, ‘does not determine 
to whom the tender shall be made, when the parties themselves are agreed expressly.’121 In 
The Bishop of Bath’s Case (1605), the court observed that a term on the commencement of a 
lease would be taken ‘most beneficially for the lessee.’122 They cited Wrotesley v Adams (1559), in 
which, they explained, a lease was given ‘a good commencement’ by ‘reasonable 
construction.’123 Again, this was a gloss: neither reason nor the contra proferentem rule was 
mentioned in the relevant part of Wrotesley, but only ‘the intent of the lessor and of the 
plaintiff.’124 Discussion of the parties’ intentions had been displaced by the mandates of both 
reasonable construction and a more specific interpretive maxim.  
 																																																								
116 David A Smith, ‘Was There a Rule in Shelley’s Case?’ (2009) 30 Journal of Legal History 53, 66. 
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Coke, with his great love of formulating rules, bore particular responsibility for the 
proliferation of these maxims.125 In one short passage in his Commentary upon Littleton, he 
jammed around a dozen Latin maxims of interpretation together, devoid of any context or 
explanation.126 In general, however, Coke used maxims in a much more sophisticated way 
than this rather disorderly list would suggest. In his Reports, Coke usually attempted to place 
specific maxims in a wider context, drawing links between them and treating them as integral 
parts of his overall approach to construction. 
 
In Humfrey Lofield’s Case (1612), for example, Dorothy Young demised a wine cellar to 
Humfrey Lofield for a year, and, if the parties so agreed, for a further three years, rendering 
£40 rent annually. Lofield failed to pay the first instalment of rent. The defendant, Lofield’s 
executrix, claimed that no rent had in fact been reserved for the first year of the lease, but 
only for the subsequent three year term. ‘Every reservation,’ she argued, ‘shall be taken strictè 
against the lessor, and beneficially for the lessee.’127 This was rejected. The maxim that a lease 
must be taken against the lessor could not be relied upon in isolation. It must be seen in the 
context of the court’s search for the parties’ reasonable meaning. Coke cited a case from 1581, 
which, he explained, ‘proves that a reservation shall be expounded according to the 
reasonable intention of the parties, to be collected by the words of their deed.’128 In fact, the 
case in question mentioned no such general principle, but only reiterated that a reservation 
was ‘to be intended the most strongly against the reservor.’129 For Coke, however, the maxim 
itself was less important than the context in which it was applied. In the 1581 case, the maxim 
accorded with ‘the reasonable intention of the parties,’ and so it could be relied upon. Here, 
in contrast, it would be unreasonable to invoke the maxim, and so it failed to obtain. 
 
Maxims were conclusions of reason, and the parties to a deed were presumed to intend what 
was reasonable. In principle, then, there was no conflict between specific interpretive rules 
and more general references to reason and the parties’ intentions. The former were examples 
of the latter, and the latter could be distilled into the former. Thus, in Nokes’s Case (1598), 
Popham CJ held that a general covenant would be qualified by a more specific term. This 
was, he explained, ‘by the mutual consent of both parties,’ and ‘quia clausa general[is] non 
refert[ur] ad expressa’ [because a general clause is not referred to matters expressly 																																																								
125 Simpson, Leading Cases in the Common Law (n 114) 39. 
126 Coke (n 32) 36. 
127 Humfrey Lofield’s Case (1612) 10 Co Rep 106a, 106b. 
128 ibid 107b; see Anon (1581) Dyer 376b. 
129 Anon (n 128) 377a. 
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mentioned].130 Just as the parties’ intentions were thought to coincide with reason, they also 
necessarily coincided with more specific maxims based upon reason. 
 
It is also worth noting the form that these maxims took. Although a maxim could be any kind 
of legal rule, short Latin sentences were certainly in vogue. Coke, Bacon and Egerton all 
collected Latin maxims of interpretation,131 and Coke seems to have had a preference for 
expressing maxims in Latin, rather than the vernacular. In Edward Altham’s Case, for example, 
he referred to ‘a maxim and principle of the law’ that ‘quando carta continent generalem clausulam, 
posteaque descendit ad verba specialia, quae clausulae generali sunt consentanea, interpretanda est carta 
secundum verba specialia’ [when a deed contains a general clause, and afterwards descends to 
special words, to which the general clauses are agreeable, the deed is interpreted according to 
the special words].132 As he pointed out, ‘the same rule almost word for word’ was put in a 
1333 case. 133  In that case, however, the rule had been expressed in the Law French 
vernacular. Coke therefore made the deliberate choice to translate it into Latin when 
describing it as a ‘maxim.’  
 
Coke’s Latin maxims are often described as ‘spurious,’ or more-or-less invented.134 However, 
this was not generally true of his maxims of interpretation. Some he did coin himself: for 
example, ‘maledicta expositio est quae corrumpit textum’ [it is a bad exposition that corrupts the text] 
seems to have been a Coke original.135 However, as Hans Baade has observed, ‘virtually all of 
the Latin-language maxims on interpretation’ from Coke’s Reports and Institutes ‘are readily 
traced to’ the ius commune.136 For example, ‘expressum facit cessare tacitum,’ which we encountered 
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in Goodall’s Case, derived from Bartolus.137 ‘Lex est cuicunque aliquis quid concedit, concedere videtur, et 
id sine quo res ipsa esse non potuit’ [the law is that whoever grants a thing is understood to grant 
that without which the grant would have no effect], cited by Coke in Richard Liford’s Case, was 
from Nicolaus Everardus. 138  Coke’s maxim in Edward Altham’s Case bore a striking 
resemblance to the canon law rule, ‘generi per speciem derogatur’ [the specific derogates from the 
general].139 ‘Expressio unius est exclusio alterius’ [the expression of one is the exclusion of the 
other] was quoted by Coke in his Commentary upon Littleton,140 as well as by many civilian 
authors.141 Both Coke and Egerton cited the maxim ‘omne maius continet minus’ [every greater 
thing contains the lesser thing],142 a close relation to the ius commune’s ‘cui licet quod est plus, licet 
utique quod est minus’ [one who may do what is more may also do what is less].”143 Many of the 
maxims Coke cited in his short passage on deeds focused on the importance of the parties’ 
intentions, and also had civilian origins.144 ‘Verba intentioni non e contra debent inservire’ [words 
should serve the intentions, and not the reverse],145 for example, was another maxim of the 
canon law.146 The same trend held true for Coke’s maxims that related specifically to statutory 
interpretation.147 And Coke was not alone in his penchant for borrowing Latin maxims. 
Bacon explicitly attributed his maxims of construction to the ‘civilians,’148 while Egerton 
derived many of his maxims of interpretation from non-legal sources. In Saunders v Starkey, for 
example, he cited maxims from Bernard of Clairvaux,149 Augustine150 and Panormitanus151 to 
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argue that a deed should be interpreted ‘according to the intention and minds of the 
parties.’152  
 
Why, then, did lawyers begin to recast the law of interpretation in terms of specific maxims? 
And why did they adopt so many of these from the ius commune? We have already seen that 
Coke was aiming to provide clear legal rules for the instruction of lawyers when he wrote his 
Reports. He lamented that the common law ‘consisteth upon so many, and almost infinite 
particulars,’ with the result that ‘the right reason and rule of the judges’ could easily be 
mistaken.153 By framing his cases in terms of specific maxims, rather than more general 
principles of interpretation, Coke was able to provide clearer directions for his readers. He 
could present the law of interpretation as a system of specific rules, which would guide his 
readers through a morass of complex case law.154 This approach was consistent with legal 
trends more generally.155 Maxims were increasingly popular, used to help both law students156 
and practitioners157 navigate the ‘confusedly scattered and utterly undigested’ common law.158 
 
Maxims also helped to summarise the law memorably and succinctly: hence, they were often 
expressed in Latin. Bacon, for example, noted that he had chosen Latin for his treatise on 
maxims because it was ‘the briefest [language] to contrive the rules compendiously, the aptest 
for memory, and of the greatest authority and majesty to be avouched and alleged in 
argument.’ 159 Latin maxims were pithy and elegant. They were also imbued with the 
intellectual respectability of the ius commune, 160  demonstrating the speaker’s taste and 
learning.161 Because the civil law was understood to be based on reason,162 the citation of a 
civilian maxim could strengthen an argument by showing that it was founded on reason.163 																																																								
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Sometimes, these civilian maxims were simply ornaments to the argument.164 Egerton, for 
example, did not make his maxims the substantive foundation of his arguments, but dropped 
them in as asides. Some were no more than marginal notes.165 His commonplace books 
contained whole lists of maxims, from which he would select the most appropriate for each 
occasion.166 In other cases, a civilian maxim was used as ‘a pithy summation of an existing 
common law position.’167 We have seen that this was how Coke used maxims in Goodall’s Case 
and Edward Altham’s Case. Similarly, when Egerton relied on civilian maxims in his arguments, 
he immediately followed them with references to common law authorities. After quoting 
Bernard and Augustine in Saunders v Stanfourde, for example, he began to discuss Hill v Grange, 
and assured his listeners that examples of similar common law cases were ‘infinite.’168  
 
As David Seipp observes, the origins of these maxims in the ius commune often went 
unacknowledged: they were simply treated as part of the common law.169 Some had been 
floating around the common law for centuries. In the medieval period, continental 
jurisprudence had swiftly made its way to English canonists.170 Many Chief Justices prior to 
the fourteenth century were clerics, who would have been perfectly familiar with canon law.171 
As a result, Latin maxims used by common lawyers were often derived from civilian regulae 
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iuris.172 Beresford CJ, for example, was particularly fond of quoting from the Liber sextus.173 
Material borrowed from the ius commune by medieval lawyers was assimilated into the common 
law; its similarity to the civilian rules was then remarked on by common lawyers in our 
period.174 Two maxims that underwent this process, ut res magis valeat and the contra proferentem 
rule, will be discussed below. 
 
It should also be noted that the more specific maxims we have discussed were not applied to 
wills. The courts used only a limited set of maxims when interpreting a will. Most of these 
were very general, emphasising only the intentions of the writer. Egerton, for example, cited 
some theological sources on the subject, enjoining an interpretation according to the intention 
of the testator. In Scott v Scott, he quoted a dictum of Hilary of Poitiers, which also formed part 
of the Liber extra: ‘intelligentia dictorum ex causis summenda est dicendi’ [the understanding of things 
said must be taken from the reason for which they were said].175 Similarly, in Englande’s Case, 
he referred to Anselm of Canterbury’s observation that ‘omnis voluntas habet quid & cur, quia 
omnis voluntas sicut vult aliquid, ita vult propter aliquid, et quemadmodum videndum est quid velit, ita 
considerandum est cur velit’ [every will has a what and a why, because every will which wills 
something, also wills it for the sake of something, and just as we must see what it wills, we 
must consider why it wills].176 As we saw in chapter five, lawyers believed that a testator would 
have had a reasonable intention, but were only prepared to make limited assumptions about 
what that might entail.177 The only Latin maxim that was applied to wills with any kind of 
regularity was ut res magis valeat quam pereat, which will be discussed further below. 
 
The fact that narrow, and often civilian, maxims were colonising the interpretation of deeds 
was not, in one sense, a substantive change. In theory, maxims were simply being used to 
summarise the results that the courts were already reaching.178 However, in another sense, the 
law was being refashioned in the image of these maxims. Coke, for example, drew together 
disparate cases that had not previously been seen as instances of the same rule. In Richard 																																																								
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Liford’s Case (1614), for example, it was held that a lessor who had the power to sell trees on 
the land would also have the power to enter the land and show the trees to a potential buyer. 
Coke explained that ‘lex est cuicunque aliquis quid concedit, concedere videtur, et id sine quo res ipsa esse 
non potuit, and this is a maxim in law.’179 He cited over a dozen cases in which a similar 
argument had been made. Some were directly on point;180 the relevance of others was much 
more tenuous.181 However, none had purported to lay down a general principle, let alone a 
maxim, except the most recent case, which Coke himself had reported. 182  While the 
substantive law of interpretation was not new, the way in which the law was being described 
had changed. Instead of attributing an interpretation solely to the parties’ intentions or to a 
reasonable construction, lawyers were now inclined to explain it in terms of specific maxims 
and rules. By reshaping how the case law was understood, lawyers like Coke were altering the 
common law itself.  
 
Furthermore, while reason and the parties’ intentions remained central to the courts’ 
interpretive approach, lawyers were now trying to play this down. Instead, they preferred to 
emphasise the primacy of clear legal rules and a systematic approach to construction. This 
bore the risk of divesting the law of some of its flexibility. Plowden, for example, had used the 
metaphor of a nut and shell to describe interpretation: the letter of the law was the shell, but 
the ‘fruit and profit’ lay in the sense of the law.183 Coke, in contrast, wrote that the ‘thick and 
hard shell’ of the law was any matter that distracted from the ‘right reason of the rule’ in a 
case.184 For Plowden, the problematic ‘shell’ was a formalistic approach to interpretation, and 
the means to getting at the ‘kernel’ was to enquire into the intentions of the writer. For Coke, 
on the other hand, this kind of enquiry was part of the ‘shell.’ The ‘sweetness of the kernel’ 
could only be ‘tasted’ by identifying a clear rule, which would aid in the resolution of future 
cases.185 As lawyers focused on rules derived from legal authorities, they sidelined arguments 
about interpretation that focused on a priori reason or the parties’ intentions alone.  
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6.5. Maxims: two case studies 
 
We will now examine the use of two particular maxims of interpretation: ut res magis valeat quam 
pereat and the contra proferentem rule. These were two of the most consistently popular 
interpretive maxims in our period. This discussion will therefore shed more light on the 
approach the courts took to construing documents. The two maxims also provide case studies 
of the relationships, already discussed in this chapter, between reasonable construction, the 
intentions of the parties, and the authority of legal rules. 
 
6 .5 .1 .  UT RES  MAGIS  VALEAT QUAM PEREAT  
 
The maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat had been formulated by the glossators of the medieval 
ius commune. 186  It was adopted by Bracton, with an explanation added: ‘favourable 
interpretations are to be made so that the thing may take effect rather than be destroyed, 
because of the ignorance of laymen.’187 It thereby made its way into the common law 
phrasebook.  
 
This maxim was clearly linked to the intentions of the writer: after all, he must have intended 
his deed to have some effect, or else he would not have made it. Invocations of the principle 
thus often made some link to the writer’s intentions. For example, in The Dean and Chapter of 
Chester’s Case (1578), Egerton argued that the judges ‘must supply the rudeness and 
imperfection of the deed, by favourable construction according to the intent of the parties, ut 
res magis valeat quam pereat.’188 In Fish v Bellamy (1605), the Bishop of Bath and Wells made a 
lease of land to Robert Clerk, to begin after the deaths of the existing lessees. It was objected 
that the second lease was not good, because the first lease would not terminate on the deaths 
of the lessees.189 However, a majority of judges in the Common Pleas held that the second 
lease could begin at any time after the deaths of the lessees, for ‘in deeds such construction 
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In these cases, lawyers argued that the deed or term as a whole ought to be given effect. The 
maxim was also used to make the point that every word in the deed was intended to be 
effectual. In Bold v Molineux (1536), Fitzherbert and Baldwin JJ pointed out that, if the words 
‘then living’ referred to the time of Johan’s death, there would have been no point in 
including them; the term would make equal sense without them. This interpretation therefore 
fell foul of the rule that ‘in all conditions, a man ought to expound every word that purports a 
meaning of the parties.’191  
 
Similarly, in Sharplus v Hankinson (1595), the parties had made a bond on condition that the 
obligor pay £20 ‘which shall be in the year 1599, in and upon 13 Oct. next ensuing the date 
hereof.’ The question was whether this meant 13 October in 1593, the year after the bond 
was made, or in 1599.192 The majority of the judges thought that the money must be due in 
1599, since by this construction, the fewest words would be void. Popham CJ, for example, 
argued that ‘by this exposition, all the words but “the date hereof” stand.’ Clench J thought 
the same, explaining that ‘by this exposition and interplacing of the words, all parts may stand 
together; and so without doubt was the intent of the parties.’193 This principle was closely 
connected to the mandate to construe all parts of a deed consistently.194 Thus, when quoting 
Bracton’s version of the maxim in Knight’s Case (1588), Coke emphasised that ‘all the parts’ of 
the deed ought to ‘agree with themselves,’ because ‘the words of the indenture… import the 
intent of the parties.’195  
 
In other cases, however, the maxim did not apply, since the court found that a particular term 
had not actually been intended to have any legal effect. In Englefield’s Case (1590), for example, 
Francis Englefield had covenanted to stand seised of land to the use of his nephew. However, 
in order to dissuade his nephew from ‘intolerable vices,’ he provided that the uses would be 
void if he tendered the nephew with a ring.196 Popham AG successfully argued that the ring 
could be tendered for any reason. The mention of ‘intolerable vices’ was ‘nothing but a 
flourish, devised by Mr Plowden, which imports some of the colourable causes that moved Sir 
Francis to make the condition, but it is not part of the condition.’197  
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In these cases, the courts framed the maxim as a guide to the parties’ intentions. However, in 
other instances, it was treated as an independent legal principle. This was particularly evident 
in Coke’s works. He cited the principle many times in his Commentary upon Littleton: in his 
passage on ‘deeds and their distinctions,’198 and when discussing grants of rents,199 grants to 
joint tenants,200 and confirmations of grants.201 He did not explicitly connect it to the parties’ 
intentions, however. Instead, he explained that the grant would be good ‘by construction of 
law,’202 or that ‘the law shall make such a construction as the gift by possibility may take 
effect.’203 In the latter case, Coke was commenting on a passage in which Littleton had based 
the operation of the principle on reason. Littleton wrote that, if it were impossible for a grant 
to take effect according to the literal meaning of its words, ‘the law wills that their estate and 
their inheritance will be such as reason wills.’204 Coke therefore connected the maxim to his 
own concept of the law’s reason, explaining that when his reader understood ‘the right reason 
of the law,’ it would ‘not only serve him for the understanding of that particular case, but of 
many others.’205 In one case, he even linked the maxim to a policy aim: protecting the quiet 
possession of estates. Discussing the law of misnomer, he argued that deeds should not be 
‘impeached and overthrown’ because of ‘too much niceness and curiosity,’206 in order to 
ensure ‘the surety and quiet’ of the parties to the deed, as well as ‘their farmers and others 
claiming from them… ut res magis valeat quam pereat.’207  
 
We have seen that Coke made sure to record plenty of previous cases as authorities for the 
maxim: for example, citing eleven cases in Butt’s Case.208 Sometimes these were authorities for 
the general principle, and sometimes they related to the specific term in question. In Mallory’s 
Case, for instance, the question was whether a reservation of rent to the Abbot and Convent of 
Sawtry ‘or their successors’ could be read as ‘and their successors.’209 The court began by 																																																								
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discussing Hill v Grange, in which the words of a reservation were ‘so marshalled and 
transposed’ as to not lose their effect.210 However, they then moved on to the specific facts of 
the case, discussing authorities where ‘or’ had been read as ‘and,’ and vice versa.211 Here, 
again, the court focused less on what the parties’ intentions had been and more on what the 
law ought to do. Fenner J briefly mentioned ‘the intent’ of the deed, but Gawdy J emphasised 
‘the construction of the law,’ and Popham CJ observed that ‘the law must make such 
construction of deeds that they may stand with possibility.’212 
 
It has already been mentioned that ut res magis valeat was the only Latin maxim to be cited 
consistently in cases involving the interpretation of wills. Lawyers were not prepared to make 
many presumptions about a testator’s wishes, but they could be confident that he had 
intended his will to be effective. We saw in chapter five that the principle was often justified 
on the basis of the testator’s intention.213 In Welcden v Elkington (1578), for example, Thomas 
Davis devised a term to his wife Johan for her life, and, after her death, to his son Francis. 
The defendant claimed that, when a life estate was granted in a lease for years, it was 
impossible to limit a remainder over.214 However, Sjt Anderson and Manwood J successfully 
argued that it was ‘the office of the court… so to marshal and construe the words that the 
intent may take place, and the thing be effected, and not destroyed.’215 If the devise to Francis 
had been made first and the devise to Johan second, both would undoubtedly be good. Since 
this devise was ‘in substance to that purpose,’ the court ought ‘so to place [the words] that the 
one part may not destroy the other, but that each may stand together.’216 It was ‘reasonable 
and the office of the judges to make such exposition of the words’ as was ‘agreeable to the 
intent of the testator,’ by construing ‘the latter devise to the son to precede the former devise 
to the wife.’217 Similarly, in Matthew Manning’s Case (1609), the court held that a remainder 
could be limited on a term for years by will, ‘ut res magis valeat.’218 
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The principle meant that, if a will could only have one possible effective construction, the 
courts would be obliged to take this as its meaning. In the serjeants’ case of 1567, for example, 
Sjt Lovelace argued that general words in a will would not pass land that was purchased after 
the will had been made. However, if the testator had specifically named a piece of land that 
he bought later, the devise would be good, ‘for otherwise it is void for all purposes.’219 
Similarly, in Heigham’s Case (1583), Windham J argued that a devise must be given the only 
construction by which it could have any effect.220 And in Sir Edward Clere’s Case (1599), the 
court held that, where the testator had no power to devise his land at law, it would ‘of 
necessity enure as a limitation of an use, or otherwise the devise shall be utterly void.’221 On 
the same principle, the courts sometimes rejected a construction of a will that would simply 
replicate the position at law. In one 1588 case, Peryam J argued that, if the will were ‘nothing 
but in accordance with the course of the common law,’ the devisee would take ‘as heir, and 
not by the will, and the will will be void, which is a bad construction.’222 
 
In some cases, the principle was rejected, because the proposed effect would diverge too far 
from the words of the will. In Michell v Dunton (1588), a lessor made a lease of messuages for 21 
years, with covenants to keep them in good repair. By his will, he devised that the lessee 
should have the messuages for 30 more years with the same covenants.223 However, since only 
the lessor could enforce the covenants, this provision was useless. It was therefore suggested 
that the testator must have intended to convert the covenants into conditions, which could be 
enforced by the remainderman.224 ‘If they are not taken in this sense they will be void,’ it was 
argued, ‘which the law will not suffer if they may be taken by any reasonable intendment to 
be available.’ 225  The court replied that ‘the words neither express nor imply that the 
tenements will be enjoyed on condition,’ and that ‘to make such words make a condition is 
against the sense of the words.’226 It was argued that the testator must have intended to make 
a condition, since ‘otherwise the words the words will be vain and void.’ However, this was 
not enough to prove his intention. Perhaps he ‘never thought of a condition, and if he did not 																																																								
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think of a condition, he never intended it.’227 The words of covenant in the will were therefore 
void, despite the maxim.228 It can be seen here how reluctant the courts were to make any 
presumptions at all about what a testator might have intended, if he did not clearly spell it out 
in his will. 
 
In other cases, lawyers sought to argue that every word of a will must be given an effective 
construction. Again, this could be controversial. Perhaps, because wills were presumed to be 
drafted inops consilii, it was less surprising if they included meaningless or redundant words. In 
Lowen v Coxe (1599), for example, Lowen devised his messuage to his two sons, ‘to them 
equally, and to their heirs.’229 The question was whether the sons took as tenants in common 
or as joint tenants. Altham, counsel for the plaintiff, argued that the word ‘equally’ must have 
been intended to make them tenants in common. If they were joint tenants, the heir of the 
survivor would take the whole messuage, and so their heirs would not hold ‘equally.’230 The 
‘word “equally” will be idle and in vain, and always each word said will be construed to some 
effect.’231 Gawdy and Clench JJ agreed: ‘otherwise the word “equally” will be utterly vain and 
to no purpose, which will not be when it may have a reasonable construction according to the 
intent of the devisor.’232 After all, it was ‘understood that the devisor put each word for some 
purpose.’233 Judgment was given for the plaintiff in the King’s Bench. Coxe then brought a 
writ of error, and the case was argued again in the Exchequer Chamber. Here, Walmsley J 
rejected Altham’s argument. The testator, he claimed, must be presumed to be ‘an illiterate 
man, in which case it is no marvel if he used an idle word.’234 However, it was again held that 
the brothers were tenants in common, by a majority of four to three.235 
 
The courts, then, were somewhat uncertain about the propriety of applying the maxim to 
wills. Perhaps this is why, in Welcden v Elkington, Sjt Anderson and Manwood J were quick to 
observe that ‘this sort of exposition will by no means seem strange to us, if we do but cast our 
eyes back, and consider in what manner the judges in former times have expounded the 
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words of wills.’236 Sjt Anderson cited three cases, none of which were directly on point, but 
which, he claimed, showed that ‘the intent is the principal point to be considered in wills.’237 
In Matthew Manning’s Case, Coke reminded his reader that ‘it has been of late often adjudged 
according to these resolutions,’ citing Welcden and Paramour v Yardley.238 And in Lowen v Coxe, 
Altham and Gawdy J relied on Bold v Molineux to establish that ‘there is not any word in a 
deed or will which shall be idle, if it may be taken to any reasonable intent.’239 Even such a 
well-established maxim of interpretation as ut res magis valeat had occasionally to be bolstered 
by the citation of authorities. 
 
6 .5 .2 .  CONTRA PROFERENTEM  
 
The contra proferentem rule also originated in the ius commune, as a medieval amalgam of several 
older principles of Roman law.240 It had percolated into the common law courts by at least the 
late fourteenth century.241 Unlike ut res magis valeat, it was not discussed by Bracton, but it was 
regularly cited in court as the admonition that a party’s words must be taken ‘most strongly 
against him.’242 In 1535, Audley LC declared that ‘we have a maxim in the law that every 
grant or deed of a man will be taken most strongly against him who made it.’243 The rule did 
not only apply to deeds, but also to pleadings.244 Coke seems to have been the first to 
introduce the Latin tag contra proferentem,245 followed by Bacon, who described the maxim as 
‘one of the most common grounds of the law.’246  																																																								
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In the fifteenth century, the maxim was used in the interpretation of both ambiguous words 
and contradictory deeds.247 Indeed, lawyers saw the issues as two sides of the same coin: both 
were cases in which a deed could ‘be taken to different purposes.’248 Examples of the two 
kinds of case were used interchangeably to demonstrate the application of the maxim.249 By 
the sixteenth century, however, lawyers were generally content to apply the rule that the 
premises of a repugnant deed were effective,250 and the contra proferentem rule was primarily 
applied to ambiguous terms.251 It is also worth noting that the contra proferentem rule did not just 
license a restrictive reading of an ambiguous term. In Ewer v Heydon (1599), for example, the 
court held that the word ‘land’ would be taken as extensively as possible in a grant, because 
this was the most favourable interpretation for the grantee.252 
 
The contra proferentem rule was much more difficult to explain than ut res magis valeat had been. 
The first problem was identifying the proferens of the words. As we saw in chapter four, the 
medieval law had strict rules about which party must ‘speak’ which words in a deed. 253 This 
made it relatively easy to identify the party who put forward the words in question. For 
example, since a grantor was responsible for setting out the terms of the grant, they would be 
taken most strongly against him. Thus, in a 1423 case, Sjt Paston explained that a feoffment 
would be taken ‘most strongly against him who enfeoffed me, because it is his own deed.’254 If 
an indenture contained terms spoken by both parties, each term could be taken most strongly 
against its own proferens. In 1469, Choke J observed that an indenture was ‘the deed of both,’ 
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and would therefore ‘be taken most strongly against him who made the deed in that clause 
which belongs to him.’255 
 
The standard explanation for the maxim in this period was that the party who set the terms 
was responsible for them, and it was his own fault if they turned out to his disadvantage. This 
was closely connected to the principle that a party would not generally be excused if his 
obligation turned out to be impossible to perform.256 In a 1462 case, for example, Sjt Billing 
argued that 
 
if I am obliged to L. on condition… that I enfeoff one R. and R. does not want to 
take the estate, I forfeit the obligation, because it is my folly thus to be bound: so 
there I am bound to perform the condition at my own peril. And my deed will be 
taken the most strongly against me.257 
 
Similarly, in a 1492 case, Sjt Rede argued that the condition of a bond must be strictly 
performed, because ‘it was his folly that he wanted to be thus bound, and also the deed of a 
man is taken the most strongly against him who made the deed.’258 This rationale was also 
applied to cases involving pleadings: if a party pleaded incorrectly, ‘it was his deed and his 
folly, and will be most strongly against him.’259 
 
As we have seen, however, fifteenth-century lawyers were debating whether a term in an 
indenture, although spoken by one party, was in fact made by the agreement of both of the 
parties.260 If so, this would make it much more difficult to explain the contra proferentem rule. In 
one 1480 case, for example, Sjt Townshend argued that a bond must be ‘interpreted more 
beneficially for the grantee.’ Bryan CJ responded, ‘You speak well of a deed not indented, but 
when it is indented, there it is the deed of both of them, by my understanding, so it cannot be 
taken more beneficially to one than to the other.’261 
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This issue continued to trouble the courts throughout the sixteenth century. As we saw in 
chapter four, lawyers were increasingly of the view that both parties’ intentions were relevant 
to the interpretation of any deed, no matter who had technically spoken its terms.262 Because 
they continued to distinguish between the speakers of certain terms, it was still possible to 
identify the proferens. Thus, sixteenth-century lawyers explained that a grant was to be ‘taken 
most strongly against the grantor,’263 and ‘most beneficially for them to whom the grant or gift 
was made.’264 Reservations ‘shall always be taken most strongly against the reservors, because 
it is their words and act,’265 while a release of actions ‘shall be most beneficially for him to 
whom the release is made, and most strongly against him who makes it.’266 However, if the 
term had been made by the agreement of both parties, it was difficult to explain why it should 
matter who had spoken it. 
 
Some lawyers took Bryan CJ’s approach, and simply denied that the contra proferentem rule 
could apply to indentures at all. Sjt Stanford and Walsh took this tack in Browning v Beston. In a 
deed poll, they explained, ‘the words shall be taken most strongly against the grantor, and 
most available to the grantee.’ However, ‘it is not so in a deed indented, because the law 
makes each party privy to the speech of the other.’267 Other lawyers later repeated this 
argument. For example, in Saunders v Stanfourde, Egerton observed that an 
 
indenture contains the mutual agreement of both the parties, and the words in 
the indenture are the words of each party, and therefore will not be construed 
more to the advantage of the one than of the other, but equally according to the 
meaning of the parties.268  
 
If this were the case, the traditional rationale for the rule need not be disturbed. Indeed, this 
rationale was still relied upon when applying the maxim to pleadings. In Stradling v Morgan 
(1560), for example, when applying the rule to the plaintiff’s declaration, the Barons of the 
Exchequer observed that it was ‘reasonable to take it in that sense which makes against [the 																																																								
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263 Throckmerton v Tracy (n 77) 152. 
264 Reniger v Fogossa (1550) Plow 1, 10. 
265 Hill v Grange (n 13) 171. 
266 Justice Windham’s Case (n 22) 7b. 
267 Browning v Beston (n 10) 134. 
268 Saunders & Starkey v Stanfourde (n 23) f72v. See also Scovell and Cavels Case (1588) 1 Leo 317, 318; 
William Sheppard, An Epitome of All the Common & Statute Laws of This Nation, Now in Force (Lee, Pakeman 
et al 1656) 398–9. 
184 
plaintiff], for if his complaint lies in the other point it is his folly that he did not show it 
precisely.’269 Sjt Saunders, discussing pleadings in Colthirst v Bejushin, argued that ‘the law 
interprets the words and actions of every man most strongly against himself.’ He drew an 
analogy to the interpretation of deeds: if a lessee covenanted to keep the land in good repair, 
he would be liable for damage caused by an act of God, ‘for his special agreement alters the 
law, and makes his words to be taken most strongly against himself.’ 270  The courts’ 
uncompromising attitude towards foolish promisors had not relaxed. They distinguished 
between obligations created by law, from which one might be excused, and those created by 
the parties themselves, which would be interpreted strictly.271 Thus, in Mallory v Payne (1601), 
Mallory warned that, while a general reservation of rent would be interpreted broadly by the 
courts, ‘when a man takes it on himself to limit the precise form of the reservation, there the 
law makes a strict construction of his words, so that he will not have more than he reserves.’272 
Similarly, illness might excuse a person from performing an obligation imposed by the law, 
but not an obligation created by ‘his own act.’273 
 
However, this attitude was no longer closely linked to the contra proferentem rule in the same way 
that it had been in the fifteenth century. After all, it did not make much sense when the 
obligation was not created by the obligor alone, but by the agreement of both parties. The 
basis of Stanford and Walsh’s and Egerton’s critiques was that the maxim was inconsistent 
with the courts’ new focus on the intentions of both the parties. Stanford and Walsh, for 
example, argued that an indenture should not be taken contra proferentem but ‘in such manner 
as the intent of the parties shall be supposed to be.’274 Similarly, Egerton rejected the contra 
proferentem rule and argued that an indenture should instead be construed ‘equally according to 
the meaning of the parties.’275 Although ‘the maxim is that a deed will be taken more strongly 
against him’ who made the deed, the cases showed that the law often qualified the words of a 
deed in accordance with ‘the true intent and plain meaning of the parties.’276  
 
Other lawyers also noticed this problem with the maxim, and proposed alternative 
explanations. For example, one of the participants in Hake’s Dialogue on Equity volunteered 																																																								
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that he had ‘heard it often said and partly have read it myself that the grant of every common 
person is to be expounded most strongly against himself.’277 Hake, however, had informed 
them that deeds were to be ‘taken and construed according to the intent of the parties.’278 
Were these two rules not inconsistent? Not at all, Hake replied: a grant was to be construed 
‘altogether for the benefit of the grantee,’279 but only if ‘the intent of the parties be found not 
to the contrary thereunto.’280 For example, ‘if I grant unto you common throughout all my 
manor, yet you shall not thereby put your cattle into my garden.’281 This was the same 
example that Egerton had used in Saunders v Stanfourde to argue that the maxim should not 
apply at all.282 However, Hake’s explanation was that, although grants ‘must be expounded 
most for the benefit of grantees,’ the grantees were ‘not so to be favoured, as that the grant 
thereby should be expounded contrary to reason, which no doubt it should be if it were 
construed against the intent of the parties.’283 Hake therefore sought to integrate the maxim 
into an approach to interpretation that was based on reason and the intentions of the parties. 
However, he did not really explain why the contra proferentem rule should be applied at all. He 
seems to have viewed reason as something that could qualify, rather than justify, the use of the 
maxim. 
 
Other lawyers attempted to find a solution, re-conceptualising the rule as a means of 
identifying the parties’ reasonable intentions. This was not an entirely new idea. In 1406, for 
example, Thirning CJ had argued that an ambiguous deed should be taken ‘for the greater 
advantage of him to whom the deed was made, and to any meaning that may be 
understood… so that the grant may be performed, and the will of the donor observed.’284 This 
was, however, an isolated claim, and may only have been prompted by the fact that the grant 
in question was of an entail.285 Sixteenth-century lawyers, on the other hand, were keen to 
integrate contra proferentem into their general approach to the interpretation of deeds. In 
Throckmerton v Tracy, for example, one of Stanford J’s three rules for the construction of deeds 
																																																								




280 ibid 55. 
281 ibid. 
282 Saunders & Starkey v Stanfourde (n 23) f73v. See (1430) YB Mich 9 Hen 6 pl 8, f35b-36a, f36a. 
283 Hake (n 277) 54. 
284 (1406) YB Trin 7 Hen IV pl 9, f16b-17a, f16b. 
285 See 3.2.4. above. 
186 
was that ‘they shall be taken most beneficially for the party to whom they are made.’286 He 
evidently thought that this was perfectly compatible with the principles that ‘a deed shall 
never be void, where the words may be applied to any intent to make it good’ and that ‘the 
words shall be construed according to the intent of the parties,’ although he did not explain 
exactly how he thought his three rules would interact.287 Coke also emphasised that the 
maxim could serve the intentions of the parties. In Justice Windham’s Case, he explained that ‘a 
grant shall be taken more strong against the grantor, and shall take effect as near as may be 
according to the intent of the parties.’288 After all, if the parties wished the grant to be made, it 
was reasonable to assume that they intended the grantee to benefit by it.  
 
Lawyers who argued in this way were facing something of an uphill battle. As we have seen, 
lawyers like Stanford, Walsh and Egerton thought that the maxim was incompatible with an 
approach to interpretation that was based on the parties’ intentions. When speaking of wills, 
lawyers also seemed to take it for granted that an interpretation contra proferentem could be 
contrasted with an interpretation according to the intentions of the writer. In the serjeants’ 
case of 1567, for example, Sjt Lovelace argued that ‘in all things in testaments the intent of 
the devisor is most favourably to be construed. But in deeds the intent will be most strongly 
taken against the feoffor.’289 In Ewer v Heydon, the question was whether a devise of all the 
testator’s lands would pass his house to the devisee. The court held that a grant of ‘all his 
lands’ would pass a house, because ‘the deed will be most strongly taken against him who 
made it.’290 However, ‘in wills it is otherwise, for there they will be most reasonably taken and 
according to the intent of the devisor.’291 
 
The problem was that the contra proferentem rule required the interests of the two parties to be 
set against each other. As Hake had pointed out, it was somewhat strange to claim that a deed 
was being interpreted according to the intentions of both parties, and also more favourably to 
one of the parties than the other. Why, then, did lawyers think that the contra proferentem rule 
could be compatible with construction according to the intentions of the parties? The answer 
is that, as we have seen, there was a strong presumption that the parties would have intended 
what was reasonable. 292  Like other interpretive maxims, the contra proferentem rule was 																																																								
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grounded on reason. It was associated with other precepts of reason: we have seen, for 
example, that Stanford J linked it to the maxim ut res magis valeat. In Green v Edward (1590), 
Anderson CJ also argued that ‘deeds shall be taken most beneficially for the grantee, and most 
strongly against the grantor, especially ut res magis valeat quam pereat.’293 Coke linked the 
two maxims in Butt’s Case, explaining that a ‘grant shall be taken more strong against the 
grantor, and shall not be void, when by any construction it may be made good.’294 Bacon 
wrote that the contra proferentem rule could be used to ensure that grants would be read so as to 
take effect.295 
 
Like ut res magis valeat, then, the contra proferentem rule could be used to establish what the parties 
must reasonably have intended. In Dashper v Dashper (1592), for example, Edward Pomerey 
granted the reversion of certain ‘land’ to John Dashper. It was objected that ‘land’ was not a 
sufficient word to pass the reversion of a messuage, meadow and pasture.296 However, 
Dashper successfully argued that it could not have been the grantor’s intention to make ‘a 
grant that was utterly void, and therefore it may not reasonably be taken that the grantor 
intended a void and idle thing or act; for which reason the law must expound this grant most 
beneficially for the grantee.’297 In this case, however, ut res magis valeat seems to have been the 
principle doing most of the justificatory heavy lifting. The court was largely concerned that 
the grant not be void, and it was only coincidental that a construction contra proferentem would 
avoid this result. 
 
Indeed, there were other cases in which the two maxims were opposed to each other. In 
Mallorye v Payne, for example, the Abbot had reserved rent to himself ‘or’ his successors. If the 
reservation were read contra proferentem, the rent would determine on the Abbot’s death.298 
Reading the reservation ut res magis valeat, to preserve the rent, would mean taking it in favour 
of the Abbot.299 It was the latter construction that the court ultimately chose.300 Bacon also 
advised that the contra proferentem rule would not be relied upon when it conflicted with other 
maxims of interpretation. It was, he explained, ‘the last to be resorted to, and is never to be 
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relied upon but where all other rules of exposition of words fail.’301 The courts would prefer to 
apply ‘other rules which are of more equity and humanity,’302 such as ‘ut res magis valeat, quam 
pereat.’303  
 
Lawyers faced the same problem when associating the maxim with reason in general. 
Sometimes, a construction contra proferentem would be a reasonable one, but in many cases it 
would not. We have seen, for example, that Hake viewed reason as a principle that qualified 
the application of the maxim. Similarly, in Throckmerton, Saunders J held that ‘deeds ought to 
have a reasonable exposition, which shall be without wrong to the grantor, and with the 
greatest advantage to the grantee.’304 His examples were similar to those given by Hake and 
Egerton: for example, ‘if one grants to another common in his land for all his cattle, yet he 
shall not have common for goats or geese, which are things hurtful to the land.’305 He was 
unwilling to fully endorse the contra proferentem rule, concluding rather that ‘there is a kind of 
equity in grants, so that they shall not be taken unreasonably against the grantor, and yet shall 
with reason be extended most liberally for the grantee.’306 
 
The courts would not apply the contra proferentem rule where it conflicted with what they 
regarded as a reasonable construction of a deed. In Hill v Grange, for example, the plaintiff 
relied on the rule to claim that no rent had been reserved for the first six months of his lease. 
‘Reservations,’ he explained, ‘shall always be taken most strongly against the reservors, 
because it is their words and act, and therefore they shall not be extended beyond the 
words.’307 Thus, a reservation of rent to be paid at the Feasts of the Annunciation and St 
Michael could not be ‘extended’ to require a first payment at Michaelmas. As we have seen, 
however, the court found that there was ‘no sort of reason’ in this construction, since the 
lessee would have the land for six months rent-free.308 Exactly the same result was reached in 
Humfrey Lofield’s Case. The defendant argued that ‘every reservation and exception shall be 
taken strictè against the lessor,’309 but the court held that ‘a reservation shall be expounded 
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according to the reasonable intention of the parties.’310 In this case, the contra proferentem rule 
did not help to identify the parties’ reasonable intentions, and so was not used by the court. 
 
Lawyers also encountered difficulties when applying the rule to conditioned bonds. These 
were a hugely popular means of contracting in the medieval period.311 In the standard form of 
a bond, the obligor would confess his obligation in the first person.312 The condition formed a 
separate part of the instrument, and was often written on the back.313 It seems to have been 
generally accepted that the obligor was the maker of the bond, and that the contra proferentem 
rule required the condition to be interpreted most strongly against him.314 In a number of 
cases, however, lawyers argued for precisely the opposite result. Because the condition was 
made for the benefit of the obligor, to save him from paying the penalty sum, they contended 
that it ought to be taken most beneficially for him.315 This line of argument persisted 
throughout the sixteenth century. In Laughter’s Case (1595), for example, the court reached the 
opposite result to that mandated by contra proferentem. ‘The condition is made for the benefit of 
the obligor,’ they explained, ‘and shall be taken beneficially for him.’316 Similarly, in Hawford v 
Andros (1599), Dodderidge argued that the condition of a bond is made ‘for the benefit of the 
obligor, and therefore, by the assent of the parties, may be enlarged for the benefit of him for 
whose benefit it was made.’317 Yet in Lamb’s Case (1599), it was held that, since ‘the condition 
is for the benefit of the obligor, and the performance thereof shall save his bond, he hath 
taken upon him to perform it at his peril.’318 He would therefore be strictly obliged to perform 
the condition. There does not, then, seem to have been a consistent line on the construction of 
conditioned bonds. Perhaps this was because, in these cases, the contra proferentem rule 
conflicted with what the courts thought the parties would reasonably have intended the 
condition to mean. 																																																								
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Other lawyers of the time took a third approach to the contra proferentem rule. They accepted 
that it did apply to indentures, but maintained that its function was not to identify the 
reasonable intentions of the parties. Bacon, for example, explained that the rule made  
 
an end of many questions and doubts about construction of words: for if the 
labour were only to pick out the intention of the parties, every judge would have 
a several sense, whereas this rule doth give them a sway to take the law more 
certainly one way.319 
 
For Bacon, then, the rule functioned as a tiebreaker. When it was impossible to identify the 
parties’ intentions, the maxim enabled the judges to bypass fruitless speculation and guided 
them to the best construction of the deed. Choosing to construe against, rather than in favour 
of, the proferens was a policy choice. Firstly, it would make ‘men watchful in their own 
business,’ and, secondly, it would produce ‘quiet and certainty’ by favouring the possession of 
the grantee.320 In Moyes v Grigg (1600), Sjt Hele connected the contra proferentem rule to the 
principle that ‘odious’ conditions would be taken strictly. He successfully argued that a 
condition in a lease was ‘to be taken strictly for the lessor and most favourably for the 
advantage of the lessee’ because it was ‘penal,’ and threatened to defeat the lessee’s estate.321 
As we have seen, the rule about destructive conditions was explicitly a rule of policy, based on 
the law’s reluctance to destroy estates.322 
 
In Davenport’s Case (1610), the rule was reframed as a means of preventing a grantor from 
exploiting the grantee. The Earl of Huntingdon had granted Robert Bradshaw the next 
avoidance of a rectory, if it occurred during the Earl’s 15 year term. The rectory fell vacant 
within the 15 years, but not until after the Earl had died and the rectory had passed to the 
reversioner. It was held that Bradshaw would have the avoidance, even though the Earl’s term 
was over. Otherwise, the court explained, ‘the grantor himself would derogate from his own 
grant, and would make it void at his pleasure.’ This would be ‘against the rule of law… that 
the grant of every one shall be taken most strongly against himself.’323 If the grant was not 
construed contra proferentem, a grantor would be able to exploit an ambiguous deed for his own 
advantage, leaving the grantee with nothing. 																																																								
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The contra proferentem rule, then, presented something of a puzzle for sixteenth-century lawyers. 
It had been bequeathed to them by the medieval law, and therefore came with the weight of 
many precedents, as well as the intellectual authority of the civil law. However, they found it 
difficult to explain. It did not fit comfortably into their general approach to interpretation, 
which was based on the intentions of both parties and on reason. Some lawyers tried to 
establish it as a guide to the reasonable intentions of the parties, like ut res magis valeat. 
However, in reality, it was more or less arbitrary whether the maxim pointed to the same 
result as the parties’ reasonable intentions or not. If it did, it was effectively superfluous. If it 
did not, it was overruled. Others thought that it could not intelligibly be applied to indentures 
at all, or that it was simply an anomalous rule of policy. No lawyer in our period managed to 
provide a convincing explanation for the rule, which was better-suited to a system with a more 
formalistic approach to contracting. 
 
Lawyers were clear, however, that the rule did not apply to wills. It has already been 
mentioned that this was seen as a key contrast between the interpretation of deeds and wills, 
although its rationale was rarely explicitly discussed.324 Bacon wrote that the rule had ‘no 
place at all… in devises and wills upon several reasons,’ but did not clarify what those reasons 
were.325 The clearest explanation was given by Sjt Lovelace in the serjeants’ case of 1567. He 
observed that ‘in deeds the intent will be taken most strongly against the feoffor, because it is 
made on consideration and deliberation,’ while a will was made ‘by the necessity of death.’326 
This links back to the medieval view of the maxim. A deed was made at the party’s own peril, 
and so he ought to be careful about his words, while a testator was in extremis, and deserved 
favourable treatment by the court.327 
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We have seen, then, that reason played a significant role in the interpretation of documents 
throughout our period. Reason was not only a means of identifying the parties’ intentions. 
Identifying a reasonable construction was also a desideratum in and of itself, especially in 
relation to deeds. We have also seen how the use of reason changed. In the mid-sixteenth 
century, lawyers were likely to appeal to a broad concept of reason, which everyone could 
access through their own reasoning processes. However, by the end of the century, lawyers’ 
arguments were more likely to be based on authorities that demonstrated the reason of the 
common law. Reason was also more likely to be distilled into specific maxims of 
interpretation, which provided useful guidance for lawyers in future cases.  
 
We have also examined two influential maxims of interpretation, ut res magis valeat quam pereat 
and the contra proferentem rule. Both were originally derived from the ius commune, and had been 
part of the common law since the medieval period. For lawyers of the sixteenth century, they 
presented different challenges. It was easy to argue that the basis of ut res magis valeat was the 
intentions of the parties, and that the maxim aligned with a reasonable construction of the 
document. For this reason, it was rarely rejected in cases involving deeds. However, its 
application to wills was a little more uncertain. Lawyers were not only reluctant to make 
presumptions about a testator’s intention that extended beyond his words, but also to place 
much weight on his words as evidence of his intention. To compensate for this uncertainty, 
they often multiplied authorities to establish the relevance of the rule. 
 
The contra proferentem rule was much more difficult to explain. As many lawyers pointed out, it 
did not necessarily help to identify either the parties’ intentions or a reasonable construction. 
It clearly did not apply to wills. Although frequently cited, it did not play much substantive 
role in the construction of deeds either. It did not fit well with lawyers’ conception of 
contracting, which was based on the agreement of both of the parties. When it was not 
overruled by conflicting principles of interpretation, it was simply used to support them, and 
contributed little to the argument. Yet it carried sufficient authority that lawyers continued to 
cite it regardless. 
 
Coke’s work both exemplified and influenced the developments in this period. Coke was not 
the only contemporary lawyer who emphasised the use of authority and maxims when 
interpreting documents. However, the shift in approach we have identified can be seen most 
clearly in Coke’s writings. He consistently presented the law of interpretation in a new way. 
He also provided intellectual support for this new approach by openly discussing his 
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conception of the law’s reason. In the next chapter, we will explore the context in which 
interpretation was changing, and identify some developments that may have been influencing 
lawyers’ new attitudes to legal documents. 
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In the preceding chapters, we have seen how lawyers’ attitudes to the interpretation of deeds 
and wills changed throughout our period. They were increasingly likely to prioritise the 
proper signification of the words of the document over the writer’s intentions. They were also 
more inclined to frame their identification of the document’s meaning as the product of 
‘artificial’, rather than ‘natural’, reason, based on the authority of cases and the systematic 
application of specific rules and maxims. In this chapter, we will examine some of the 
background to these changes.  
 
Firstly, lawyers’ understanding of interpretation itself was evolving. In the mid-sixteenth 
century, the identification of the writer’s intention had been presented as the sum total of 
interpretation. The court’s role was to identify the extant meaning of the document, not to 
construct or contribute to it. By the early seventeenth century, however, it was recognised that 
the law was also injecting its own values into the interpretive process. Lawyers became more 
aware of the ways in which they could mould meaning through their interpretive choices, and 
debated the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches. They were also 
increasingly concerned that a document might be misinterpreted by its, potentially inexpert, 
reader. 
 
Secondly, we will see that these changes took place in a broader context of anxiety about the 
law, legal documents, and litigation. Interpretation could go wrong if either the writer or the 
reader made a mistake. Lawyers lamented that drafters were either so incompetent that they 
drew up nonsensical documents, or so cunning that they would subvert established rules with 
novel forms of conveyance. Laymen, suspicious of legal jargon, feared that they were being 
taken for a ride. Both criticised the greedy lawyers who sought to undermine conveyances 
with quibbles or invented meanings. The result, they feared, would be uncertainty, as the 
estates that depended on those documents were threatened. 
 
As usual, we will find Coke at the forefront of these developments, complaining loudly about 
societal ills and proposing his own solutions. Like other lawyers of the time, he maintained 
that these problems were not caused by the law itself, but by those who had failed to properly 
understand it. In interpretation cases, as in the law generally, his proposed remedy was a 
renewed focus on the law’s reason, and on the cases and maxims from which it could be 
extracted. 
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7.2. Interpretation and legal values 
 
In the previous chapter, we saw that there were competing conceptions of interpretation in 
our period. For Plowden, reason and the writer’s intention were closely bound together. If a 
deed was to be interpreted reasonably, or contra proferentem, or so as to save its effect, it was 
because this is what the parties would have intended. For Coke, however, principles of 
interpretation were established by the law. They did not necessarily reflect the writer’s 
intention, but were emanations of the common law’s reason. When discussing the maxim ut 
res magis valeat quam pereat, for example, Plowden explained that ‘the reasonable construction of 
the law… inclines the words to the intention of the parties.’1 The courts would make the deed 
effective because reason told them that this was what the parties had intended by their words. 
In contrast, Coke’s explanation for the principle was based on the reason of the law. He 
explained that ‘the law shall make such a construction as the gift by possibility may take 
effect.’2 It was reasonable to interpret deeds in such a way as to make them effective, and 
therefore this was the construction that the law had determined to make.3 The parties’ 
intentions faded into the background. Instead, Coke emphasised that there were good policy 
reasons for the rule, since it ensured that settled estates would not be disrupted.4 
 
For Plowden, to construe a document was simply to declare its meaning according to the 
intentions of its writers. In Partridge v Strange (1553), for example, the judges agreed that it was 
not permissible to extend the ambit of penal statutes by equity.5 However, ‘the words of them 
may be construed beneficially according to the intent of the makers thereof.’6 To construe the 
words according to the legislator’s intention was not to add anything to their meaning, but 
simply to expound it. As we have seen, for Plowden, the parties’ meaning was immanent in 
the words they had used.7 The words were the ‘shell,’ and the ‘sense’ of the words was ‘the 
fruit and profit’ that lay within.8 When construing a document, the courts were only drawing 
out a meaning that was there all along. 																																																								
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2 Sir Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, or, A Commentary upon Littleton (The 
Societie of Stationers 1628) 183v. 
3 ibid. 
4 The Reports of Sir Edward Coke, vol V (Joseph Butterworth and Son 1826) 10 Co Rep xix. 
5 Partridge v Strange & Croker (1553) Plow 77, 86; see Samuel Thorne (ed), A Discourse upon the Exposicion & 
Understandinge of Statutes (Huntington Library 1942) 51. 
6 Partridge v Strange & Croker (n 5) 86. 
7 See 3.2.1. above. 
8 Eyston v Studd (1574) Plow 459, 465. 
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For Coke, however, there was a distinction between the intended meaning of a document and 
the construction that would be given to it by the common law. In Nokes’s Case (1599), for 
example, he explained that ‘the best construction of deeds’ was one that was ‘quoad fieri possit 
[as far as possible] according to the true intent and meaning of the parties.’9 It was therefore 
evidently possible to construe a deed in a way that did not reflect the parties’ ‘true intent and 
meaning.’ Similarly, in Knight’s Case (1588), Coke advised that ‘the true intent of the parties’ 
was to be observed, but only when it agreed with ‘the rule and reason of the law.’10 The 
judges’ role was not only to identify the intended meaning of the deed, but also to ensure that 
their construction accorded with the reason of the law. Later in the same case, the court noted 
that grants of the King were to be interpreted ‘so that no prejudice shall accrue to him by 
construction or implication on his grant more than he truly intended by it.’ It was possible, 
however, to construe the grant of a subject in a way that its writer had not intended.11 For 
Coke, to construe a document was to give it a meaning that had not necessarily been given to 
it by its writer. 
 
Egerton does not seem to have had a consistent view on the relationship between the 
document’s intended meaning and its legal construction. In Saunders v Stanfourde, for example, 
he identified ‘the meaning of the parties’ with the ‘exposition’ of the deed, both of which could 
be opposed to ‘the literal sense’ of the words.12 A ‘reasonable construction and meaning,’ he 
argued, was ‘not repugnant to the words, but may aptly and properly stand with the proper 
nature and right signification of them.’13 Here, Egerton seemed to treat ‘meaning’ and 
‘construction’ as synonymous. Later in the same case, however, he discussed the 
interpretation of the Statute of Fines, dividing his analysis into four sections: ‘letter,’ ‘mischief,’ 
‘meaning’ and ‘construction.’14 Having considered the words of the statute and the reason for 
which it was made, he concluded that the two together determined its intended meaning: if 
the present case was within both the letter and the mischief of the statute, ‘how can it be 
imagined otherwise than that the meaning of the Parliament was to reach it also?’15 However, 
establishing this meaning was insufficient: he then listed eleven ‘reasons to maintain this 
																																																								
9 Nokes’s Case (1599) 4 Co Rep 80b, 81a. 
10 Knight’s Case (1588) 5 Co Rep 54b, 55a. 
11 ibid 56a. 
12 Saunders & Starkey v Stanfourde (undated) Hunt MS El 482 f70, f76v. 
13 ibid f74v. 
14 ibid f77v. 
15 ibid f78. 
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construction,’ noting cases previously decided on relevant points. 16  Like Coke, he was 
concerned to demonstrate that his ‘construction’ did not only reflect the document’s intended 
meaning, but also accorded with the rules of law.17 
 
Lawyers were beginning to accept that the law of interpretation was not simply a channel for 
the transmission of the writer’s intention, but also involved active choices on the part of the 
reader. However, this raised an unsettling possibility: that the interpretive process might go 
wrong. Plowden had presented interpretation as a seamless process of communication 
between writer and reader. There was little doubt that the meaning identified by the court 
from the written document was the meaning that its writer had intended to convey. For 
example, when discussing the interpretation of statutes, Plowden assumed that the reader 
could ‘easily find out’ what the legislator would have intended, simply by ‘imagining’ what he 
would have responded if asked.18  
 
Coke, in contrast, worried that speculating about Parliament’s intentions could lead to an 
incorrect interpretation. In Edrich’s Case (1603), he recorded the court’s warning that   
 
they ought not to make any construction against the express letter of the statute; 
for nothing can so express the meaning of the makers of the Act, as their own 
direct words, for index animi sermo [speech is an indication of thought]. And it 
would be dangerous to give scope to make a construction in any case against the 
express words, when the meaning of the makers doth not appear to the 
contrary.19 
 
For Coke, it was ‘dangerous’ to look for the writer’s intentions if they had not been clearly 
expressed. In Butt’s Case (1600), he also warned that ‘quoties in verbis nulla est ambiguitas, ibi nulla 
expositio contra verba expressa fienda est’ [where there is no ambiguity in the words, then no 
exposition contrary to the express words is to be made].20 Here, Coke seemed to be nodding 
to a civilian maxim, ‘cum in verbis nulla ambiguitas est, non debet admitti voluntatis quaestio’ [where 
																																																								
16 ibid f78v. 
17 In another case, Egerton distinguished between the words of the statute, the intent of the statute, and 
the way in which its ‘meaning will be construed’: Lepur v Woolf (undated) Hunt MS El 482 f157, f158v–
f160. 
18 Eyston v Studd (n 8) 467. 
19 Edrich’s Case (1603) 5 Co Rep 118a, 118b. 
20 Butt’s Case (1600) 7 Co Rep 23a, 24a. See also Leonard Lovies’s Case (1613) 10 Co Rep 78a, 87a. 
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there is no ambiguity in the words, no question as to the intention should be admitted].21 
Coke’s focus here, however, was not on the contrast between words and intention. He had 
previously explained that ‘the law will not make an exposition against the express words and 
intent of the parties, when it may stand with the rule of law.’22 His concern now was that the 
legal construction of the document must not diverge too far from its intended meaning, unless 
the rules of the law demanded it. He warned that departing from the document’s words and 
intention could be a dangerous course, fearing that ‘the law, by construction against the words 
and intention of the parties, would do an injury.’23 
 
Coke was painfully aware of the possibility that a legal document might be misinterpreted. In 
the prefaces to his reports, he fretted that those unfamiliar with the common law might 
misunderstand legal texts.24 ‘The fair outsides of enamelled words and sentences,’ he warned, 
could ‘bedazzle the eye of the reader’s mind’ so that they failed to ‘pierce into the inside of the 
matter.’25 If readers did not have a proper apprehension of the law’s reason, they would be 
unable to correctly interpret legal writing.  
 
Richard Ross has shown that fears about the misinterpretation of legal texts were 
commonplace in the late sixteenth century. Thanks to the printing of more, and more 
accessible, works of law, legal knowledge was newly available to laymen.26 Some lawyers were 
alarmed that laymen would now be able to read law books without a proper understanding of 
the law’s interpretive conventions.27 In the early sixteenth century, the audience for law books 
was largely limited to the small world of the legal profession.28 Texts were written in Law 
French and terms of art abounded, making legal works difficult to understand for those 
without legal training.29 Books were regarded only as a means of preserving knowledge held 
primarily in the profession’s collective memory.30 																																																								
21 D.32.25.1. 
22 Butt’s Case (n 20) 24a. 
23 ibid. 
24 The Reports of Sir Edward Coke (n 4) 10 Co Rep xxx. 
25 The Reports of Sir Edward Coke, vol II (Joseph Butterworth and Son 1826) 3 Co Rep xlii. 
26 Richard J Ross, ‘The Commoning of the Common Law: The Renaissance Debate over Printing 
English Law, 1520-1640’ (1998) 146 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 323, 391–402. 
27 ibid 326. 
28 ibid 391. 
29 ibid 392. 
30 Richard J Ross, ‘The Memorial Culture of Early Modern English Lawyers: Memory as Keyword, 
Shelter, and Identity, 1560-1640’ (1998) 10 Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 229, 276–9. 
199 
 
By the end of the century, however, legal writing had become available to a much wider 
audience, comprising not only the expanded lower branch of the profession, but also those 
with no legal training at all.31 Writers no longer assumed that their readers would understand 
the profession’s language, but provided explanations of legal institutions, practices and 
terminology.32 Fulbecke imagined his works being read by a ‘poor country yeoman’ who 
wanted to keep up with his neighbours.33 These neighbours were ‘so full of law points,’ he 
lamented, ‘that when they sweat, it is nothing but law; when they breathe, it is nothing but 
law.’34 Littleton’s Tenures was their ‘breakfast,’ ‘dinner’ and ‘supper,’ and ‘every plough-swain’ 
carried ‘the book of the grounds of the law’ with him.35 Aiming to attract a wider audience, 
many writers also began to publish in English. Coke explained that his Commentary upon Littleton 
was written in English so that ‘any of the nobility, or gentry of this realm, or of any other 
estate, or profession whatsoever’ would be able to understand it.36 Fulbecke’s yeoman added 
that he had bought the book ‘because it was in English,’ admitting that he had been 
disconcerted to find ‘a vengeance deal of Latin in it’ and had been obliged to invest in a 
dictionary.37  
 
Lawyers feared that these new, inexpert readers would misunderstand the law, since they 
lacked a broader understanding of the legal profession’s interpretive conventions. Coke, for 
example, explained that law books were often written in French ‘lest the unlearned by bare 
reading without right understanding might suck out errors, and, trusting to their conceit, 
might endamage themselves.’38 Lawyers drew analogies to the misinterpretations of scripture 
which, they claimed, had resulted from the printing and translation of the Bible.39 Ross 
observes that the same intellectual atmosphere pervaded debates over religion and law, and, 
although lawyers of the time rarely commented on the similarities between the two,40 rhetoric 																																																								
31 Ross (n 26) 416. 
32 ibid 392–3. 
33 William Fulbecke, The Second Part of the Parallele, or Conference of the Civill Law, the Canon Law, and the 
Common Law of This Realme of England (Thomas Wight 1602) B2. 
34 ibid. 
35 ibid. 
36 Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, or, A Commentary upon Littleton (n 2) preface 
(unpaginated). 
37 Fulbecke (n 33) B3. 
38 The Reports of Sir Edward Coke (n 25) 3 Co Rep xl. 
39 Ross (n 26) 405. 
40 ibid 385. 
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often ‘migrated from religious to legal polemic.’41 In particular, there were clear parallels 
between fears about Biblical hermeneutics and legal interpretation. Richard Bancroft, the 
Archbishop of Canterbury, complained that ‘nowadays every man, though he have not read 
more than the first leaf of Littleton, is able to teach the best doctor of divinity,’ just as ‘every 
ignorant ass interprets scriptures according to his hot humours.’42 The theologian Richard 
Hooker cited a Digest passage to decry those who resiled from a ‘literal interpretation’ of the 
Bible that had ‘the general consent of antiquity.’43 As well as writing on the perils of legal 
interpretation, Coke also warned his readers against imported Catholic books. They were, he 
explained, ‘like to apothecaries’ boxes… whose titles promise remedies, but the boxes 
themselves contain poison.’44  
 
The difficulties of interpretation, then, were well-recognised in late-sixteenth-century 
England. Lawyers were aware that readers could misinterpret legal texts if they came to them 
without a deep understanding of the law’s reason. It seems likely that this awareness 
influenced debates about the interpretation of other kinds of legal document. As we have seen, 
they now recognised that construing an instrument was not just a passive exercise in receiving 
the writer’s meaning. It also involved active choices to impose certain values on the text, 
ensuring that it conformed with the reason and rules of the common law. This, in turn, raised 
the spectre of an incorrect construction. Interpretation could go wrong when reader and 
writer were not both sufficiently attuned to the law’s reason, and were not working within the 
same interpretive conventions. Lawyers could no longer rest secure in the knowledge that the 
writer’s intended meaning was the one that his reader would apprehend.  
 
7.3. Lawyers, litigation and legal change 
 
Lawyers, then, were growing anxious about the possibility of misinterpreting a legal 
document. They were also concerned that the law of interpretation was being hijacked by 
incompetents and scoundrels. For Coke, it was not only the inexpert reader who was to blame 
for the difficulties of legal interpretation. It was also the writer who had disguised his meaning 
with ‘affected words’ and ‘the strong scent of great swelling phrases.’45 After all, if the words of 																																																								
41 ibid 343. 
42 Cited in ibid 404. 
43 Richard Hooker, Of the Lawes of Ecclesiasticall Politie (John Windet 1593) 130. The same passage was 
cited by Coke to make a similar point in the context of law: Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws 
of England, or, A Commentary upon Littleton (n 2) 229v. 
44 The Reports of Sir Edward Coke, vol IV (Joseph Butterworth and Son 1826) 7 Co Rep vi. 
45 The Reports of Sir Edward Coke (n 25) 3 Co Rep xlii. 
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the document were clear, its meaning would be successfully conveyed and there would be no 
need to venture into the dangerous mire of construction. 
 
West, too, blamed drafters for problems with the interpretation of wills. He warned that it was 
‘much better’ when wills were ‘perspicuous of themselves,’ rather than ‘enlightened by the 
exposition and allowance of others.’46 A badly-drafted will could ‘deceiv[e]… even men of 
good judgement, insomuch that of one self question they pronounce different opinions.’47 
Where a will suffered from ‘obscurity, ambiguity, and uncertainty,’ it would be ‘doubtful in 
what sense the testator would have his words taken,’ and his intentions must ‘rather by 
probable argument be guessed than rightly gathered.’48 West was clearly prepared for trouble. 
His sample wills were headed with recommendations like ‘a good precedent for a testament’49 
or ‘a very perfect form of a will,’50 descriptions he did not find it necessary to include for other 
kinds of document. He even provided a sample ‘clause of a will’ which contained directions 
on interpretation. If ‘any ambiguity, doubt or question’ arose about the words of the will or 
the testator’s ‘true intent and meaning,’ the executors were to ‘expound, explain and 
interpret’ it ‘according to their wisdoms and good discretions.’51 This suggests that testators 
were well aware of the difficulties that could arise in the interpretation of their wills. 
 
Concerns about bad drafting were not new, but they were on the rise. Prior to 1536, around a 
third of the land in England was held by monasteries,52 which were accordingly responsible 
for the drafting of many conveyances.53 Some had developed their own house styles for 
drafting and included idiosyncratic standard terms in their leases.54 Lawyers in our period 
tended to grumble about this. Broke CJ, for example, complained that  
 
the cloisterers, in making their leases and deeds, had commonly a peculiar form 
thereof, which they would stick to so precisely, that rather than deviate from 
their custom, they would mar the whole, and therefore because they would not 																																																								
46 William West, The First Part of Symboleography (Thomas Wight and Bonham Norton 1598) s 632. 
47 ibid. 
48 ibid. 
49 ibid s 645. 
50 ibid s 642. 
51 ibid s 646. 
52 CW Brooks, Pettyfoggers and Vipers of the Commonwealth: The ‘Lower Branch’ of the Legal Profession in Early 
Modern England (Cambridge University Press 1986) 98. 
53 JM Kaye, Medieval English Conveyances (Cambridge University Press 2009) 255. 
54 ibid 256. 
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direct their form according to the rule of law, but would have the law bend to 
their usage, they have destroyed the force of many deeds.55 
 
Similarly, Bacon criticised terms that had been added to deeds ‘upon ignorance of the law and 
ex consuitudine clericorum [from the custom of priests] upon observing of a common form, and 
not upon purpose or meaning.’56 
 
The courts would sometimes treat the drafter of an instrument with deference. In one 1431 
case, for example, Babington CJ refused to hold part of a patent void, since ‘the most learned 
in the law have made patents in such form before this time, and they were held to be good.’57 
Similarly, in a 1568 case on the validity of a certain condition, Dyer CJ noted that a similar 
condition had been held good in a previous case, and that ‘it was commonly put into leases 
from the Abbot of Westminster.’58 We saw in chapter three, however, that the courts were 
increasingly unwilling to tolerate poor drafting.59 In Morris v Smith (1585), one landowner faced 
doubts about the validity of his deed, despite the fact that prominent lawyers had helped to 
write it. Francis Ascough had bargained and sold ‘his manor of North-Kelsey’ to Ralph Bard. 
Peryam J objected that there was no such manor of North-Kelsey; Ascough had only the 
manor of Castor, part of which was in the town of North-Kelsey.60 Anderson CJ was prepared 
to accept that the conveyance was effective, although ‘the form of it might have been better 
and more consonant to the law.’61 Bard grumbled that ‘his conveyance was made by Wray 
and Manwood, and that their opinion, and the opinion of Carell of the Inner-Temple, was 
clear that the grant was good to convey a manor in North-Kelsey.’62 In other cases, the parties 
met with less success. On one occasion, Anderson CJ observed that ‘it is no reason to expound 
a lease which is void to be good because there are many of them made.’63 He also warned of 
																																																								
55 Throckmerton v Tracy (1555) Plow 145, 163. 
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the ‘mischiefs’ that would follow if ‘knavish and foolish’ terms were upheld.64 In The Earl of 
Pembroke v Sir Henry Berkeley (1596), the justices of the Exchequer Chamber held that ‘the 
ignorance of scriveners’ must ‘be corrected by the law,’65 despite objections that this would be 
‘perilous to the estates of men.’66  
 
The incompetence of scriveners and their ilk was a favourite theme of lawyers in our period. 
Scriveners were professional writers who drew up contracts and conveyances. Only a few had 
legal training, 67  and many were also involved in money-lending and investing. 68  As 
conveyancing became more complex towards the end of the sixteenth century, attorneys, 
members of the lower branch of the legal profession,69 also became more closely involved in 
drafting. 70  Coke, in particular, was scathing about their efforts. ‘Conveyances and 
instruments,’ he complained, were being ‘made by men unlearned,’ and wills ‘by parsons, 
scriveners and such other imperites [unskilled people].’ 71  Elsewhere, he griped that 
‘conveyances and wills’ were ‘drawn and devised by’ those who had ‘scientiam sciolorum quae est 
mixta ignorantia’ [the knowledge of the inexperienced, which is mixed with ignorance].72 The 
result was instruments full of ‘insensible and disagreeing words, sentences, and provisos,’73 and 
‘wills intricately, absurdly and repugnant set down.’74 Coke recommended that lawyers ‘speak 
effectually, plainly, and shortly’ to avoid such confusion.75	
 
Wills were even more likely than other documents to be badly drafted, simply because they 
were generally made in haste on a testator’s deathbed. Treatise-writers clearly recognised this 
problem. West, for example, emphasised that ‘many times’ wills were difficult to understand, 																																																								
64 The Heirs of Sir Roger Lewknor and Ford’s Case (1586) Godbolt 114, 118. 
65 Henry Earl of Pembrook v Sir Henry Barkley (1596) Popham 116, 119. 
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442. 
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and that they were ‘oftentimes’ misconstrued.76 He did not express similar concerns about 
deeds. Coke observed that the ‘obscure and insensible words, and repugnant sentences’ in 
wills were often due to their ‘being made in haste.’77 Since poor drafting was more likely when 
the will was not made ‘in full health and memory,’ Coke advised his readers to make their 
wills ‘by good advice, in your perfect memory,’ and thereby ‘prevent questions and 
controversies’ from arising later.78 Elsewhere, he cautioned that ‘few men pinched with the 
messengers of death have a disposing memory,’ and that it would be ‘some blemish or touch 
to a man well esteemed for his wisdom and discretion all his life, to leave a troubled estate 
behind him… after his death.’79  
 
Brooks has warned that some of this hostility to attorneys and scriveners was simply the 
product of snobbery. The upper branch of the legal profession was largely composed of well-
educated and socially elite men, who liked to see themselves as the heirs of the jurists of 
ancient Rome.80 They duly disdained the lower branch, who carried out ‘mechanical’ work 
and were trained by apprenticeship.81 Even members of the lower branch, however, were 
aware that there was a problem. Phayer, who worked as solicitor to the Council of Wales and 
the Marches, 82  bemoaned the ‘great incommodities and danger’ of badly-drafted legal 
documents.83 ‘Difficult, double and obscure’ documents, he warned, containing ‘as many 
doubts as sentences (a very great occasion of wrangling and strife)’ were being drawn up ‘by 
the negligence or rather ignorance’ of writers ‘presuming upon their own wits’84 and ‘not 
exactly learned in the laws.’85 Meanwhile, West, an attorney,86 blamed ‘notaries, and such as 
write wills,’ for the ‘ambiguities and uncertainty’ of their instruments, and ‘the obscurity in the 
words or sentences thereof.’87 Admittedly, both men were hawking their books of precedents, 																																																								
76 West (n 46) s 632. 
77 Butler and Baker’s Case (1591) 3 Co Rep 25a, 36a. 
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81 ibid 178, 268. 
82 Philip Schwyzer, ‘Phaer [Phayer], Thomas’ [2009] Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
<https://doi.org/10.1093/ref:odnb/22085> accessed 22 March 2019. 
83 Thomas Phayer, A New Boke of Presidentes (Edward Whytchurche 1543) Ai v. Phayer was a ‘lawyer, 
medical doctor and translator of Virgil’s Aeneid’: Brooks, Helmholz and Stein (n 62) 86. 
84 Phayer (n 83) Ai v. 
85 ibid Aii. 
86 Brooks (n 52) 44. 
87 West (n 46) s 632. 
205 
and so they had a vested interest in painting their colleagues as incompetent bunglers. 
However, the success of Symboleography and other formularies showed that there was a ready 
market for such books.88 Legal business was booming, and new entrants to the profession were 
in need of guidance on drafting increasingly complicated conveyances.89 Indeed, Coke also 
criticised those who relied too heavily on precedents without understanding how to adapt 
them to the facts of each case.90 
 
This was, after all, a period of significant upheaval in land law. New forms of conveyance 
were rapidly developing through a back-and-forth between drafters and the courts.91 As we 
saw in chapter three, the Chancery had allowed certain devices that were impermissible at 
common law to be created by use.92 After 1536, it was established that the common law rules 
would not apply even to uses executed by the Statute of Uses. Settlors swiftly exploited this 
concession to create devices that technically broke common law rules, such as shifting and 
springing uses.93 It was also generally thought that perpetuity clauses, abhorred by the 
common law, could be effective in the limitation of a use, and they were included in a great 
number of sixteenth-century settlements.94 Their incidence even increased after 1560, at least 
in settlements made by the peerage.95 Only in a series of cases at the turn of the century were 
all forms of perpetuity clause held to be invalid.96 
 
Given the unsettled state of the law, drafters were forced to experiment. In his argument in 
Chudleigh’s Case (1595), Bacon observed that it was ‘likely that counsellors of the law have 
advised men in such cases that when the cases come to be scanned it is hard to argue how the 
law will be taken.’ However, for a hopeful settlor, there was little downside to testing a new 
form of drafting: ‘if they prove void… it is but a conveyance adventured, inconvenience there 
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is none.’97 As a result, new, and increasingly daring, forms of drafting continued to develop as 
conveyancers sought to evade the courts’ crackdown on perpetuities.98 Judges were constantly 
playing catch-up with drafters. 
 
The uncertainty caused by these novel conveyances made a deep impression on common 
lawyers. Some pointed to the deleterious social effects of perpetuity clauses: Popham CJ, for 
example, argued that they tended ‘to the subversion of noble and great families,’ because they 
‘would stir up the son… to put his father out of the land.’99 Coke employed a colourful range 
of invective against perpetuity clauses, which he described as ‘a monstrous brood carved out 
of mere invention, and never known to the ancient sages of the law.’100 Interestingly, however, 
he focused his most withering criticisms on the form of perpetuity clauses, rather than their 
substance. He described them as ‘upstart and wild provisos and limitations, such as the 
common law never knew,’ which ‘breed and multiply infinite troubles, questions, suits and 
difficulties.’101 
 
Coke had three main problems with the drafting of these clauses. Firstly, they were so widely 
drafted as to be unclear. In Sir Anthony Mildmay’s Case (1605), for example, the court objected 
to the form of a perpetuity clause that barred the tenant in tail from ‘attempting, going about 
or entering into communication’ to alienate the land. These words, the judges held, were 
 
uncertain, and void in law, and God forbid that the inheritances and estates of 
men should depend upon such uncertainty; for it is true, Quod misera est servitus, ubi 
jus est vagum, et quod non definitur in jure quid sit conatus, ne quid est [that it is a 
miserable slavery when the law is uncertain, and that it is not defined in law what 
might be an attempt, or what is] going about, etc. or communication.102 
 
Because the clause was so widely drawn, the tenant would have no way of knowing if he were 
in breach of it or not. Coke raised a similar objection in Fitzwilliam’s Case (1604), criticising 
provisions in limitations of uses that were ‘so extravagant that none shall know any rule to 
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decide the questions which arise upon them, which will produce uncertainty, the cause of 
infinite troubles, controversies and suits.’103 
 
Secondly, Coke criticised the length of these clauses. In Mildmay’s Case, he observed that 
 
in the said proviso found at large by the special verdict, there are more than a 
thousand words; whereas in our books, when tenant in tail was restrained from 
alienation, there were not twelve words, haec fuit candida illius aetatis fides et 
simplicitas, quae pauculis lineis omnia fidei firmamenta posuerunt [this was the pure view 
of that faithful and simple age, that a few lines were sufficient to ordain 
everything].104 
 
In his Commentary upon Littleton, he described contemporary deeds as ‘elephantinae chartae’ 
[elephantine charters], comparing them unfavourably to Magna Carta.105 
 
Finally, Coke objected to the novelty of their drafting. They were ‘late inventions and 
devises… such as the common law never knew,’106 which had been conjured up by ‘these new 
inventors of uses, without any approved ground of law or reason.’107 The fact that nobody had 
used such clauses before suggested that they had always been known to be ineffective.108 Coke 
admonished his reader ‘to follow approved precedents; for Nihil simul inventum est, & perfectum’ 
[nothing is simultaneously invented and perfected]109 and boasted, ‘Periculosum existimo quod 
bonorum virorum non comprobatur exemplo’ [I hold it dangerous which is not approved by the 
example of good men].110 After all, when ‘the rule of the old common law’ was applied to 
‘novelties’ like perpetuity clauses, it might ‘utterly crush them and bring them to nothing.’111 																																																								
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104 Sir Anthony Mildmay’s Case (n 96) 43a. 
105 Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, or, A Commentary upon Littleton (n 2) 81. 
Fleetwood, writing on Magna Carta, made a similar point: JH Baker, The Reinvention of Magna Carta 
1216-1616 (Cambridge University Press 2017) 243. 
106 The Reports of Sir Edward Coke (n 25) 4 Co Rep vii. 
107 Sir Anthony Mildmay’s Case (n 96) 43a. 
108 Corbet’s Case (n 96) 87b; Sir Anthony Mildmay’s Case (n 96) 42b. Arguments from an absence of 
examples were also used by other lawyers at the time: see, for example, David Ibbetson, ‘The 
Arguments in Calvin’s Case (1608)’ in Troy L Harris (ed), Studies in Canon Law and Common Law in Honor 
of R. H. Helmholz (Robbins Collection Publications 2015) 219. 
109 Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, or, A Commentary upon Littleton (n 2) 230. 
110 The Reports of Sir Edward Coke (n 44) 7 Co Rep x. 
111 Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, or, A Commentary upon Littleton (n 2) 379v. 
208 
Elsewhere, Coke cited a civilian maxim to support his view that ‘that which is most commonly 
used in conveyances is the surest way. A communi observantia non est recedendum, & minime mutanda 
sunt quae certam habuerunt interpretationem’ [There should be no departure from common usage, 
and those things which have had a certain interpretation should be changed least].112  
 
For Coke, then, problematic interpretation cases could be avoided if legal instruments were 
properly written. Writers should express their meaning clearly, using established forms of 
words, instead of dabbling in new forms of drafting. If they did so, there would be no need for 
interpretation cases at all. Uncertainty in the law was ‘hominis vitium non professionis’ [the fault of 
men and not the law], because ‘the greatest questions’ arose, ‘not upon any of the rules of the 
common law,’ but because of badly-drafted conveyances, wills and statutes.113 ‘If men,’ he 
assured his reader,  
 
would take sound advice and counsel in making of their conveyances, assurances, 
instruments, and wills… then should very few questions in law arise, and the 
learned should not so often and so much perplex their heads, to make atonement 
and peace by construction of law between insensible and disagreeing words, 
sentences, and provisos, as they now do.114 
 
Returning to the same theme in a later volume of his reports, he explained that ‘doubts and 
questions of law’ arose on ‘long and ill-penned statutes lately made,’115 on ‘late and new 
devices and inventions in assurances,’ and on ‘conveyances and wills drawn and devised’ by 
the ignorant.116 For Coke, cases on the interpretation of documents were a clear symptom of 
incompetent drafting. 
 
However, lawyers’ ire was not reserved for the drafters who had drawn up these instruments. 
They were also critical of the parties who sought to challenge them in court. Elyot, who had 
studied at Middle Temple and served as clerk to the justices of assize,117 attached blame to 
both drafters and parties, lamenting that  
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all the learned men in the laws of this realm, which be also men of great wisdom, 
cannot with all their study devise so sufficient an instrument, to bind a man to his 
promise or covenant, but that there shall be something therein espied to bring it 
in argument.118 
 
Similarly, Coke bemoaned ‘this eagle-eyed world’ in which badly-drafted wills were ‘subject to 
so many questions.’119 He seems to have suspected many parties to interpretation cases of 
acting in bad faith, deliberately misconstruing documents for their own advantage. He 
advised his readers about the ‘pretences’ that might be used to invalidate a will.120 West, 
likewise, warned that ‘things well meant by the testators’ could be ‘evil and diversely 
understood by their posterity and survivors.’121 Fulbecke, speaking in the voice of his imagined 
yeoman, described his neighbours as ‘full of sension and tension, and so cunning, that they 
will make you believe, that all is gold, which glistereth.’122 Elsewhere, he criticised lawyers 
who engaged in ‘fraud and cavilling.’123  
 
Coke was particularly preoccupied by the idea that ‘fraud and deceit abound in these days 
more than in former times.’124 He regarded deliberate misinterpretations of documents as one 
such species of fraud, arguing, for example, that the construction of a patent ‘contra intentionem 
Regis [against the intention of the King]… sounds in deceit of the King.’125 One who ‘wresteth 
or misapplieth any text, book, or authority of the law against his proper and genuine sense’ 
infringed the principles of justice.126 Elyot was even more emphatic, writing that  
 
in every covenant, bargain, or promise ought to be simplicity, that is to say one 
plain understanding or meaning between the parties… And where any man of a 
covetous or malicious mind will digress purposely from that simplicity, taking 
advantage of a sentence or word, which might be ambiguous or doubtful, or in 
some thing either superfluous or lacking in the bargain or promise, where he 
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certainly knoweth the truth to be otherwise: this in mine opinion is damnable 
fraud, being as plain against justice as if it were enforced by violence.127 
 
Again, such worries may have been linked to contemporary concerns about the deliberate 
misinterpretation of the law more generally. Exploiting the newfound accessibility of the law, 
lay pamphleteers were circulating creative misrepresentations of statutes.128 In 1661, the 
lawyer Fabian Phillipps drew a link between these and misconstruals of the Bible. ‘They that 
could then misinterpret scripture,’ he complained, ‘abuse the plain and genuine sense and 
meaning of all our laws.’129  
 
Others in the legal profession criticised the lawyers who exploited drafting errors on behalf of 
their clients. Thomas Wilson, for example, castigated lawyers in his Art of Rhetoric, griping that,  
 
rather than fail, they will make doubts oftentimes where no doubt should be at 
all. ‘Is his lease long enough,’ quod one? ‘Yea sir, it is very long,’ said a poor 
husbandman. ‘Then,’ quod he, ‘let me alone with it; I will find a hole in it, I 
warrant thee.130 
 
Wilson was a doctor of the civil law, but seems to have been writing for an audience of 
common lawyers.131 Another civilian, Swinburne, warned that no matter  
 
how favourable soever the law be toward dead men’s wills, the lawyers are not so 
favourable to their clients, and therefore if it were but to avoid long and costly 
suits, it is meet that the testator utter his mind, as plainly and certainly as he 
can.132 
 
No matter who was at fault, however, it was agreed to be highly undesirable that such cases 
were coming to court. It was a commonplace of early modern England that the law had been 
instituted to order society and settle disputes. As Sjt Pollard put it, ‘certainty is the mother of 
repose, and uncertainty the mother of contention, which our wise and provident law has ever 																																																								
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guarded against.’133 Coke wrote that ‘the end of law is to settle repose, and make peace 
between man and man.’134 For early modern common lawyers, ideas of the ‘commonweal’ 
revolved around the importance of, firstly, resolving disputes with certainty and, secondly, 
ensuring that disputes did not arise in the first place.135 As a result, lawsuits were a worrying 
indication that the law was failing to fulfil its proper function.136  Laymen were not being 
properly guided on the ordering of their lives, but instead were quarrelling with their 
neighbours. Lawyers, instead of working to reconcile the parties, were fomenting these 
disputes in pursuit of fees.137 
 
Unfortunately, the lawyers who held these views were living through what was perhaps the 
most litigious time in English history.138 Between the beginning of our period and its end, 
there was an unprecedented increase in the number of lawsuits being heard at common law. 
Brooks has shown that the number of cases in advanced stages in the King’s Bench and 
Common Pleas rocketed from around 5,000 in 1560 to over 13,000 in 1580 and 23,000 in 
1606. 139  Brooks attributes much of this rise to the fact that ‘the sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries were a period of unprecedented prosperity’ for many. 140  As the 
economy developed, more disputes were inevitable,141 and litigation became affordable for 
more of the population.142 
 
Contemporary lawyers were well aware that the courts were attracting more business than 
ever before.143 Coke, for example, speculated on the causes of this ‘multiplication of suits in 
law.’144 Several of his suggestions were linked to the proliferation of written documents. For 
example, it was a time of ‘plenty, the nurse of suits,’ as more individuals engaged in financial 
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transactions.145 Similarly, ‘many questions and doubts’ had arisen on the dispersal of lands 
that had previously belonged to monasteries.’146 More individuals had become landowners, 
and were more likely to take disputes with their neighbours to the Westminster courts.147 Both 
kinds of case were likely to involve the interpretation of written instruments.  
 
Coke seems to have been correct in his intuition that legal documents were contributing to the 
spike in litigation. Brooks observes that the frequency of debt actions was increasing even in 
relative terms: in 1512, debt accounted for 58% of all Common Pleas business, a figure that 
had risen to 88% by 1640.148 Nine out of ten debt actions were brought on bonds.149 As a 
result, ‘actions of debt, and the ubiquity of written obligations in particular,’ were a major 
factor in the increase of litigation.150 The Statutes of Uses and Wills had also expanded the 
common law’s jurisdiction over other kinds of written instrument, and, as we have seen, 
created confusion that took decades of litigation to resolve.151 
 
Cases on interpretation, then, could have deleterious legal and social consequences. Coke 
warned that it would be ‘dangerous’ to depart from ‘praxis jurisperitorum’ [the practice of those 
skilled in the law] when dealing with conveyances, ‘for thereupon would rise infinite 
contentions, quarrels, and suits, which would be inconvenient.’ 152 This concern to end 
litigation was cited as a motivating influence behind many results in interpretation cases. For 
example, in Clayton’s Case (1585), it was held that a lease expressed to last ‘for three years from 
henceforth’ would terminate three years after the date of delivery, but that the time of delivery 
was irrelevant. If the parties had to calculate ‘fractions and divisions of a day,’ it would lead to 
‘uncertainty, which is always the mother of confusion and contention.’153 Similarly, in Baspole’s 
Case (1610), John Baspole was obliged to abide by the award of an arbitrator on ‘all matters’ 
between him and William Freeman. 154  Baspole objected that the arbitrator had not 																																																								
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considered all matters at stake between them, and that he was therefore under no obligation 
to abide by the award.155 The court held that the arbitrator’s duty was only to consider all the 
matters referred to him by the parties.156 ‘If other construction should be made,’ the judges 
explained, ‘many arbitraments might be avoided’ by concealing a secret cause of action, ‘et 
expedit reipublicae ut sit finis litium’ [and it is for the public good that litigation come to an end].157  
 
7.4.  Lay perceptions of  legal interpretation 
 
It was not just lawyers who were concerned about the state of legal interpretation. Attacks on 
the legal profession by both moralists and satirists had become increasingly vehement since 
the Reformation.158 We have seen that, in our period, laymen were more involved with legal 
documents than ever before, living ‘in a matrix of parchment and paper.’159 We have also 
seen that many more people were learning to use legal texts, and more were becoming 
involved in legal disputes concerning written documents. It is therefore unsurprising that 
many of these attacks focused on problems with legal instruments and their construction. Two 
popular complaints about the law echoed lawyers’ concerns about interpretation: firstly, legal 
documents were too difficult to understand, and, secondly, lawyers were exploiting the process 
of interpretation for their own advantage. 
 
E. W. Ives argues that many complaints about lawyers arose from the fact that they were 
‘unintelligible to laymen.’160 Many people in England were illiterate, and therefore incapable 
of deciphering the documents that regulated their lives. 161 Even those who could read, 
however, found that legal instruments were full of incomprehensible jargon, the effects of 
which could only be guessed at. The language of common lawyers was a popular target of 
satire.162 In plays, the stock character of a lawyer often spoke in impenetrable legalese, which 																																																								
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was humorously misunderstood by the other characters.163 In George Ruggle’s 1615 play 
Ignoramus, for example, the eponymous lawyer uses absurd Latin constructions, offering his 
beloved Rosabella ‘garteros, spanica ruffos’ and ‘cambrica smockos.’164 He then makes her a lengthy 
offer of jointure, enumerating so many appurtenances to the land (‘forests and woods, gorses, 
heaths, moors, salt marshes, fresh marshes, land, turfing land, elm-bearing land, mossy land, 
pasturage on common land’ and so on) that he runs out of breath. A concerned bystander 
asks if he is ‘well in his wits’ and compares him to a parrot.165 Later in the play, his legal 
jargon is mistaken for a magic spell166 and the other characters attempt to carry out an 
exorcism.167 Edward Tucker notes that lawyers in this period were commonly associated with 
the Devil,168 who was himself reputed to speak in an unknown language.169 
 
Unable even to understand legal documents, laymen began to fear that they could easily be 
exploited by their lawyers.170 The stock character of a lawyer was greedy, amoral and 
duplicitous, prepared to argue anything for the right fee. 171  Ignoramus’s first name is 
Ambidexter,172 and he makes ‘truth, no truth, and no truth, truth.’173 Many complaints about 
lawyers’ tactics focused on abuses of court procedure, arcane rules of pleading, and the use of 
writs of error to overturn judgments.174 However, the law of interpretation was another easy 
target. A layman would naturally expect his deed to have a clear meaning. If it turned out not 
to have its intended effect, he would either blame the inadequacies of the drafter or the 
cunning of his opponent’s counsel. In plays, lawyers ‘played cheap tricks with legal 
technicalities in hopes of a quick and easy profit.’175 Ignoramus’s clerk, Dulman, congratulates 
him because he has ‘tickled the point of the law’ by raising suspicions about the validity of a 																																																								
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deed.176 Ignoramus then warns Dulman not to get a single letter wrong in an indenture he is 
drawing up, ‘for in law but one comma misplaced, overthrows a whole plea.’177 In Samuel 
Daniel’s 1605 play The Queen’s Arcadia, an aspiring lawyer boasts that he can 
 
make the gloss to overthrow the text;  
I can allege, and vouch authority, 
T’embroil th’intent, and sense of equity: 
Besides by having been a notary, 
And us’d to frame litigious instruments 
And leave advantages for subtlety,  
And strife to work on, I can so devise 
That there shall be no writing made so sure 
But it shall yield occasion to contest 
At any time when men shall think it best.178 
 
Here, lawyers and notaries are presented as colluding to ensure that legal documents are 
unreliable. The notary deliberately leaves the instrument open to ‘subtlety and strife.’ 
Meanwhile, the lawyer is able to ‘vouch authority’ so that the original intention behind the 
document is disregarded by the courts. 
 
The interpretation of private instruments was most likely to cause complaint amongst laymen. 
After all, these were the legal documents with which they would have been most frequently in 
contact. However, the interpretation of laws was also a matter of great political concern, 
feeding into a general culture of suspicion towards legal interpretation. Some accused lawyers 
of manipulating legal interpretation to serve the interests of the Crown. The 1559 Mirror for 
Magistrates, for example, opened with a poetic diatribe against Tresilian CJ ‘for misconstruing 
the laws, and expounding them to serve the Prince’s affections.’ In this telling, corrupt judges 
admitted that  
 
the laws we interpreted and statutes of the land, 
Not truly by the text, but newly by a gloss: 
And words that were most plain when they by us were scanned 
We turned by construction like a Welshman’s hose, 
Whereby many one both life and land did lose.179 																																																								
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Later in our period, however, lawyers were more likely to be accused of making constructions 
that were hostile to the Crown. James I echoed the words of Mirror for Magistrates, complaining 
to Coke that ‘if the judges interpret the laws themselves and suffer none else to interpret, then 
they may easily make of the laws shipmen’s hose.’180 This is another image that also circulated 
in contemporary religious debate. In 1567, John Jewel, the Bishop of Salisbury, criticised 
Catholics who treated scripture like ‘a shipman’s hose,’ ensuring that ‘they may be fashioned, 
and plied all manner of ways, and serve all men’s turns.’181 The King himself made the link 
between Biblical hermeneutics and legal interpretation, complaining that ‘the judges are like 
the papists. They allege scriptures and will interpret the same.’182 
 
James’s hostility ensured that criticisms of legal interpretation had an influential audience. 
Ignoramus was premiered for the King, who enjoyed it so much that he insisted on watching it 
twice, despite its ‘extreme length.’183 It is recorded that this ‘nettled the lawyers.’184 In 
particular, the play took aim at Coke, and his approach to legal language.185 On one account, 
the performers ‘dressed Sir Ignoramus like Chief Justice Coke and cut his beard like him and 
feigned his voice.’186 James was well aware that Coke was being mocked by the production. 
Another account tells that, when the actors manufactured a disruption to the play, he cried 
that it was ‘a plot of Coke’s’ to prevent them from continuing.187 Coke’s approach to 
interpretation was therefore under scrutiny in the highest quarters. After Coke’s downfall, the 
King advised the courts to make their  
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interpretations… always subject to common sense and reason. For I will never 
trust any interpretation, that agreeth not with my common sense and reason, and 
true logic. It must not be sophistry or strains of wit that must interpret, but either 
clear law, or solid reason.188 
 
Judges who based their decisions on ‘niceties,’ he warned, had introduced a ‘corruption’ to the 
common law which must be ‘purged.’189 While James was concerned with the interpretation 
of the law itself, his criticism must have contributed to a climate in which any kind of legal 
interpretation was not only disreputable, but also politically perilous. 
 
Ross observes that, in the Elizabethan and early Stuart periods, ‘streams of criticism of 
common law and lawyers’ were flowing from the press. Lawyers were accused of ‘corrupt[ing] 
the equity of law with false glosses, twisting words in search of payment’ and manipulating 
‘technicality in favour of local notables and the rich.’190 The inadequacies of the law, and of 
legal interpretation, were repeatedly pointed out by ‘poets, dramatists, historians, landed 
gentry, ministers, scholars, satirists, and merchants,’ not to mention the King himself.191 
Common lawyers’ changing attitudes to interpretation must therefore be seen in this context 
of overwhelming hostility. 
 
7.5. Interpretation and uncertainty 	
Legal interpretation, then, was a cause of general concern. Lawyers and laymen alike thought 
that cases requiring the construction of documents were only coming to court because of 
unskilled or reckless drafters; contentious, if not actively deceitful, parties; and greedy, 
manipulative lawyers. The result, it was generally agreed, was likely to be uncertainty in the 
law. Judges, forced to guess at a writer’s meaning, would come to different conclusions about 
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The uncertainty of the common law was a frequent cause of complaint in our period.192 David 
Chan Smith argues that the common law was becoming a victim of its own success. Its 
‘sixteenth-century fluorescence’ had brought about intellectual transformation,193 but also led 
to fears that the law was becoming confused and uncertain.194 Thomas Starkey, an enthusiast 
for the civil law,195 described the common law as ‘without order or end,’ so that there was ‘no 
stable ground therein nor sure stay, but everyone that can colour reason maketh a stop to the 
best law that is before time devised.’196 The abundance of new information and texts about 
the law made it difficult for anyone to get a handle on the material.197 Complaints grew more 
vociferous as the century wore on. Bacon described ‘the uncertainty of the law’ as ‘the 
principal and most just challenge that is made to the laws of our nation at this time,’198 while 
the King lambasted the ‘uncertainty’ that was found in the common law.199  
 
The result of this uncertainty, it was feared, would be an unsettling of estates in land. We have 
seen that the courts were increasingly suspicious of drafters. However, counterbalancing this 
was their concern that judicially-sanctioned conveyancing practices ought to be maintained, 
so as not to undermine estates. After all, many conveyances were not challenged in court until 
generations after they had been drawn up.200 Departing from the common practice in such 
cases therefore risked destabilising many similar settlements. In Dowman’s Case (1586), for 
example, the question was whether a declaration in an indenture could direct the uses in a 
previous common recovery.201 The court held that it could. ‘Great inconvenience,’ they 
warned, ‘would ensue’ if not, ‘for the inheritances of many subjects in England depend upon 
such declarations subsequent.’202 Furthermore, their conclusion agreed ‘with the common 
opinion of men learned in the law, and common experience; and the alteration of such 																																																								
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opinions which concern assurances of inheritances would be too dangerous.’203 Similarly, 
Moore argued that it would be ‘mischievous’ to construe a proviso in a feoffment to use so as 
to suspend the settlor’s power of revocation.204 His explanation was that ‘all great lords and 
gentlemen have made many small leases of part of their possessions.’ It would therefore be 
‘utterly contrary to reason and equity’ to prevent them from altering the uses to provide 
jointures or income for their younger children. 205  For ‘proof that the law allows this 
construction,’ he offered the fact that it was ‘the common case’ to include such a proviso in 
the limitation of a use.206 
 
Coke’s concerns about novel drafting and excessive litigation were also linked to his desire for 
certainty in the law. ‘The ancient judges and sages of the law,’ he explained, had always 
‘suppressed innovations and novelties… lest the quiet of the common law might be 
disturbed.’207 It was important not to let doubt be cast on conveyances because of their 
importance to estates. Fines and recoveries, for example, were ‘like to the pole Arctic and 
Antarctic, for upon those assurances of lives depend.’208 Similarly, judges in interpretation 
cases ought to prioritise the certainty of estates: Coke lauded cases in which documents were 
‘well expounded for the quieting of the possessions of many.’209 
 
Some lawyers remarked on the irony that written documents, which ought to have been used 
to settle estates, were in fact being used to foment uncertainty. As we saw in chapter one, 
Phayer had praised written documents as a means of ensuring that ‘matters of doubt are put 
out of question,’ ‘contention avoided, unity and concord induced, virtuous and politic order 
observed,’ and lives lived ‘in quiet.’210 ‘As a trusty anchor,’ he explained, they held ‘the right 
of every man’s possessions safely and surely against all troublous and stormy tempests of 
injuries.’211 However, when the instruments were badly drafted, certainty and peace would be 
actively subverted. Written documents would lead to ‘great incommodities and danger… 																																																								
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between man and man,’ and be ‘a very great occasion of wrangling and strife.’212 For Coke, 
too, problems with written documents were a major cause of uncertainty in the common law. 
As we saw above, he argued that ‘the greatest questions’ in law arose, ‘not upon any of the 
rules of the common law,’ but upon badly-drafted conveyances, wills and statutes.213 Again, 
these led to uncertain, and potentially ruinous, ventures into interpretation. It was, Coke 
observed, ‘full of great inconvenience’ when nobody knew ‘what construction to make, or 
advice to give’ about the meaning of a will.214 He lamented that ‘intricate and subtle questions 
in law daily arose upon the validity and construction of wills of lands… to the ruin of many 
and hindrance of multitudes.’215 
 
How, then, did lawyers respond to the problem of uncertainty in the law? Many advocated 
improvements in the common law method. It was not the law itself, they explained, that was 
at fault, but those who had failed to understand it properly. Coke, for example, criticised 
civilians who had condemned the common law as ‘dark and obscure’ on the basis of a ‘sole 
and superficial reading.’216 Lawyers began to publish pedagogic texts, offering clear and 
rational explanations of the common law’s rules.217 Fulbecke admitted that the ‘weakness of 
man’s memory cannot tolerate the multitude of particular laws.’218 As a result, some thought 
that the law was ‘an art obscured with difficult cases, shadowed with conceited terms, and, as 
it were, covered with clouds and wrapped in darkness.’219 However, the law was actually 
‘bounded by certain rules and limits,’ and could be ‘comprehended and delivered in certain 
general precepts.’220 If a student properly understood the law’s general principles, he would be 
able to apply them to any particular case that might arise, and need not be troubled that ‘the 
law books are so huge, and large, and that there is such an ocean of reports.’221 The law was 
‘definite in itself,’ and the ‘science itself is short and easy to one that is diligent.’222 
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As we saw in chapter six, many of these books gave a leading place to legal maxims.223 Bacon, 
for example, compiled his collection of maxims in order to ‘establish and settle a certain sense 
of law which doth now too much waver in uncertainty.’224 He argued that it was vital to 
reduce the laws ‘to more brevity and certainty’ in order that, inter alia, ‘the great hollowness 
and unsafety in assurances of lands and goods may be strengthened;’ ‘the counsellor better 
warranted in his counsel;’ and ‘the contentious suitor that seeketh but vexation disarmed.’225 
Many of Bacon’s maxims related to the interpretation of documents: for example, ‘verba fortius 
accipiuntur contra proferentem’ [words should be taken more strongly against the one who put 
them forward];226 ‘verba generalia restringuntur ad habilitatem rei vel personae’ [general words should 
be confined to the character of the thing or person]; 227  and ‘non accipi debent verba in 
demonstrationem falsam, quae competunt in limitationem veram’ [words should not be taken according 
to a false demonstration if they make sense according to a true limitation].228 
 
Bacon seems to have regarded problems with interpretation as more or less inevitable. He was 
troubled by the difficulty of conveying meaning through language: 229 in his extra-legal 
writings, he observed that words could inhibit understanding if they represented things in an 
inaccurate or confusing way. 230  When discussing the law, he acknowledged the ‘many 
questions and doubts about construction of words’ that arose when ‘every judge’ had ‘a 
several sense’ of the parties’ intentions.231 As a result, he explained, the law needed tiebreaker 
rules, such as the contra proferentem maxim, which would give judges ‘a sway to take the law 
more certainly one way.’232 He thought that a clear and rational system of rules would help to 
moderate the inevitable uncertainties of interpretation. If necessary, the search for the writers’ 
intentions would simply have to be abandoned in the name of certainty and the speedy 
resolution of disputes. 
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Coke seems to have been less pessimistic about the possibility of conveying meaning through 
writing. Although a written document was only a ‘dead letter,’ he believed that it might still 
convey ‘the effect of all that was spoken.’233 However, he was aware of the risk that ‘multiple 
meanings often lie under the very same words.’234 He thought that the only sure way of 
transmitting the writers’ intentions was to ensure that all parties adhered closely to the 
common law’s method. As Smith puts it,  
 
Coke believed that it was the obligation of both writer and reader to follow a 
method, to write and read in a particular way that made plain the memory of the 
law in the text and so exposed the ‘right reason and rule of the law.’235  
 
As we have seen, Coke largely blamed two actors for problems with interpretation: writers 
who failed to explain their meaning, and readers who failed to understand it. The law, he 
explained, was ‘not uncertain in abstracto, but in concreto,’ and there were two causes of this 
uncertainty: ‘praepostera lectio and praepropera praxis, preposterous reading and over-soon 
practice.’236 Both reader and writer must be aware of the same interpretive conventions in 
order to correctly identify the meaning of the text. 
 
Thus, like many of his contemporaries, Coke argued that the problem of uncertainty could be 
solved if the rules of the common law were properly understood by all. We saw in chapter six 
that Coke’s reports were intended as a means of instructing other lawyers in these rules.237 He 
hoped to present the common law as a clear and rational system of maxims and precedents, 
rather than a confusing mass of case law. He was publishing his reports, he declared, ‘for the 
common good… in quieting and establishing of the possessions of many in these general 
cases, wherein there hath been such variety of opinions.’238 Legal certainty required that there 
be clear rules for the interpretation of both the law in general and private instruments in 
particular. As we have seen, Coke emphasised the role of ‘artificial reason’ in interpretation, 
encouraging lawyers to ground their arguments on established principles, rather than broad 
appeals to their own ‘natural’ reason.239 																																																								
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However, it would be a mistake to think of Coke’s approach to interpretation as in any way 
formalistic. He was well aware that relying on strict rules of construction encouraged a 
quibbling approach to documents. Quibbling was not just associated with fraud, but also 
raised the spectre of uncertainty just as surely as a lack of rules did. In Roger Earl of Rutland’s 
Case (1608), for example, the King had granted the herbage and pannage of Clipson Park to 
the Earl of Rutland, although it was then in the possession of Thomas Markham. The 
defendant argued that the patent was void for uncertainty, since the grant could not take 
effect during Markham’s term, and there was no indication of when it was meant to begin.240 
The court held that it was clearly intended to commence when Markham’s term ended. Coke 
castigated the defendant, complaining that ‘of late times such nice and strict construction hath 
been strained by some of letters patent, to subvert the force and effect of them.’241 The result 
was that ‘many good letters patent are drawn in question, which is to the King’s dishonour, 
the disherison of the subject and against the true reason and ancient rule of the law.’242 He 
concluded that ‘such nice and captious pretence of certainty, confounds true and legal 
certainty, et maledicta expositio est quae corrumpit et confundit textum’ [and it is a bad exposition that 
corrupts and confounds the text].243 ‘Apices juris,’ he reminded his reader, ‘non sunt jura’ [points 
of law are not laws].244 Charles Donahue has argued that, for continental humanist scholars, 
the ‘apices juris’ were rules of strict law that must give way to equity.245 Similarly, Coke 
recognised that clear rules of interpretation must sometimes be compromised in order to 
achieve ‘true and legal certainty.’ 
 
Coke also referred to this maxim in cases that concerned the misnomer of corporations.246 
Here, too, he criticised parties who relied on legal technicalities, warning that ‘too much 
niceness and curiosity’ in the law would result in conveyances being, ‘against all honesty and 
just dealing, impeached and overthrown.’247 Until ‘this generation of late times,’ he lamented, 
corporations had never sought to avoid their grants on the basis of a ‘curious or nice’ 																																																								
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misnomer, and ‘what suits and troubles thence ensued, everybody knows.’248 The proper 
approach to misnomer, on the other hand, would ensure ‘the surety and quiet’ of both 
corporations and ‘their farmers and others claiming from them… for estates, covenants, and 
other things made unto them.’249  
 
Again, we see Coke’s recognition that different approaches to interpretation were possible. In 
the medieval period, there was little discussion of the principles used to understand a 
document.250 By the mid-sixteenth century, we have seen that lawyers were beginning to 
analyse their own interpretive techniques. However, writers like Plowden presented only one 
correct way of construing a document. Coke, on the other hand, acknowledged that there 
were multiple possible approaches to construction, each of which had its own pros and cons. 
Too much emphasis on certainty subverted certainty by encouraging quibbling.251 Too much 
emphasis on reason, meanwhile, subverted reason by encouraging ‘infinite contentions, 
quarrels, and suits.’252 Only through a deep understanding of the common law’s reason could 
lawyers successfully chart a course between this Scylla and Charybdis. 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that not all lawyers were distressed by the uncertainty that resulted 
from a proliferation of interpretive choices. As a senior judge and politician, Coke was 
naturally concerned with the direction of the common law, and keen to set it on what he saw 
as the right path. We have seen, however, that practising lawyers do not seem to have shared 
his qualms: indeed, they were notorious for exploiting this multiplicity of interpretive options 
for their clients’ best advantage. That this was not a baseless stereotype can be seen by 
examining Egerton’s draft arguments from the 1580s, before his judicial appointments and his 
association with the Chancery. These arguments were not written for publication; Egerton’s 
only concern was to advance the interests of his clients. As a result, he was not interested in 
presenting the law as a coherent and intellectually satisfying system, but in identifying and 
manipulating its ambiguities. It is clear that Egerton found considerable room for manoeuvre 
in arguments over the interpretation of documents. In some cases, he argued that the court 
must disregard ‘the natural property’ of words and instead apply them to ‘the meaning of the 
parties,’253 even when interpreting a condition.254 In other cases, however, he insisted that 																																																								
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conditions must be ‘taken strictly according to the words.’255 Sometimes, he would claim that 
the words of a will were only ‘dead elements’;256 at other times, he would emphasise their 
importance for establishing the intention of the testator.257 By tactically selecting cases from 
the Year Books and Plowden’s and Dyer’s reports, Egerton was always able to multiply 
citations in support of his favoured approach to construction. 
 
Egerton’s papers demonstrate that practising lawyers were benefiting from the contemporary 
uncertainty about interpretation. Egerton clearly believed that all of his arguments had at 
least a chance of appealing to the court. It would be a rare case in which he could not muster 
some support for his client’s preferred construction of a document. It is perhaps notable that 
in none of his arguments did Egerton express any concern about the consequences of the 
uncertainty generated by the law of interpretation. When he did express doubts about the 
place of interpretation, they were based on philosophical or theological writings, rather than 
the state of the contemporary common law.258 Laymen and statesmen may have fretted over 




In our period, issues surrounding the interpretation of private documents were a microcosm 
of issues in the common law more broadly. Thanks to the intellectual flourishing of the 
sixteenth century, lawyers were increasingly insecure about legal knowledge. They were also 
under pressure from societal changes, as legal instruments were put to new and rapidly 
evolving uses and litigation rates soared. The law of interpretation was caught up in these 
changes. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, it was a target for criticism by the 
profession, the public, and even the Crown.  
 
In the mid-sixteenth century, writers like Plowden had taken for granted that the meaning of a 
document was immanent within it, waiting to be drawn out by the interpreter. By the end of 
the century, Coke and his contemporaries had admitted that the construction of a document 
was the product of choices made by the reader. They were deeply troubled by the possibility 
of misinterpretation and its potentially far-reaching consequences. If the documents upon 
which estates were based could be unsettled, the commonwealth itself would be destabilised. 																																																								
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Grasping for certainty, lawyers sought to retrench. They began to place more emphasis on the 
words of a document, on previously-judged cases, and on specific interpretive maxims. These 
developments in the law of interpretation only mirrored trends in the law more generally. 
 
To an extent, however, these attempts to correct the law’s course created a feedback loop. 
Lawyers thought that focusing on clear rules and precedents would reduce uncertainty. 
However, their shifting approach to interpretation itself created new uncertainty about 
legitimate techniques for construing documents. As the law of interpretation remained in flux, 
lawyers like Egerton were able to exploit it for their own advantage, spinning potential 
meanings without clear limits. Coke himself seems to have been aware that it was futile to pin 
down rules for interpretation. Although he repeatedly lauded the importance of both reason 
and certainty, he admitted that both, taken to their extremes, would be self-defeating. Unlike 
Plowden, he saw interpretation as a dangerous endeavour, with potential disaster lurking at 
every turn. 
227 
8 .  C L O S I N G  R E M A R K S  
 
Wigmore dismissed the early modern law of interpretation as marred by the ‘stiff and 
superstitious formalism’ of ‘primitive minds.’1 Hampered by their ‘scholastic technicality,’ 
lawyers viewed each word as a ‘fixed symbol’2 and were unaware of the principles of ‘rational 
interpretation.’3 When dealing with wills, they did not engage in ‘a liberal and sympathetic 
search for testators’ meaning.’ 4 When construing deeds, they preferred to ‘treasure the 
shibboleths of conveyancing’ and their ‘store of esoteric learning’ rather than permitting ‘any 
liberality of interpretation.’ 5  Wigmore concluded sorrowfully that some contemporary 
‘judicial utterances seem now obstinate enough in their blindness.’6 
 
It has been the argument of this thesis that, pace Wigmore, early modern common lawyers 
took a thoughtful and sophisticated approach to the interpretation of private documents. 
Wigmore’s remarks were based on a reading of Broke CJ’s judgment in Throckmerton v Tracy 
(1555),7 which, as we have seen, was not necessarily representative of lawyers’ views in this 
period. 8  To a great extent, judges did take a ‘liberal and sympathetic’ approach to 
interpretation, which prioritised the identification and implementation of the parties’ 
intentions. When they hewed more closely to the words of the document, it was as a result of 
genuine concerns about a lack of clarity in the law and the uncertainty that this could cause. 
In either case, the courts’ approach to interpretation was based on complex theories about the 
nature and purpose of law, language and legal instruments that were anything but ‘primitive.’ 
 
In chapter two, we saw that lawyers used the rules of grammar and legal precedents to 
establish the signification of words in a document. However, since they were aware that a 
word might bear multiple meanings, this was only the beginning of their enquiry. Chapter 
three investigated the relationship between the ‘proper signification’ of the words used by the 
writer and the meaning that he had intended to give them. It was established that this 
relationship varied depending on the kind of document at issue. The meaning of the words 																																																								
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was more important when construing a deed than it was for construing a will or the limitation 
of a use. This was justified with reference to differences in the creation, context and purpose 
of each document. The balance struck by the courts also changed over time. As the sixteenth 
century wore on, lawyers became more reluctant to allow the writer’s intentions to trump the 
signification of his words when interpreting any kind of document. 
 
Chapter four examined the nature of the intentions that the courts were invoking. The 
intentions of a testator were understood differently to those of the parties to a deed. Only the 
testator’s intention had to be taken into account when interpreting a will, but the intentions of 
both parties were relevant to the interpretation of a deed. In chapter five, we saw how this 
affected the means by which those intentions were identified. In both cases, lawyers looked at 
the words of the instrument and the circumstances in which it was made. However, they were 
also prepared to make presumptions about what reasonable parties to a deed would have 
intended. They were much more reluctant to make similar presumptions when interpreting a 
will. Chapter six explored the role of reason further. We saw that it changed throughout our 
period, as lawyers became less content to rely on a priori reason. Instead, they grew more 
reliant on the authority of previously-judged cases, their effects often distilled into specific 
interpretive rules and maxims.  
 
The changes identified throughout this thesis formed part of the same general trend. In the 
mid-sixteenth century, interpretation was a broad and flexible process, in which lawyers relied 
on their own reasoning faculties to identify the intentions of a writer. By the end of the 
century, the process of interpretation was becoming more structured. Lawyers focused more 
closely on the words of the document, and relied on precedents and rules to guide them. In 
chapter seven, we investigated the background to this shift. We saw that, by the end of the 
sixteenth century, lawyers had grown insecure about legal interpretation. They were worried 
that its formlessness could lead to uncertainty, and threaten the stability of the whole common 
law. The changes in their approach to interpretation must therefore be seen in a broader 
context of anxiety about the law and legal documents. In this period, fears about the direction 
of the common law in general often coalesced around issues in the law of interpretation.  
 
Some issues raised by this thesis remain to be fully explored. Firstly, it has not been possible, 
except in the briefest of terms, to discuss the interpretation of legal documents other than 
deeds and wills.9  An important next step is to expand this study to cover other legal 
instruments with which the courts frequently dealt: in particular, statutes and letters patent. 																																																								
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This would provide a comprehensive overview of interpretation at common law in this period. 
By comparing the courts’ approach to these different kinds of document, it would be possible 
to identify ideas that applied to all kinds of interpretation, and those that were specific to 
particular instruments. This thesis has also focused on the practice of the common law courts. 
Future research could expand its scope by comparing interpretive methods at common law to 
those used by the contemporary courts of equity or ecclesiastical courts in England. 
 
Secondly, more could be done to identify other sources of ideas about interpretation that 
influenced common lawyers. For example, at a number of points, we have observed that 
common lawyers drew on works of civil law, rhetoric or philosophy for their understanding of 
interpretation.10 However, within the scope of this thesis, it has not been possible to trace 
these influences in detail. This should be a fruitful avenue for future research. We have also 
noted that issues raised by legal interpretation were, in many ways, similar to issues 
surrounding other kinds of interpretation in early modern England, such as Biblical 
hermeneutics.11 The research in this thesis could therefore feed into broader debates about 
Renaissance attitudes to writing and meaning. Finally, this thesis has focused on lawyers’ 
understanding of language and legal instruments, but we have seen that laymen were often 
unhappy about the way in which their words were interpreted by the courts.12 Future research 
could further explore the tensions between writers’ and readers’ understandings of their 
documents. 
 
In William Shakespeare’s Henry VI, Part Two, composed in the 1590s,13 Jack Cade decries the 
profound effects a legal instrument can have when it gets away from its writer. ‘Is not this,’ he 
asks,  
  
a lamentable thing, that of the skin of an innocent lamb should be made 
parchment; that parchment, being scribbled o’er, should undo a man? Some say 
the bee stings, but I say ‘tis the bee's wax; for I did but seal once to a thing, and I 
was never mine own man since.14 
 
It is clear that it is vital to understand the courts’ approach to the interpretation of private 
documents in this period. As Shakespeare observed, it was an issue that concerned laymen of 																																																								
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all stations in life, who were often dependent on such documents. It was also an issue that 
contemporary lawyers cared about fiercely. Whether writing paeans to equitable construction 
like Plowden, quibbling over grammar like Dyer, reflecting on continental theories like 
Fulbecke, fretting over the dangers of interpretation like Coke, or exploiting its ambiguities 
like Egerton, lawyers spent a significant amount of their time and energy on the subject. The 
questions raised by the interpretation of private documents touched on many disparate 
aspects of early modern life and law. As they expounded its principles for the first time, 
common lawyers were treating with a topic of the utmost significance. 	 	
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